1854. SMITH v. SMITH. the omission of the signature of counsel, which is no part of the pleadings, or of the affidavit denying collusion in an interpleader suit, either of which defects may be taken advantage of by demurrer. It seems to follow, that, if a false description be inserted, so as to obviate the possibility of a demurrer, the mode of raising the objection must be by plea. The case of Rowley v. Eccles (1 S. & S. 511) seems to shew that. There a demurrer was put in, which failed, because on the face of the bill there was a sufficient statement of the place where it was alleged that the Plaintiff was residing. Then a plea was put in, that this statement was false; and it was not suggested in the argument, nor did it occur to the Court, that there was a short mode of disposing of the matter, by saying that the objection could not be taken by plea. It was said, only, that there could not be two dilatories without leave of the Court, and, therefore, the plea was ordered to be taken off the file. But it seems to me that the averments in this plea are not sufficiently distinct. The plea states that the description is false. That would be satisfied in one sense, by its being at this moment an untrue description. It would not be a moral falsehood if the assertion had been true at the time when the description was given; but it would be a false description within the literal meaning of the plea. Nor do I think that the subsequent part of the plea is a sufficient averment that the description of the Plaintiff was untrue at the time of filing the bill. It would not be a precise issue to try, and a more exact averment is necessary before the plea can be allowed. All decisions of this kind rest on very narrow grounds, because it is important that a plea should contain very precise averments. I recollect a case before the late Vice-Chancellor of England, where there was a plea that the Plaintiff had not proved the will, and the Vice-Chancellor held that the plea, having called the instrument "the will," had admitted it to be a will, and that the Plaintiff was an executor, and said that he might sue before probate. That was a strong case, but the Court on all occasions has held parties to the strictest possible form in a plea, in order that it may tender a precise issue for decision. The plea must, therefore, be disallowed, with costs. BUTCHARDT v. DRESSER. Feb. 11th. extended Orders of the 7th of August, 1852. MR. BAGSHAWE, sen., moved, with notice, for leave to enrol a Enrolment of decree made by the Lords Justices, rather more than six months Decree-Time before the motion. By this decree, the judgment of his Honour in the cause had been affirmed, and the parties now wished to carry the suit into the House of Lords. He referred to the Orders of the 7th of August, 1852, relating to appeals; and said, that, to save time, in order to be able to appeal during the present session, the course of moving at once with notice had been adopted. Mr. Osborne, contrà, objected that the motion should be made to the Lord Chancellor under Order 6. Then the appeal had been dismissed with costs, and these costs were not paid, and as this party was now asking an indulgence, the Court should put him upon the terms of first paying the costs of the appeal. VICE-CHANCELLOR SIR W. PAGE WOOD: I think, with regard to the question of jurisdiction, that it is quite clear, upon the construction of the Orders, that the motion is to be made before that branch of the Court to which the cause is attached. The 1st of the Orders of the 7th of August, 1852, provides, that there shall be no appeal after the lapse of five years. Nothing about leave is there mentioned. Then, by the 2nd Order, the enrolment of a decree is to be made within six months after it is pronounced, and not at any other time, without special leave of the Court; and by the 5th Order, no enrolment is to be made after five years from the date of the decree. Then it is provided, by the 6th Order, that the Lord Chancellor, either alone or with the Lords Justices, where it shall appear just and expedient, shall be at liberty to enlarge the periods therein before appointed for a rehearing, an appeal, or for an enrolment: that is to say, the authority that made these Orders has left it to the Lord Chancellor and Lords Justices to vary those particular periods, when the circumstances seem to require it; but the Court, under the 2nd Order, is to give leave for enrolment, that is, the Court to which the cause is attached; and I think that some very strong circumstances must be shewn to prevent the Court giving to the parties leave to appeal. Under the 2nd of the 7th of August, 1852, with respect to appeals, the Court to which any cause is at tached, and not the Lord Chan cellor and Lords Justices only, has jurisdiction to extend the time within which a decree may be enrolled beyond the pe rind of six tioned in the months men order. applying for this indulgence is The party not bound first the application. 1854. BUTCHARDT The only question then is, as to the terms on which that leave must be given. Of course, the costs of this motion and order must be paid; but I do not think that I can stay the appeal until the costs of the unsuccessful appeal to the Lords Justices are paid. Feb. 11th & 20th. Vesting Order -Trustee Act, 1850. The Court has authority to make a vesting order under the Trustee Act, 1850, in cases where there is vent a convey In the Matter of MANNING'S TRUSTS. In the Matter of THE TRUSTEE ACT, 1850. THIS was a petition for the appointment of trustees, in the place of deceased trustees, there being no power of appointing new trustees in the instrument creating the trust, and for a vesting order under the Trustee Act, 1850 (a). Mr. Pearson, for the petition, called the attention of the Court to the fact that there was nothing to prevent the trust property nothing to pre- being conveyed to the persons appointed trustees by the Court, and said that the late Sir James Parker, V. C., and Sir R. Kindersley, V. C., had refused, in such cases, to make a vesting order; but it appeared that vesting orders in like cases had been made by other branches of the Court. ance of the trust property to the trustees ap pointed by the Court. Feb. 20th. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said, that he would consult with the other Judges as to the proper course. VICE-CHANCELLOR SIR W. PAGE WOOD said, that he had conferred with the other Judges, and found that vesting orders had only been refused where the facts of the particular case rendered it improper to make such an order. None of the learned Judges had any hesitation as to the power of the Court to make such an order, though there might exist a person capable of executing a conveyance. In this case the order might be made. (a) See sect. 34, and 15 & 16 Vict, c. 55, s. 1. 1854. In the Matter of THE WINDING-UP ACTS, 1848 and 1849; Feb. 14th. In the Matter of GEORGE HERITAGE, Gentleman, one &c. THIS was a petition by the official manager, under the Wind- Winding-up Act, 1848, ing-up Acts, for the taxation of the bill of costs of Mr. Heritage, s. 50-Name a solicitor, who had acted for the mortgagees of one of the estates belonging to the National Land Company. The petition was headed "The humble petition of the Official Manager of the National Land Company." Mr. Roxburgh for the petition. of Official Manager. In a petition Mr. Chandless, Q. C., contrà, objected that the name of the quired, must be official manager was not given. Mr. Roxburgh referred to s. 50 of the Winding-up Act, 1848, which enacts, that all "proceedings" on behalf of the company "shall be commenced or instituted and prosecuted by the official manager, by the style and designation of 'the official manager' of such company." The VICE-CHANCELLOR SIR W. PAGE WOOD held, that, the objection having been made, the petition must be amended by adding the name of the official manager. stated in the petition. 3 VOL. I. [g] E. K. W. 1854. March 4th. -Society dis solved. In the Matter of THE ECLIPSE MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION; In the Matter of THE FRIENDLY SOCIETIES ACTS, 10 Geo. 4, c. 56, 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 40, and 9 & 10 Vict. c. 27. 10 Geo. 4, c. 56, THIS was the petition of John Newton and John Hard, stating s.15-Petition that they, together with one William Idle, were duly appointed trustees of the Eclipse Mutual Benefit Association, which was a Friendly Society duly enrolled; and that a sum of 25l., with some interest thereon, was standing in their joint names in the Finsbury Savings Bank. Under the Friendly Societies Acts, and particularly under 10 Geo. 4, ter a society That dissensions having arisen in the said society, it was c. 56, s. 15, af- agreed that it should be dissolved; and a plan of dissolution, stating the intended appropriation and division of the funds of the said society, as directed by the said Acts of Parliament, was adopted by the said members, to the effect, that the committee of management should sell the effects of the said society, and appropriate the stock and funds for the benefit of the membersmember to receive his proportionate or equal division of every the funds, according to the number of monthly contributions he had paid. within their provisions has been dissolved, though its affairs are not wound up, the Court of Chancery has no jurisdiction upon petition to appoint a person to convey or assure property in the possession of a trus who refuses to concur with his co-trustees in realising it, The petition stated, that the petitioners had been and were desirous to wind up the affairs of the said society in pursuance of the foregoing plan of dissolution; but that the said William Idle, although often requested to join the petitioners for the purpose of withdrawing the above-mentioned fund, had refused so for the purpose to do; and prayed that the Court would be pleased to appoint such person, as to the Court should seem meet, on behalf and in the name of the said William Idle, to transfer the aforesaid fund to the petitioners. of having it dis tributed among the members. The affidavit of the petitioner, John Newton, verified the above facts, and stated, that the society was dissolved in June, 1852, with the votes of consent of five-sixths of the existing members, testified under their hands. Mr. Roxburgh, for the respondents, took a preliminary objection to this petition, that, as it appeared upon the face of the petition that the society was dissolved, the Court had no jurisdiction, under the Friendly Societies Acts, to grant the prayer of the petition, but that the application must be by a suit in Chancery in the usual way. Mr. Doyle, for the petition, referred to sect. 15 of 10 Geo. 4, |