should be understood to have, which will by and by be shewn to be capable of such a construction as makes it perfectly consistent with the conclusion come to above.

The right application of the phrase, er wons auris, having been, as I presume to think, thus ascertained, it would seem just to remark upon it, that the intention of Moses thereby was to make it expressly understood that the prohibition of marriage with a wife's sister applied to the very contingency in which it is contended that, by means of this same clause, he meant to signify the divine permission of it; that is to say, in the event of the wife's decease. For whereas he had already, in vv. 6. 16, implicitly forbidden this union, without any limitation of the restraint being implied, it is only reasonable to conclude, that when he further proceeded to make an express prohibition of it, he must have done so with some particular object in view. And that his object was not, as the advocates of the lawfulness of the marriage in question have imagined, to limit the prohibition so as to remove it in case of the wife's decease, but rather to do what is the very reverse, to fix the prohibition on it in that very case, in express terms, would seem to be indicated beyond all doubt by the addition of this very clause, provided its legitimate application be what has been above claimed for it, which the principles of Greek grammar would seem to require.

But, independently of this inference, from the very introduction of this clause, there is also this antecedent probability that such was the object Moses had in view in introducing it, that, whereas he might have foreseen that there would be persons who, in their desire to marry their wife's sister after her decease, would be disposed to restrict the merely implied prohibition to the lifetime of the wife; he may therefore have seen it to be expedient, by adding this clause with the intention of making it refer to the lifetime of the wife's sister, to take away all po-sibility of misconceiving, or misinterpreting the prohibition, and to signify expressly that it applied as well to the case of marrying a wife's sister after the wife's decease, as during her lifetime. And it may be added, that the circumstance of Jacob's having had two wives who were sisters, may have appeared to the Divine wisdom to give the more occasion for this anticipation, and was probably that which made it appear expedient, that the intended prohibition of this union should not be left to be collected by mere inference, from any of the preceding declarations of his will, in relation to the same matter; but that he should direct his servant Moses to deliver this express prohibition of it, and in such a way as to make it clearly understood, that it had respect not merely to the lifetime of the wife, but to the lifetime of the wife's sister also. This consideration, therefore, I conceive, affords another probable ground for inferring, as before, that the design of Moses in v. 18, was to make an express prohibition of the marriage in question, with a particular reference to the contingency before mentioned.

These conjectural ideas, savouring, as I humbly conceive they do, of considerable probability, and the reasonings founded upon them, have been adduced for the purpose of obviating an objection which

the advocates on the other side might be apt to start against the view I have advanced, that, if the marriage in question had been already implicitly prohibited in vv. 6, 16, as there could then be no other reason save that of intending to limit the general prohibition, and to restrict it to the lifetime of the wife, which could have induced Moses to make this particular reference to it, it was therefore fair to infer that he meant the clause, er wons avτns, to refer to the person signified by the preceding aury; i. e., the married sister or wife. It has been shewn above, on the contrary, that there might be other reasons which could have induced him to do so, and that they are not only probable ones, but such also as would require that the clause in question should be understood to refer to the person signified in the preceding airns; i. e., the unmarried sister. The objection, therefore, would not appear to have any sufficient ground to stand upon to entitle it to be considered of any weight. And hereupon I seem warranted, in the course of my argument, to lay down now the following position :-That, unless the advocates on the other side will undertake to shew, and to express their belief, that propriety of speech would require that Moses should have used the present form of expression, as it is given in the Septuagint, and not either of those other two which I have said he would naturally have used instead, when it is supposed that his intention in the last clause was to refer to the married sister, they ought to feel compelled to disavow their belief that this was his intention, and to acquiesce in that view of his meaning in the passage which has been above propounded.

With respect now, in the last place, to the force of the phrase arrinλor, to which, in accordance with the bearing that has been given to it in our English version, these persons would doubtless be disposed to attach the notion, that it shews the reason of the prohibition to have had respect only to the lifetime of the first married sister, some explanation concerning it would seem to be requisite; for certainly, if such a view of it must necessarily be taken, it could not then be denied that this would give some colour of probability both to the notion they entertain respecting the clause, erɩ Čŵons avrñs, that it is rightly to be applied to the same sister, and also to the inference they deduce therefrom, that Moses was here only prohibiting the marriage of the second sister during the lifetime of the first married one.

I conceive then there is no necessity that this phrase should be so understood, as that it can only imply a reason for the prohibition which has respect to the lifetime of the first married sister, as is the case with the meaning assigned to it in our English version. For what should hinder its being urged with at least equal probability, that the phrase was rather meant to suggest a secondary reason for the prohibition, derived from the consideration of what was likely to be the consequence of the marriage, even though it should take place only after the decease of the first married sister; namely, that it would cause the second married sister to act towards the children of the first from feelings of envy and jealousy? For it is obvious, that the second sister might act from such feelings towards the children of the first, as well in the case of being married after her decease, as during her

lifetime. And in corroboration of the probable correctness of this rendering of the phrase, I would beg it might be observed, that St. Basil would seem to have regarded it in this light; for, in the conclusion of his epistle to Diodorus, he makes the following exclamation in reference to the effect that would be likely to attend upon such an union, in the case of the marriage taking place after the decease of the first married sister, to which alone he is speaking:-"Make not, Oman, the aunt to be the stepmother of infants! Do not arm with unrelenting jealousies one whose duty it is to cherish in the place of a mother."

After these remarks, and having now concluded my argument, I would humbly appeal to every one who desires to ascertain the truth, that he may embrace and maintain it, whether right reason would not seem to require that we should recognise in the following paraphrase, the just sense of what Moses ought to be considered to have intended to deliver in this perplexed passage: "Neither shalt thou marry thy wife's sister at any time as long as she (the sister) lives, to cause her to entertain and practice jealousies either towards her sister, or her sister's children."

Hoping that in this investigation I have proceeded on sure grounds to the result just stated, and that, in that case, it will be deemed a satisfactory and seasonable elucidation of the truth in this matter. I remain, Mr. Editor, your obedient servant,

OMICRON.

ON ARCHDEACON HARE'S SERMONS.

MR. EDITOR, I was somewhat surprised, and, I confess, disappointed, in taking up a volume of sermons, lately published by Mr. Archdeacon Hare, and turning to his Visitation Sermon. Amidst many evils enumerated,-which we must all deplore in common, and for pointing out which, as well as for his honesty and fearlessness in putting them in bold relief, Mr. H. deserves, and will receive, the thanks of his readers and his brethren, I was grieved to find much matter which I could not but condemn, and which must startle his readers.

There is, if I mistake not, something strange in his origin and foundation of the church. It is separated from the apostles, and contradistinguished from them, as though it were not built on them, as though they were not its very basis and pedestal, (resting, of course, as we must never forget they did, on their Lord and head,) (Eph. ii. p. 20,) as though they did not exclusively gather in the Peculium and Segullah, which they were commissioned to do by our Great High Priest and Apostle.

I am at a loss also to make out his theory of church government and discipline. It seems to me vague and indefinite, and to admit of all the shades and varieties of civil government, ranging from absolute monarchy to downright democracy. It may be anything to suit the taste and prejudices of the religious body, and yet in every variation be equally divine, and equally useful in the several circumstances and

phases, because God has expressed his will and preference respecting

none.

As regards the apostolic succession, that is described "as a strengthless prop," "reared indeed by amiable and pious men, but in fact nothing but the brain-sick whim of an invalid," "a fascinating delusion," "the mere dregs and earthly part" of a heavenly system, the "mere dust of a ruined temple, to which a lofty and gentle-minded spirit clings," from a love of antiquity, "a solitary cave in the wilderness," "a form, which romantic minds maintain as the only one, not because it is founded in truth, but because it is their own," because "they have not examined the foundations of other churches with patience, with candour, and with righteous self-distrust." In short, "the arguments of the Romanists in favour of the inalienable primacy of St. Peter are far more specious and plausible than those in favour of this scheme of amiable and pious men, derived from the same source."

Is then every form of civil government as much divine as that form of ecclesiastical polity which we maintain as our own, not merely because it is our own, but because, as we firmly believe, it was handed down to us by the apostles? Without asking how far the arguments in favour of the observance of the Lord's day, infant baptism, public churches, public prayers in the church, texts to be handled in sermons, the canon of Scripture, receiving women to the eucharist, and many similar things, are specious or not, may we not ask, in reading St. Paul's epistles, is there nothing to be found in them on the subject of the form of church government but what is only as specious and plausible as a Romanist error? In weighing the climax in Rom. x. 14, 15, compared with the epistles to Tim. and Titus, (especially such texts as 1 Tim. i. 3, v. 1-19; Tit. i. 5,) may we not ask if every one may not send his brother to preach, who may? If presbyters may, how comes Titus to have the charge of ordaining presbyters in every city in Crete? How has Timothy the charge of rebuking presbyters? How had he power over them, if he were but their equal? or, if he was not their equal (as clearly he was not), why are these things left on record, but for our learning? Why should Crete and Ephesus be made examples to us, but for our imitation? Why should Timothy and Titus (confessedly superior to presbyters) be left as patterns for us? Why should the same powers be given to them both? Why (with reverence be it asked) should the Holy Spirit give directions in these matters to Crete and Ephesus alone? Why should not that which was imperative in the government of the Christian churches in Crete and Ephesus, be also imperative always and everywhere? Why should this form be peculiar to the apostolic age or the apostolic converts? Why should what was fixed then be arbitrary now? Is all this only as specious as the Romanist's argument for the papal supremacy ? But Mr. H. says, "I cannot discover a shadow of a word in the gospels to countenance the interpretation referred to." Surely he would not be understood to say that the epistles of St. Paul are less the inspired word of God than the works of the four evangelists? If not, surely we have found something of a shadow of a word. If by

the gospels he means the writings of the four evangelists, others have found very significant shadows even there.

Even in the passage which forms the text of the sermon, Matthew, xxviii. 20, to say nothing of authorities that might he quoted in great number, who have seen very plain substance where Mr. H. rejects even the shadow, Grotius, an authority which Mr. H. may perhaps be disposed to reverence more than our own, or those of elder date, does not extend the promise to the church generally, but confines it to the successors of the apostles, and so to the church in and through them. His words are," Hic autem manifestissime apparet, voluisse Christum, ut Apostoli aliis, illi rursum aliis fidis viris (ea, quæ audisti a me per multos testes hæc commenda, qui idonei erunt et alios docere, 2 Tim. ii. 2) munus illud magisterii commendarent; Nam, cum promissio hæc ad consummationem sæculi se extendat, Apostoli autem tam diu victuri non essent, omnino hic Christus in apostolorum persona censendus est etiam successores ejus muneris compellâsse." Surely here is a shadow of a word to countenance our interpretation. Does it seem doubtful whom Grotius means here by the successores muneris apostolici ? Let him supply the answer himself. In a letter to his brother William, the very letter in which he speaks of publishing his commentaries on the Scriptures, dated "pridie novi anni, qui erit 1645," he says, " Alioqui suaderem eis (Remonstrantibus) ut constituerent inter se quosdam in eminentiori gradu, ut episcopos, et ut ii xɛpodería sumerent ab archiepiscopo Hiberno (Bramhall) qui ibi est. Et ita ordinati ordinarent deinde pastores cæteros, atque sic initium facerent redeundi ad mores et antiquos et salutares, quibus contemptis licentia invaluit pro novis opinionibus faciens novas ecclesias, quæ quid post aliquot annos credituræ sint, nescimus."--Epist. p. 975, ep. 739. Here, at the same time that we have the value of his testimony, we have also

A something like prophetic strain

His old experience did attain,

(for he was then approaching the verge of life,) pointing but too truly to the modern heresies in the novæ ecclesiæ of Holland and Germany, originating in the very departure which he condemns.

Again. Is there nothing more than the shadow of a word in St. John, xx. 21-3? Our Lord, when he uttered these words, was about to return to his Father; he sent his apostles as commissioners to supply his place, to perform those offices in his church which he could not corporally discharge, and so to succeed him in his office. He gives them the power of the keys, installs them in their stewardship (on the execution of which they entered on the day of Pentecost), gives them the power of governing and judging, of admitting into, and excluding from, his church. Now, is not, we may ask, this power as necessary now as then? Did our Lord intend that, at their death, or the death of those appointed by them, that all order in his church should cease? all government, all power of admission, and of exclusion? Were not these officers appointed by God? and can that which is ordained by him be changed by any but him? Can any man dare to reverse or abolish what the Sovereign and Universal Lord has established? Is there any notice of his intending his officers to be mutable, tempo