indeed that he himself abandoned the Western for the Eastern dogma. These forsooth are the critics, who deride Ultramontanes as being unhistorical! These are the critics, who allege that Ultramontanes distort facts for the sake of a theory!

F. Gratry's opponents had a very easy task before them, in replying to his puerilities; but they have done their work as carefully as though they had not to contend with a mere man of straw. We have already mentioned the Abbé Chantrel. The "Civiltà" has contributed a most admirable and complete paper on the subject; and Dom Gueranger also has treated the whole matter with the greatest care and success. On one entirely insignificant question, there is some discrepancy between the defenders of orthodoxy. The "Civiltà" writer agrees with F. Bottalla that even the Greek bishops did not condemn Honorius's Letters as Monothelistic: whereas Dom Guéranger and Abbé Chantrel adopt the view which to us has always seemed more probable; viz., that the Eastern bishops did endorse this most unjust charge, and that S. Leo II. implicitly corrected their mistake. Mgr. Dechamps, in his admirable second letter to F. Gratry, places before him both of these views, and adds that any orthodox Catholic can choose between them.

Dom Guéranger has also replied very triumphantly to F. Gratry's allegations concerning the Roman Breviary.

There is another subject, just hinted at by F. Gratry, on which we must say a few words. He comments (p. 66) on what he calls the "shameless assertions" of "certain English Catholics," that "the system of Copernicus and Galileo was false in the seventeenth century but is true and orthodox in the nineteenth, for no other reason than because the Church now authorizes it." The author of these "shameless assertions" is, it seems, the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW; and we must charge F. Gratry with the offence-we will not say of making "shameless assertions"-but at all events of bringing forward a calumnious and totally unfounded charge, on what he must have well known to be ridiculously insufficient evidence. We find from the "Revue Catholique" of February, not only that F. Gratry has never read a word of what we had written, but that even M. Martin himself, from whom F. Gratry borrows all that part of his statement which he has not himself invented,—that M. Martin, we say, also confesses to speaking merely from hearsay. It is on no better grounds than these, that F. Gratry thinks it legitimate to accuse his fellow-Catholics of "shameless assertions." M. Martin, who has never seen what we have written, ventures to put forth a report of it which happens to be entirely mistaken; and then F. Gratry, on his own hook, distorts M. Martin's report into what we must be allowed to call a preposterous travestie.*

What we have said on the Galileo case is, that we heartily concur with the ground taken up by Bellarmine and by Galileo's other theological opponents. It is a very serious thing indeed to interpret Scripture con

* We observe a letter from Abbé Morel in the "Univers" of February 16th, stating that M. Martin's statement of our view is importantly different from F. Gratry's.

trariwise to its one obvious and its one traditional sense and nothing can justify a Christian in doing so, except some decisive scientific demonstration. But in Galileo's time Heliocentricism, even on strictly scientific grounds, was not one whit a more probable theory than its rival: consequently the Roman Congregations did excellent service to orthodoxy by adopting the course they did. M. Martin, it seems, thinks that their decrees discouraged scientific investigation: but they must have done just the contrary. Bellarmine's language was this: "Let Heliocentricism be scientifically proved, and there will be no theological objection to holding it." How could such language as this discourage scientific investigation? We must refer however to our article on Galileo (Oct. 1865) for a detailed answer to the objection.

Undoubtedly, as Dom Guéranger observes, no Pope ever condemned Copernicanism ex cathedrâ. Yet Paul V. did in some sense condemn it. On Feb. 28th 1666, Galileo was solemnly warned, " in the name of our Holy Father the Pope," to abandon the Heliocentric tenet. See "Revue des Questions historiques," livraison 5, p. 98, note 2. Certainly we think we did some service to the Papal cause, when we showed how simply reasonable was Paul V.'s intervention; nay, how urgently it was called for in the interest of orthodox doctrine.

However, if F. Gratry will do us the common justice of reading our article, and if he will then do us the honour of commenting on its arguments, we promise him that we will meet his comment point by point without flinching or reserve.

Before concluding, we must revert once more to the Honorius question; because an important contribution to the controversy has appeared, since we sent our notice to press. F. Colombier, S. J., has now published four out of five papers in the "Etudes," and the fourth enters on new ground of some importance. On the whole doctrinal aspect of the case, F. Colombier takes exactly the view which to us also appears the most probable. He holds with great confidence, that the Greek bishops did condemn Honorius's letters as heretical; and adds, of course, that such condemnation was monstrously unjust. But he considers that S. Agatho died a year earlier than is commonly supposed; that the news of his death had reached Constantinople before any condemnation of Honorius was attempted; and that in this way some explanation is given of the gross injustice with which that Pontiff was treated (pp. 390, 391), in his being condemned off-hand without argument or judicial investigation. Our immediate impression, we confess, is adverse to F. Colombier's historical view but we speak with extreme diffidence, and recommend our readers to study carefully his masterly and most learned disquisition.

The "Revue Catholique," in its March number (p. 353), quotes with warm approval Dom Guéranger's statement, that the declarations of the Sixth Council " can have no œcumenical character, except in virtue of the Papal confirmation, and only in the sense and within the limits of that confirmation."

Seconde Lettre à Mgr. Dechamps. Par A. GRATRY.

Troisième Lettre à Mgr. Dechamps. Par A. GRATRY. Paris: Douniol.

F.

GRATRY'S second and third letters are in every respect worthy of his first. We will not however here enter on their argument; because it will be far more convenient to await the appearance of F. Bottalla's long-expected work on infallibility. For the present therefore we will content ourselves with submitting a somewhat obvious dilemma to the consideration of F. Gratry and his admirers.

All Gallicans consider that no definition can be truly accounted infallible, which is not confirmed by a preponderating majority of the Episcopate. We will begin then with putting this question to F. Gratry. Does he or does he not hold, that by God's promise a preponderating majority of the Episcopate will always confirm every Pontifical definition? If he replies in the affirmative, then even on his own view he must admit that such definition is infallibly true so soon as it is issued; because God has revealed that it will in due time receive episcopal assent. We must infer therefore that, according to F. Gratry, God has made no promise of the kind.

Such an event therefore as the following may, according to F. Gratry, happen at any time. On some emergent question the Pope may define on one side, and the preponderating majority of the Episcopate on another. Under such circumstances we ask F. Gratry—is there or is there not an infallible definition? According to the answer which he gives it would follow, either (1) that in certain grave cases the Church's power of deciding infallibly may be altogether suspended; or else (2) that the Pope may be under an obligation of abandoning his own dogmatic definition, in deference to an infallible adverse definition of the Episcopate.

Now F. Gratry professes to build his view on history. We ask him therefore straightforwardly-can he produce, from any corner of history however obscure, either before or after the False Decretals-any sanction whatever for either of these two doctrines? Whichever of the two he may claim as his own, he is advocating a theory as utterly unsupported by facts, as would be the theory e. g. that theological infallibility is vested by God in the Lord Mayor of London. But if in very shame he shrinks from both these amazing doctrines, then (if he would remain a Catholic) he is obliged by strict logical necessity to take up with the only alternative; viz. the dogma of Pontifical infallibility.

Les Doctrines Romaines sur le Liberalisme.

Paris Lecoffre.

Par le P. H. RAMIÈRE, S.J.

HIS is the work which the Holy Father so graciously recognizes in his

THIS is the F. Ia mière, which we have printed elsewhere. We hope

in an early number to treat the whole subject, using F. Ramière's volume as the text for our remarks.

Declaration from the Authorities of Trinity College, Dublin, presented to Mr. Gladstone February 19th, 1870.

N 1868 these gentlemen presented a petition, in which they proclaimed

purpose of promoting education based on the Protestant religion; and had faithfully fulfilled the trust imposed on it during three centuries." Not two years have elapsed since this solemn profession; and now they declare that "for the last three-quarters of a century" they have "consistently acted upon the principle of imparting to all in common the same secular education, without offending the religious convictions of any." They think then, it would seem, that "education based on the Protestant religion" cannot "offend the religious convictions of" Catholics.

The real truth is, that they will make any sacrifice rather than that Catholic denominational education should be promoted; because (however unconsciously) in real truth they see with much greater equanimity the advance of latitudinarianism, deism, and atheism, than of Catholic orthodoxy and of loyalty to the Holy See.

Catholic Ireland is a conquered country. If the conquerors still intend to govern her on the principle of antipathy to her national creed, let them openly say so.

An Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, D.D., of the Oratory. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

IT

T will be admitted by all Father Newman's readers, that this is the hardest work he has ever written. Hitherto it has been his habit to diversify his treatment of a grave subject by rhetorical and descriptive episodes, which recreate and charm the reader and give him fresh spirit for abstract thought; but in the present work he seems so sensibly influenced by the gravity of the

task which he has undertaken, as to be incapable of digression. Then, again, he is proceeding for the most part on ground, which has hitherto been almost untrodden, and on which he does but profess to furnish "aids" towards the formation of "a grammar." And the consequence of all this is, that, notwithstanding the profusion of his exquisite illustrations, and notwithstanding his marvellous command of the English language-which he always indeed moulds to his purpose as though it had been invented for the very end of expressing his thoughts-the present Essay is very hard reading.

It must not however be understood that the doctrines of this volume are in any strict sense new. Take e.g. what will probably be admitted to be the central proposition of all; viz., that a vast quantity of most momentous truth is obtainable with certitude, by reasoning which is utterly incapable of logical analysis. This proposition has always been implicitly held by Catholic theologians and philosophers: for not only (as F. Newman points out) they universally assign the "judicium prudentum" as the sole means of determining many important verities; but, in treating of moral certainty, they all lay down that a converging series of probabilities may establish a truth quite conclusively and irrefragably. But then at this point they somewhat take us by surprise. For (1), having stated so very pregnant and pervasive a principle, they leave it without any methodical treatment; and do not attempt to give protection against the imminent danger of mistaking mere prejudice for legitimate conviction. And (2) they not unfrequently elsewhere imply-what it is difficult to reconcile with their language about moral certainty-that all conclusive reasoning can be exhibited in logical and syllogistic form.

We think then that F. Newman would have rendered very important service, had he done no more than drawn prominent attention to this noteworthy lacuna. But in fact he has treated the whole subject thus opened out, in a manner which impresses us as being at once strikingly original and at the same time in profound harmony with known truths and facts. No doubt, in several particulars he has contented himself with opening a new vein of thought, without by any means attempting to exhaust it he has suggested many a principle, which he has left to others to exhibit in its full issue. But this was simply inevitable in so original a work.

On the other hand there are one or two matters on which we cannot assent to F. Newman's view. For one instance of what we mean, we think that he very seriously underrates the importance of logical analysis, as compelling men into consistency with themselves and with acknowledged facts; and as an invaluable protection against prejudice and intellectual self-will.

In the case of a work so boiling over with thought, it is impossible to give the least notion of its contents within the limits of a notice. We hope however, we may have an article ready for our July number, in which we shall be able both duly to exhibit F. Newman's line of thought, and also to express our general appreciation of its characteristics and merits.