Sayfadaki görseller
PDF
ePub

If Columbanus had stated apart his proofs from history, as well as his presumptive proofs from scripture, the weakness of each, and the tendency of both would have appeared in the light I have now mentioned. With egregious skill Columbanus has kept aloof from the most natural, but to his project, most unfavourable path of argument. When he quotes scripture text, it is not enough for him to give to each word and phrase that signification, which he had resolved to find, nor to help out his translation by a supplementary gloss entirely his own; he expatiates on those his second and third-hand inferences, and bringing up another text, he adjusts it by a similar operation, so as to coincide, not even with his own gloss or his own translation of the former text, but with his parenthetic illustrations, which had nothing to do either with his gloss or with his text. This inaccuracy of reasoning and of citing may, with great probability be imputed to the ardour of an original theorist; but it must be also acknowledged, that it also has the effect of blindfolding his readers, and of persuading them, not only of the sincerity of his address, but of the fidelity of his quotations, in those very places wherein it would seem as if he had no other object in view, save that of metamorphosing in jest the passages he quotes most resolutely.

My plan shall be the reverse of that design. I will begin from that epoch, at which the profession of christian faith was relieved from the threats of martyrdom; when the interior polity of the christian

system

system, (which as most particularly set upon by the heathén persecution, had been most guardedly kept secret hitherto) came forth, avowing his offices, departments, and jurisdiction; that is to say, from the peace granted by Constantine to the christian world. From this epoch I will shew, that the legislative and judicial authority in faith and Catholic discipline, not only was exercised by bishops alone, but was recognized in them, as a fundamental point of christianity. After this examination I will commence anew from that early period, which intervened between the apostolic Era and the accession of christian profession to liberty, when Constantine acceded to independent dominion. This period, affording fewest lights to critical research into church government, especially during its first half, is the privileged field for dealers in conjecture, for declaimers on pure religionism, for the visionary condenser of probabilities, as well as for the illiterate and levelling impostor. From the annals of this period, Columbanus, as I see, has quoted nothing of doubtful authority. He has relied on scripture and I will promise nothing more, as against Columbanus, in this part, than to shew, that of all the suppositions entertained concerning the meaning of those texts, his interpretation is not only the most false, but is the most absurd; and that if even true and consistent, it would make nothing for the cause he would further.

I am, Reverend Sir, &c.

On the first General Council at Nicea.

REVEREND SIR,

LETTER II.

IF at this day, some bold philosopher should make his appearance in England, for the sole object of rectifying the British constitution on many points of importance, and should gravely publish and republish, that the authority of "judging on life and death" is the right of apprentices in the law, as much as of those who are the judges by writ, or by patent: if, to prove this assertion, he should argue thus; • Exclusive trials are unknown to all antiquity: the lawyers, from time immemorial, have sat in the 'courts, as well as the judges; they have discussed points of law; they have given opinions of the greatest authority: and, as to character, we well know, how a scat on the bench may be obtained.' If the philosopher should next direct some few animated phrases to the people at large, and conjure them,

[ocr errors]

by

by their Alfreds and their Arthurs, and their barons of Runnymede, and by the battle of Blenheim, not to suffer themselves to be imposed upon by those exclusive judges, whose domineering arrogance would corrupt the bar, and leave to the rising generation, a set of low, sneaking, intriguing, sycophantic lawyers; -if this same philosopher, on being gently reprimanded by one of the exclusive judges, should instantly attack him with bad names, deny his authority of reprimand, and conclude with declaring, that, until he found all the judges sitting in judgment with all the lawyers or their proxies, and deciding against his assertion, he would continue to hold the doctrines of his lordship to be treasonable: let me ask, what could you do with the philosopher?

Again, if a judge in any one of the supreme courts, should deny the authority of a judgment in appeal by the lords, because, in fact, he had not been present, or because he was shut out, or, though present, was not consulted; whereas, by the usage of lords in parliament, he was entitled to be summoned, and "the usage of parliament is the law of parliament;" if this judge argued, that, from the most approved Anglosaxon researches, the parliament is the convention of the wisemen, and of the nobles; which wisemen can be no other than the sages of the law; that the attempt to exclude the judges was an overt act against the constitution; that it betrayed a design of making lawless laws, and lack-learning ordinances: if our judge should lastly proclaim, that, until the exclusive com

[blocks in formation]

petence of the peers should be voted by lords and judges sitting together, he would treat the pretension of the former as usurpation, and resist every judgment so exclusively given by the peers; pray tell me, what would you do with such a reasoner as the judge? In neither case would it be possible to convince; for, no government peaceably established and recognized, will lay down, or indeed can lay down its sovereignty, during a perceptible instant, for the sake of discussing its own right to govern. No government can submit to domestic arbitration, between itself and its subordinate officers, on the point of its own usurpation, when that supposed usurpation is but a part of the established system. The philosopher and the judge cannot be refuted unless by matter of fact; that is to say, by the application of that authority which they deny.

But, although neither the philosopher nor the judge can be undeceived by arguments, it is not impossible to shew to a bye-stander, that they are both very much astray in mind. It is just so with the doctrines of Columbanus. To refute this author by that authority, which alone he declares to be genuine church authority, is totally impossible. No general council will appeal to the decision of the priests" of the second order," on the assertion of Columbanus, that these priests have a divine right or an essential right, to sit as judges of faith in councils. No bishops assembled can surrender their powers of government to arbitration; much less can they receive a new charter of their

rights

« ÖncekiDevam »