strictly infallible, except those which thus purport to claim the irreformable interior assent of all Christians.

The brief discussion which we have just concluded bears far less intimately on Mr. Renouf's second thesis than on his third; but it is by no means without importance, even as regards the former. We are next therefore to inquire who are those Popes, concerning whom it can possibly be alleged that they have ex cathedrâ condemned Honorius for professing heresy. They are these: S. Leo II., in confirming the Sixth Council; Adrian I., in confirming the Seventh; and Adrian II., in confirming the Eighth. By far the most important question however concerns the first of the three; and it is before all things necessary to understand the state of the case, as it came before S. Leo II.

After our previous argument, we shall here assume that Honorius was personally free from all taint of the Monothelite heresy, and that he did not even dream of its existence. Yet it is difficult to see how a Pope could have failed much more grievously than he, in his duty of guarding the Faith. Let us suppose that when Eutyches first broached his heresy, Pope S. Leo had earnestly exhorted the Easterns to abstain from saying that Christ is either "of" or "in" two natures, and had even denounced the question as a mischievous subtlety. Honorius's offence was as great as would have been S. Leo's in this imaginary case. Most certainly indeed he did not teach ex cathedra that the question of one or "two energies is a pernicious subtlety; this we shall establish irrefragably, in answering Mr. Renouf's third thesis: but it is certain nevertheless, that he strongly enforced, and energetically acted on, this fatal opinion. In some respects indeed, we think more unfavourably of his conduct than does Mr. Renouf; because we judge Monothelism itself with so much greater severity. A certain heresy arose, which subverted Christianity from its very foundation.* Sophronius, who had the singular merit of being its earliest noteworthy opponent, saw clearly its frightful character; and saw also, that the one hope of opposing it was the explicit advocacy of Christ's two energies. Sergius, Cyrus, and the rest, with the detestable craftiness characteristic of heresy, shrank from openly denying the two energies of Christ. They took refuge in the pitiable device, that this phrase was a mere verbal subtlety; and that to insist on it would on the one hand drive thousands out of the Church, while on the other hand it would be of no service to revealed dogma. On this vital issue, the Catholic and the heretical champion appealed to the Holy See; and the occupant of that See -beyond all doubt most unwittingly-threw for the moment its

S.

See this conclusion advocated in our number for January, 1869, pp. 186-7. See also F. Bottalla's very able remarks, pp. 1-16.

whole weight into the heretical scale.* Sergius asked him for no more than a disciplinary judgment, and he pronounced that very judgment which Sergius desired. Instead of publishing, as circumstances imperatively required, an ex cathedrâ definition in favour of S. Sophronius, he sided entirely with the heretic on that very question which the heretic submitted to him. We have already argued that, so far from being personally tainted with Monothelism, he did not even dream of its existence; and had he been merely a private individual, it would have been an indefinitely less grievous offence not to see through the heresy, than personally to embrace it. But since he was the appointed guardian of the Faith, it is difficult to see how his course would have been much more culpable, even had he lapsed unawares into heresy himself. We speak throughout exclusively of actions, without presuming to conjecture motives. But it is the simple truth, that Christ placed the Faith in his charge, and that he was false to the trust. This is the conduct which S. Leo II. held up, by an anathema, to the reprobation of all subsequent ages. †

Here, however, a very obvious question will at once be asked. If we adinit that Honorius committed almost as grievous a sin against the Faith as though he had himself fallen into Monothelism, why should we trouble ourselves to oppose Mr. Renouf's first thesis? But the answer is as obvious as the question. Ultramontanes consider the dogma of Pontifical infallibility to be the ecclesiastical foundation (if we may so express ourselves) of all certainty in believing; and they consider therefore, that no trouble can be too great in multiplying legitimate defences of that dogma. This in fact is the more necessary, because Gallican controversialists are so incredibly uncandid. However irrefragable therefore may be the proof that Honorius did not speak ex cathedrâ, it is nevertheless safer to dwell also on the most certain fact, that his Letters contain in themselves no taint of heresy. Then there is a second reason, subordinate indeed but far from unimportant. A pious opinion or augury is constantly taking deeper root in the Church, that God will never permit a Pope to lapse

* Our precise meaning in this phrase shall be explained at the end of our article.

We are bound to say, on reflection, that in portions of our article in January, 1869, we did not represent Honorius's conduct in colours sufficiently dark. We have throughout however admitted-we say this because of Mr. Renouf's passing remark in p. 31-that S. Agatho and S. Leo II. differed from each other in their appreciation of Honorius's conduct; and we have added that it was the later Pope who spoke on the subject ex cathedrâ. We have suggested that possibly the human cause of this change in the Roman view may have been information received from the Roman legates who were present at the Sixth Council.

even personally into formal heresy; and it is of some moment therefore to show, that Honorius at all events was no exception to this rule. And further, thirdly, it is absolutely necessary to dwell on the indefectible purity of Roman tradition: see p. 197 of our last number. Whereas therefore Honorius lived in the full light of that tradition, devoted Catholics are desirous of showing, that his Letters afford no presumptive evidence against the indefectibleness of that purity. We shall dwell at greater length on this very important consideration, towards the end of our article.

But none of these reasons would weigh with S. Leo II. Not the first because it was impossible for him to anticipate the future unfairness of Gallican controversialists. It was obvious on the surface, as we shall presently urge, that Honorius's Letters were not described by Pope or Council as "judgments," or "definitions," or "constitutions" of the Holy See; nor would it even occur to S. Leo that any one could imagine Honorius to have been condemned for defining untruly. Nor again would the second reason, above mentioned, weigh with S. Leo; because the pious opinion or augury in question did not then exist. As Mr. Renouf points out (p. 65), Pope Adrian II., long after S. Leo II., speaks as a matter of course of the possibility that a Pope may be personally heretical and his words (as we mentioned in July, 1868) make it probable that S. Agatho had specially instructed his legates, to permit the Easterns to judge Honorius on this very charge. Indeed, since no one maintains that God has given any promise of preserving Popes from heresy, the pious opinion which we mention would not naturally occur to the mind of Catholics, until many centuries of experience had given it probability. Then lastly, the third reason above mentioned would not occur to S. Leo: because no one fact was more conspicuously manifest at that very moment and during the whole history of Monothelism, than the indefectible purity of Roman dogmatic tradition.

On the other hand what S. Leo II. did earnestly desire, was to foster in Catholics an execration of Monothelism and of all acts and words which had in any way promoted it. It sufficed then, that once for all he authentically explained the manner in which Honorius had promoted it; and there was really no reason for his taking particular pains to disabuse people of any mistaken notion they might entertain, on the precise character of his predecessor's offence. So long as Catholics duly detested both the heresy itself and the conduct of its promoters, his purpose was fully answered.

These preliminaries having been dispatched, we approach Mr. Renouf's argument for his second thesis. And never surely was

there a stranger paradox than he is obliged to assume, in order to give this argument even a colourable pretext. There are of course no degrees in infallibility and he is obliged therefore to maintain the extraordinary proposition, that the Acts of a Council are of precisely equal authority with its Definition. Let us compare the two in this particular instance. The Definition is called "the Definition"; and is signed by every one of the bishops present, with the words "definiens subscripsi": in both these particulars it differs from the Acts. The critical question however to an Ultramontane is of course precisely this: which are those decisions confirmed by the Pope. On this head there is not so much as the possibility of a doubt. F. Bottalla states most clearly the undeniable facts of the case. We italicize a few of his words.

"The fathers of the Sixth Synod, at the end of the eighteenth session, asked the Emperor to send to all the patriarchal sees an authentic copy of the definition of faith, signed by the Council. Pope Leo II. confirmed nothing but the definition of faith; although he received all the acts of the Synod, together with the imperial edict. We have several letters of this Pope in which he either authoritatively confirms the Sixth Council, or communicates to the bishops his adhesion to it. In all and each of them he pointedly limits his confirmation and approval to the dogmatic Definition. In his official Letter to the Emperor, he declares only that he confirms the definition of the right faith. In his Letter to the bishops of Spain he tells them that he forwards to them the Definition of faith sanctioned in the Sixth Synod, the prosphonetic address to the Emperor, and his edict; he promises that he will send the whole of the conciliar Acts; but he requires their signatures to no more than the Definition of faith. He says the same in his letter to Simplicius, and in that addressed to King Ervigius. So that no doubt whatever can remain with regard to his intention being really what he expresses. Again, in what manner did he sanction the Definition of faith, and in what sense did he anathematize Honorius ? Since the holy, universal, and great Sixth Synod,' he says, has followed in everything the apostolic doctrine of the most eminent fathers, and since it preached the same Definition of the right faith which the Apostolic See of the holy Apostle Peter received with veneration, therefore we, and through our exercise of our office this venerable Apostolic See, gives full consent to the things contained in the Definition of faith; and confirms them with the authority of the blessed Peter, that, being placed on the solid rock of Christ himself, it may be supplied by the Lord with strength.'

What Pontifical approval can Mr. Renouf cite for the Acts, which approaches this ever so distantly? He points out that S. Leo II. widely circulated the Emperor's Edict, the Acts and the

Acclamations, without hinting the least disagreement from the sense of the Council (pp. 57-59). This indubitably shows that, in his judgment, the general drift and contents of Edict, Acts, and Acclamations was admirable; and that they contained nothing, from which it was desirable that he should explicitly state any disagreement. But surely Mr. Renouf will not himself allege-for he has not taken leave of his senses-that this is tantamount to imposing on all Catholics an obligation of receiving the whole with irreformable interior assent. On the contrary, as to the Definition, S. Leo placed it "on the solid rock of Christ Himself"; and all the bishops had been required to subscribe it, in token of unreserved interior acceptance. The Edict, Acts, and Acclamations were most edifying ecclesiastical documents, heartily recommended to the careful and respectful study of the faithful; but it was the Definition which was to be received, as the very voice of Peter living in his

successors.

Mr. Renouf indeed argues (p. 55) from the example of earlier Councils; but his argument recoils on himself with fatal effect. The whole question turns on the issue, whether the Conciliar decrees mentioned were the whole body of Conciliar Acts, or only the Conciliar Definitions. Now not one syllable has he alleged in favour of the former alternative, whereas he has produced one (p. 58) which pronounces incontestably in favour of the latter. In his confirmation of the Sixth Council, S. Leo II. declares that he "has received and firmly proclaims" the five preceding; and adds that he receives with like veneration the Sixth." With what veneration? He had said only the sentence before: "We consent, he had said, "to those things which have been defined by it."

So Natalis Alexander speaks concerning the Fourth Council. He is considering the question of Ibas's letter having been condemned by the Definition of the Fifth Council, after having been (as some think) absolved in the Acts of the Fourth. He denies indeed that the fact was so; but he adds the following remark: "Although [this letter] could be demonstrated to have been approved by the Council of Chalcedon, and all the bishops had subscribed to it, nevertheless it was rightly re-examined and condemned by the Fifth Council"; for S. Leo I., he adds, "limited (constrinxit) the authority of the Chalcedonian Council to its Definition of faith." (Sæculum Sextum, Dissert. 4, obj. 5, resp. 3.)

Surely indeed common sense speaks on the subject, with a plainness from which there is no appeal. The infallibility of a Council means the infallibility of what it defines; and what it defines is simply, by the very force of terms, its Definition.*

*It has been suggested to us, that our remarks may possibly be understood as denying the infallibility of the Tridentine capitula. But no fact in history