human acts of God Incarnate, bears a most important part in the Monothelite controversy: by His divine acts being understood, His various performances of things miraculous; and by His human acts, all the rest. S. Leo had laid down, as we have seen, that the two natures co-operated with each other in both classes of action; but, according to Catholic theology, the mode of co-operation was essentially different. Of His divine acts, His divine will was the proximate principle, and His human nature served only as its organ or instrument; but of His human acts, His human will was the proximate principle, and His divine will inflowed into them in the way of illumination and guidance. (See Petavius de Incarn., 1. 8, c. 13, n. 5; also c. 12, n. 9.)* On the other hand it was the very essence of Monothelism, to deny all distinction whatever between His mode of performing divine and human acts respectively; for Monothelites ascribed to Him no other activity except the divine. See Theodore, Cyrus, and Macarius, quoted by Petavius de Incarn., 1. 1, c. xx. nn. 2, 3, 4.

From these doctrinal preliminaries, we proceed to an examination of Honorius's Letters. And what we profess to establish is this that if he is supposed to possess the most ordinary clear-headedness and consecutiveness, these Letters conclusively prove him to have held the doctrine afterwards defined against Monothelism. If some imaginary opponent chooses to say, "Oh! but Honorius was a Monothelite, and all Monothelites were bad reasoners,"such an objection evidently assumes the one question at issue; viz. Honorius's Monothelism. On the other hand, when Mr. Renouf maintains that some argument, which he ascribes to Honorius, cannot possibly be a contemptible argument, because Monothelites at all events used to urge it (see e.g. page 22, note), we have every right to complain of such reasoning. have every right to complain that he should depy without any attempt at proof-what almost all Catholic writers strenuously maintain the deplorable argumentative imbecility, which characterized every branch of Eutychianism.† What we allege is, that Honorius's Letters, interpreted by the recognised laws of logic and language, present one, and one only, consistent, consecutive, intelligible sense; and that, taken in that sense, they "demonstrate him to have held the orthodox dogma as clearly and explicitly as it was held by S. Sophronius, S. Maximus, S. Martin I., S. Agatho, or S. Leo II." These words are from our article of

We

* It should be explained however, that when Christ performed miracles on earth by means of bodily acts as e.g. when He cured the blind by His touch-the proximate principle of such bodily movement was of course His human will.

+ With special reference to Monothelites, Petavius says that "he who looks for consistency of reason and judgment in their dogmata, requires from them what the nature of things does not admit."-De Incarn., 1. 8, c. iv. n. 7.

January, 1869, p. 188; and we proceeded (pp. 188–198) to argue in defence of our proposition. We are now to answer those objections against our argument, which Mr. Renouf has attempted to adduce.

We will begin with that sentence of the first Letter, on which Mr. Renouf, in company with Honorius's other opponents, lays his principal stress. "We profess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ: because plainly our nature was assumed by the Godhead, not the sin in it; that is, our nature as it was created before sin existed, not that which was corrupted after the transgression." On this sentence we commented as follows:

"The question to be here asked is most simple, and admits but of one possible reply. Is Honorius speaking in these words of Christ's divine or human will? Mr. Renouf makes the astounding remark that the context of this passage' proves its reference to the divine will. Can he be in his senses? Does he think, or did Honorius think, that Adam before the Fall was a plant? a vegetable? at the utmost a brute? Was not Adam created in possession of a will? That which he was happy in not possessing, was a second will at variance with the first. Now Honorius's distinct argument is this:-'Since Christ assumed that human nature which existed before the Fall, He has only one will, and not two.' Yet Mr. Renouf will have it, and Dr. Döllinger will have it, that the will of which the Pontiff speaks is the divine. When should we have heard the last of it, if some unlucky Ultramontane had talked such nonsense?"

To this Mr. Renouf replies (p. 19, note) that, according to Honorius, "the will is to be attributed" to the person and not to the nature (p. 20); that Honorius's argument is "there is but one Person in Christ, therefore there is but one will." We can only rejoin, that Mr. Renouf, in clearing himself from one "blunder," his fallen into another still more deplorable. The reason assigned by Honorius for Christ having only one will, is His having assumed nature innocent and not nature corrupted. Most indubitably therefore it is Honorius's doctrine, that if (per possibile aut impossibile) God the Son had assumed human nature as it existed after the Fall, there would have been two wills in Christ. But, according to Mr. Renouf, Honorius thought that the number of wills necessarily coincides with the number of persons. According to Mr. Renouf therefore, Honorius thought that, if God the Son had assumed man's fallen nature, He would thereby have become Two Persons! On this notable argument we need spend no more words.

Mr. Renouf further objects (pp. 19, 20), that the particle "unde," with which Honorius's sentence begins, proves his argument to be, that "there is but one Person in Christ, therefore

but one will."

We have just shown, on the contrary, that this cannot by possibility be Honorius's meaning. As to the particle "unde," we explained in January, 1869 (p. 192), how we understand it, and Mr. Renouf has not attempted any reply to our explanation.

Nothing then can be more certain, than that the "one will ' mentioned by Honorius is one human, as contrasted with two human and contrary wills. We sympathize heartily with F. Bottalla on this point. Every time we read these words we are amazed, that men who possess an extended and scientific knowledge of literature have been able to disguise from themselves the natural and obvious purport of these words" (p. 54).

Mr. Renouf's next objection bears on Honorius's statement, concerning such well-known expressions as "Non quod volo, sed quod Tu vis," and the like. These, says Honorius, "non sunt diversæ voluntatis, sed dispensationis (oikovouías) humanitatis assumptæ." Mr. Renouf, in his former pamphlet, said that in this passage Honorius accounts such words of our Blessed Lord as "economical expressions used for our sakes." What does this mean? we asked. "Does Mr. Renouf think that Honorius considered such expressions as used by Christ for the sake of producing on us a true or a false impression? If Mr. Renouf gives the former answer, he admits at once the perfect orthodoxy of Honorius": for he admits thereby that Honorius did ascribe to Christ a human will. But if Mr. Renouf gives the latter answer, "what is the view which he ascribes to the Pope? This, that God the Son used language which in every sense was totally mendacious, for the sake of deceiving His creatures into the acceptance of false doctrine" (p. 192). Mr. Renouf now rejoins (p. 22, note) that "the logic of this is not very apparent" but we think that it must be very apparent indeed to every careful reader except himself. We must really press for an answer to our extremely intelligible question, unless our opponent will admit himself to have been grossly in the wrong. Honorius's reference to the two contrary wills-even if that sentence stood alonewould afford (we maintain) demonstrative evidence, that he so simply and firmly held Duothelistic doctrine, as not even to suspect the existence of any other.*

We said in a note, quite incidentally (p. 195), that, as a mere matter of language, the word Siapópou" must signify "at variance," and not merely "different in entity." "different in entity." Mr. Renouf replies (p. 21, note) that we are quite mistaken. Well, if we are,

* A very similar statement to this of Honorius is quoted by Petavius (de Incarn., 1. 9, c. ix. n. 6) from S. Epiphanius. Christ spoke, says that Father, economically, yet not feigningly but truly; that He might exhibit the real existence of His human nature.

VOL. XIV.—NO. XXVIII. [New Series.]

2 D

we are mistaken in very good company. Schleusner gives only the following senses of the word "Siapopos": (1) " Siapopos": (1) "discrepans "; (2) "omne quo res dignoscitur, quod dissimilem reddit"; (3) "excellens." Liddell and Scott speak altogether similarly; and we have not thought it worth while to consult other lexicographers. We still think that, as a matter of language, "Siapópov διαφόρου θελήματος” must mean “a will differently affected"; nor can we doubt that Honorius's original expression was that which now stands in the Latin, "diversæ voluntatis." But the thing is quite immaterial.

Mr. Renouf's only remaining objection concerns a sentence in the earlier part of the Pope's first Letter, which we quoted as decisive of his orthodoxy. Christ, says Honorius, "operated divine things through the mediation of His humanity," and "operated human things ineffably and singularly in His assumed nature (carne)." Mr. Renouf (p. 18, note) considers that our argument evinces our total ignorance of the Monothelite tenets; and we in return consider that his objection evinces his total ignorance of an important Catholic dogma. Mr. Renouf declares ex cathedrâ (p. 91) that Honorius's sentence "might have been written by Theodore of Pharan," one of the Monothelite heresiarchs. Suarez on the contrary, as we have shown, considers it not only to be no Monothelistic error but to be an integral part of the Catholic Faith, that Christ wrought His divine acts through the mediation of His sacred humanity. On the other hand, no view was a more essential characteristic of the Monothelites, than their denial of all difference between Christ's mode of performing His divine and human acts respectively. On this most critical issue, Honorius pronounces orthodoxly with the greatest explicitness. It is of Christ's divine acts alone, that Honorius declares Him to have wrought them "media humanitate." Of His human acts, the Pope declares that Christ "wrought them ineffably and singularly in His assumed nature."

As to the Pope's second Letter, many critics are quite satisfied with it, even among those who regard his first as more or less unorthodox in tendency. In this Letter he declares that Christ possesses "two natures, energizing and principles of action (vepγοῦσας καὶ πρακτικάς).” And the inference which would be drawn by any one less prejudiced than Mr. Renouf would be, that the Pope was prevented indeed by a certain false pride (for which we cannot of course make any kind of defence) from seeing the very disastrous mistake he had made in discountenancing the phrase "two energies"; but that he was nevertheless induced, by what he had heard from S. Sophronius's envoys, to explain his doctrine even more unambiguously than he had explained it in his former Letter.

The various questions which concern Sergius are so very far less important, that we will but most briefly touch them.

1. It is quite certain, whatever Mr. Renouf may think (pp. 26, 27), that Sergius did practise a certain studied reticence towards the Pope: for he represented S. Sophronius and himself as absolutely agreed on all points of dogma.

Mr. Renouf urges indeed, as an objection to this view, that Sergius did not speak more clearly even in the "Ecthesis" than in his letter to the Pope. But the "Ecthesis was intended as a kind of concordat between Monothelism and Orthodoxy, not as an emphatic expression of the heretical doctrine. If you would have the latter, look at the expressions brought together by Petavius from Monothelite heresiarchs: de Incarn., 1. 1, c. xx. nn. 2, 3, 4.

2. As to what Mr. Renouf (p. 25, note) considers "the most indubitably Monothelistic part of Sergius's whole letter,-the Latin translation adds the word "contrarias"; which the Greek also gives as an alternative reading, and which entirely removes all primâ facie appearance of Monothelism. Until Mr. Renouf gives reason to the contrary, we shall continue to consider this the true reading. We so consider it, both because it is far more suitable to the context; and also because we think it improbable that the most Monothelistic part of Sergius's letter should be absent from the "Ecthesis," which was so largely founded on that letter.

3. In January, 1869 (p. 190, note), we printed the two sentences of Sergius's letter which impressed us as "most indubitably Monothelistic." Mr. Renouf points out, that the latter of these was part of a quotation, made by the heretical patriarch from S. Gregory Nyssen. See the note at p. 250 of our last number. And though the sentence which we quoted first so governs and interprets this latter sentence as to fix it (in Sergius's context) to a Monothelistic sense, yet certainly here was one reason the more for Honorius failing to see Sergius's real drift.

4. Mr. Renouf considers (p. 25) that a reply to one of our arguments is found in the circumstance, that Sergius spoke indeed of two contrary wills, but not of two human and contrary. Why, our whole argument would remain exactly what it is, if the word "human" be omitted from the only two sentences in which it occurs. Our precise meaning however would have been made. clearer, if in line 16 we had added, after the word "Sergius," the words "as understood by Honorius." We had said just before, that the Pope thoroughly coincided with what he understood to be Sergius's mind."

Now let the precise point be borne in mind, for which Sergius's letter is cited in the controversy. It will soon be seen how very