you may compare this with the doctrine of divine unity, and judge for yourself whether it is subversive of it or not. I cannot refuse my assent to a proposal so reasonable; nor do I feel any inclination to shrink from the task of stating our belief, and then to proffer the excuse, that every thing respecting the subject is too mysterious and recondite to be the object of distinct contemplation. What we do believe can be stated-what we do not profess to define or explain can be stated, and the reasons why we do not attempt definition or explanation; and this is what I shall now attempt.

I must not, however, be understood as pledging myself that those, in general, with whom I am accustomed to think and act, will adopt my statement, and maintain that it exhibits the best method of explaining or defending the great doctrine in question. Notwithstanding we are so often charged with adherence to forms and modes of expression contained in creeds, we use as great a variety of language, in giving instruction with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, as with respect to the other doctrines of religion. In regard to the statement which I shall make, I can say only, that it is not the result of concert, in any degree, with my clerical brethren, for the purpose of making a statement to which they will adhere. It is the result of investigation, and reflection on the subject, as it appears to be exhibited in the Scriptures, and in the writings of the leading divines whom I have been able to consult.

I believe, then,

To

I. That God is ONE; numerically one, in essence and attributes. In other words, the infinitely perfect Spirit, the Creator and preserver of all things, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, has numerically the same essence, and the same perfections, so far as they are known to us. particularize; the Son possesses not simply a similar or equal essence and perfections, but numerically the same as the Father, without division, and without multiplication.

II. The Son (and also the Holy Spirit), does in some respect, truly and really, not merely nominally or logically, differ from the Father.

I am aware, as I have hinted above, that you may find writers upon the doctrine of the Trinity, who have stated the subject of my first proposition in a manner somewhat different. But, after making due allowance for inatten

tion to precision of language, the difficulty of the subject and the various ways which men naturally take to illustrate a difficult subject, I am not aware that many of them would dissent substantially from the statement now made. Certain it is, that the Lutheran Confession exhibits the same view.

The words are,-" The divine essence is ONE, which is called, and is, God, eternal, incorporeal, indivisible, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the Creator and Preserver of all things visible and invisible." Art. I.

The Confession of Helvetia (written a. D. 1566) declares, that "God is ONE in essence or nature, subsisting by himself, all sufficient in himself, invisible, without a body, infinite, eternal, the Creator of all things visible and invisible," &c. It adds, "We detest the multitude of Gods, because it is expressly written, The Lord thy God is one God," &c.

The Confession of Basil (A. D. 1532) déclares, that there is "ONE eternal, almighty God, in essence and substance, and not three Gods." The Confession of the Waldenses states, "that the Holy Trinity is, in essence, one only true, alone, eternal, almighty, and incomprehensible God, of ONE equal indivisible essence."

The French Confession (A. D. 1566) says, "We believe and acknowledge ONE only God, who is ONE only and simple essence, spiritual, eternal, invisible, immutable, infinite," &c.

The English Confession (A. D. 1562) states, that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," be of ONE power, of ONE majesty, of ONE eternity, of ONE godhead, and ONE substance. And, although these three persons be so divided that neither the Father is the Son, nor the Son is the Holy Ghost nor the Father, yet nevertheless, we believe that there is but ONE very God."

The Confession of Belgia (A. D. 1566) declares, that "there is ONE only simple and spiritual essence, which we call God, eternal, incomprehensible, invisible, immutable, infinite," &c.

The Articles of the English Episcopal Church declare, that" there is but ONE living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions," &c.

The Confession of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, revised at the Synod of Dort (A. D. 1618-1619) declares, "We believe that there is ONE only and simple spiritual Being, which we call God; and that he is eternal, incomprehensible, invisible, immutable, infinite," &c. (See Harmony of Confessions.)

With these agrees the Westminster Confession, approved by the General Assembly of Divines in a. D. 1647, adopted by all the Presbyterian Churches in Great Britain and America, and assented to by a great part of the Congregational Churches in New England. Its words are,"There is but ONE only living and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions, immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible," &c. West. Con. p. 32.

Now, is this the denial of the divine unity with which

we are implicitly charged? Can Unitarians present a more complete assertion of the divine unity, than is presented by these symbols of different denominations of Christians, who admit the doctrine of the Trinity?

But, admitting our statement of the divine unity to be correct, you will aver, probably, that my second proposition is subversive of the first. Whether this be so, or not,

is what I now propose to investigate.

to men.

The common language of the Trinitarian symbols is, "That there are three PERSONS in the Godhead." In your comments upon this, you have all along explained the word person, as though it were a given point, that we use this word here, in its ordinary acceptation, as applied But can you satisfy yourself, that this is doing us justice? Is it not evident from Church history, that the word person was used, in ancient times, as a term, which would express the disagreement of Christians in general with the reputed errors of the Sabellians, and others of similar sentiments, who denied the existence of any real distinction in the Godhead, and asserted that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were merely attributes of God, or the names of different ways in which he revealed himself to mankind, or of different relations which he bore to them and in which he acted. Some of the principal Fathers and Councils meant to deny the correctness of such assertions, by using the word person to designate some real, not merely nominal, distinction in the Godhead-to signify that something more than a diversity of relation or action, in respect to us, was intended. They seem to me to have used the word person, because they supposed it to approximate nearer to expressing the existence of a real distinction, than any other which they could choose.

We profess to use the word person, merely from the poverty of language-merely to designate our belief of a real distinction in the Godhead; and not to describe independent, conscious beings, possessing separate and equal essences and perfections. Why should we be obliged so often to explain ourselves on this point? Is there any more difficulty here, or any thing more obnoxious, than when you say, "God is angry with the wicked every day ?" You defend yourself in the use of such an expres

sion, by saying, that it is only the language of approxi mation,-i. e. that it is intended to describe that, in the mind of the Deity, or in his actions, which corresponds in some measure, or in some respect, to anger in men,--not that he is really affected with the passion of anger. You will permit me then to add, that we speak of person in the Godhead to express that which, in some respect or other, corresponds to persons as applied to men,--i. e. some distinction; not that we attach to it the meaning of three beings, with a separate consciousness, will, omnipotence, omniscience, &c. Where then is our inconsistency in this, or the absurdity of our language, provided there is a real foundation in the Scriptures, on which we may rest the fact of a distinction that we believe to exist?

I could heartily wish, indeed, that the word person never had come into the symbols of the Churches, because it has been the occasion of so much unnecessary dispute and difficulty. But since it has long been in common use, it is difficult, perhaps inexpedient, or even impossible, altogether to reject it. If it must be retained, I readily concede that the use of it ought to be so explained and guarded, as not to lead Christians into erroneous ideas of the nature of God. Nor can I suppose that the great body of Christians have such ideas, or understand it to mean that which you attribute to us as believing. Then, surely, it is not the best mode of convincing your opponents, to take the word in a sense so different from that in which they understand it, and proceed to charge them with absurdities, consequent upon the language of their creed. It has always been a conceded point, that, in the statement of difficult subjects, or the discussion of them, terms might be used in a sense somewhat different from their ordinary import. And what can declare in a plainer manner that Trinitarians do use the word person in this way, as applied to the divine Being, than the agreement among them that God is numerically one, in essence and in attributes ?

It might have been justly expected, likewise, that before they were charged with sentiments which subvert the divine Unity, the meaning of the word person, in the ancient records which describe its introduction into the technical language of the Church, should have been carefully in

vestigated. One of your rules of exegesis, to which I have with all my heart assented, demands that " every word should be modified and explained, according to the subject which is discussed, according to the PURPOSES, feelings, circumstances, and principles of the writer." Do us the justice to apply this law of interpretation to our language, and the dispute between us about the meaning of the word person, is for ever at an end.

What si

What then, you doubtless will ask, is that distinction in the Godhead, which the word person is meant to designate? I answer, without hesitation, that I do not know. The fact that a distinction exists, is what we aver; the definition of that distinction is what I shall by no means attempt. By what shall I, or can I define it? mile drawn from created objects, which are necessarily derived and dependent, can illustrate the mode of existence in that Being who is underived, independent, unchangeable, infinite, eternal? I confess myself unable to advance a single step here in explaining what the distinction is. I receive the FACT that it exists, simply because I believe that the Scriptures reveal the FACT. And if the Scriptures do reveal the fact that there are three persons in the Godhead (in the sense explained); that there is a distinction which affords ground for the appellations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost-which lays the foundation for the application of the personal pronouns, I, thou, he-which renders it proper to speak of sending and being sent, of Christ being with God, being in his bosom, and other things of the like nature and yet that the divine nature belongs to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; then it is, like every other fact revealed, to be received simply on the credit of divine revelation.

Is there any more difficulty in understanding the fact that there is a distinction in the Godhead, than there is in understanding that God possesses an underived existence? With what shall we compare such existence ? All other beings are derived; and, of course, there is no object in the universe with whose existence it can be compared. To define it, then, is beyond our reach. We can approximate towards a conception of it, merely by negatives. We deny that the divine existence has any author or cause;