us to proceed upon in our reafaning as to things of this nature. And otherwife, indeed, all reafoning about them would be mere childish impertinence. But ftill there is no abfolute certainty in any of our conclufions refpecting them, fince they have fome contingencies for their bafes; cóntingencies with refpect to us, but which are yet both foreknown and ordered by the fupreme Governor of the univerfe, to whom therefore we fhould always look, in an humble fenfe of both their, and our, abfolute dependence upon him. Having premifed these things once for all, and ftill keeping them in mind; I now return to the first of the propofitions laid down above; viz. THAT having loft the capital of Canada, the enemy have it not in their power to regain the poffeffion of it. To be fure, they have no Force now in America capable of doing this. Their principal and grand army has been beaten, routed, and cut to pieces: their chief military officers killed and made prifoners; and the poor remains of their regular troops, which were in that memorable battle, fent to Great Britain. If their principal force united under fo experienced and capible a commander, with other good officers, was not able to defend their capital, what can be expected, or what need be apprehended from them now, broken and difconcerted, without a fufficient number of good officers, without fpirit, and perhaps without a fufficiency of provifions and military ftores? IF this capital is regained, it must therefore be by means of large fuccours from old France; or rather by an army well fupplied and appointed, fent from thence into Canada, to join the forces already there. But this is, humanly fpeaking, impoffible. The miffi fipi is at too great a distance, and the navigation of it fuch, way! fuch, that no confiderable fuccours can come that Belides, we are in poffeffion of Niagara, the only way of communication; which fortrels might, were there occafion, be reinforced almoft with what numbers we pleafe. Neither is it to be fuppofed that an army, or any confiderable fuccours, can come to Canada by the river St. Lawrence, of which we have now the command. The British navy is fo fuperior that the ports of France, where any preparations fhould be made for this purpose, might be blocked up. Or if a fleet fhould happen to fteal out in the fpring, a fuperior one might be immediately difpatched after it, fo as to prevent its effecting any thing; and probably take or destroy it. Or a ftrong British squadron, were that judged needful, or adviseable, might be kept conftantly in the river, during the feafon for navigating it. All which things being confidered, we need be under no apprehenfions, but that we fhall be able to maintain that acquifition, which has been lately made with fo much honor to the British arms. And we will now venture to advance one step farther. as was obferved above, For, If this Capital remains in our poffeffion, all Canada muft of course be fubjected in time, even tho' we fhould here act only a defenfive part. Some may, perhaps, think this a pretty extraordinary and fanguine pofition. It admits, however, of a very fhort and eafy proof. For many European commodities are, from ufe and habit, become neceffary to the Canadians; fo that they neither will, nor can, live long without them. With thefe they cannot be fupplied from old France, as affairs are now circumftanced, either by the Miflifipi, or St. Lawrence, or any other way. Their communication with France is now effectually cut off, unless perhaps it be for letters of condoleance, which can nei ther ther do us any harm, nor themselves much good. So As things are now circumftanced, we have it in our power to act offenfively against them in fuch a manner, that the whole country may, and must be reduced in a very little time. They can receive no confiderable fuc cours or fupplies from Old France, for the reafons mentioned above. They have no cities, forts or places of defence, capable of making refistance, or holding out a fiege, even a fhort one. The country lies open to us; or rather, we have one army at least already in the heart of it. His Majefty has a large number of brave and try'd troops now in America; fo many, that all the forces the enemy can collect, probably would not dare to meet one half of them in the field: That method they have already, try'd to their coft! And tho the country should not fubmit, or be intirely fubjected this this fall, which is not indeed to be expected, confider ing how far the feafon is already elapsed; yet what fhould prevent a total conquest, even very early another feafon; when the enemy must be still in all probability, more weakened, diftreffed and difpirited, than they are at prefent? Excepting fuch things as are quite out of the ordinary courfe, nothing can prevent this. Which being confidered, the reduction of Quebec is, in effect, the reduction of all Canada, from Hudson's Bay fouthward and weftward to the great lakes and not only fo, but of all the territory which the French poffefs to the fouthward still of those lakes till, as was faid before, you come near the Miffifipi, or fome of thofe branches of it, which are at a very great distance from us. OUR next pofition was, that the reduction of this country, will be the bringing all our Indian enemies into a friendly alliance with us. For Quebec & Canada being in our poffeffion, they cannot be fupplied from thence as heretofore, with arms, ammunition and other things, which long ufe has been made neceflary to them. They must therefore come to us for them; and be obliged to court our friendfhip. And this reasoning will hold good with refpect to all the numerous favage nations, quite from the territories of Hudfons Bay. where the Indians have long been our friends, down to the great lakes, and to the fouthward of them, as far as Georgia; and Weftward, till we approach near the Miffilipi. Whereever they can be fupplied eafieft, and upon the best terms, especially if it be by those who are the most powerful on the continent, and can give them the greateft protection & affiftance in cafe of need; there they will, fooner or later, come to be fupplied. And this, probably, in a fhort time, provided thofe prudent measures continue to be profecuted with reference to to them, which have lately been used. For we fee them now daily forfaking the French intereft, coming over to us, and feeking an alliance with us. So that this reafoning is not grounded merely on hypothefis, but partly on certain fact. And it may be added here, that on the foregoing principles, the friendship of all these favages may be relied on as hearty & fincere, having not only convenience, but even neceflity for its bafis. For they cannot live, but by being and keeping on good terms with us. And fo, in fhort, they will be a barrier, if one is needed, between our fouthern colonies and the French on the Miffifipi; or, perhaps, with a little of our affiftance, fhould the war continue, make them glad to confine themselves wholly to the westward of that river. 4 SAVING the right of the natives, all the territory about Hudfon's bay, northward, weftward and fouthward as far as the bounds of Canada, already belongs to Great-Britain, where we have long had feveral forts and fettlements, of which we are ftill in poffeffion. And upon the foregoing principles, Great-Britain must of course, in a little time, be poffeffed of a territory here in North America, extending and continued from that Bay, and indeed from fome way to the Northward of it, as far as Florida to the fouthward, about two thousand miles; and extending as far back to the weftward, almoft, as we should defire; referving always, as was intimated above, to the favage nations, their juft claims, or proper rights. This is what we may, without much prefumption, promife ourselves, making proper allowance for contingencies, or things out of the ordinary courfe; on which, being unknown, we can ground none of our reafonings in this, or any other cafe. But to fay the leaft, this may probably be the confequence of reducing Quebec |