progress of the former in power and influence is briefly indicated in a note which Mr de Segur, in his edition of the work here cited, places at the end of the article from which the above is extracted. The note was written about the year 1825. His views coincide, in the main, with those which we have ventured to suggest, although we differ from him as to the probability of a coalition of constitutional powers against the progress of Russia.

er.

'Russia,' says he, has been gradually advancing ever since the period described in the text, and has now become a colossal powHer weight in the political balance is immense; almost the whole of Poland is subject to the sceptre of her sovereigns. The vast armies of France, after being stopped in their victorious career by the conflagration of Moscow, perished amidst the snows and storms of her inhospitable climate. Her own armies, on the other hand, after overrunning, on various occasions, Germany, Holland, Switzerland, and Italy, succeeded at last, by the aid of a general coalition of the other powers, in penetrating to the capital of our hitherto victorious monarchy. Russia is now at the head of a new federative system; she presides, if we may so speak, over the Holy Alliance, that unexpected league, in which interests, that before appeared irreconcilable, are now, for a time at least, united in the closest connexion. The apprehension of new revolutions forms the cement of this alliance. For the moment its policy is pacific. But who can foresee the future results of the concerted action of this imposing triumvirate, of which England alone has hitherto maintained an active independence? Would it be too much to predict that the force of circumstances will create another new federative system of an opposite character, and that a league of constitutional governments will be formed in the west of Europe as a counterpoise to this Eastern alliance of absolute monarchies?'

We have left ourselves but little room to treat the question of the influence of the war, and its results on the interest and policy of the United States, and must dispose of this part of the subject in a very summary way. The general outline of the foreign policy of our country is familiar to the public mind. The commercial rivalry which exists between the United States and England, and which affects, at times, to a certain extent, the character of their political relations, creates of course an indirect relation of an opposite kind between us and the great continental powers, to whom we should naturally look for aid on the occurrence of a difficulty in the other quarter. Hence, although our intercourse with England is much more

extensive and important than with the Continent, we are still accustomed to regard the nations of the Continent as our political allies, and England as a political enemy. These relations, which grow out of the nature of things, have been strengthened and confirmed by the progress of events, and may be traced through all the successive periods of our history. They formed in particular the principle of the important aid which we received from France in the war of the revolution. It may be remarked, however, that, during the stormy period which has since intervened, the French government have not unfrequently lost sight of the character of those relations, and of their true policy in regard to the United States. Even at the present moment, and in a somewhat more consolidated and tranquil state of the kingdom, their obstinate refusal to take into serious consideration our important claims upon them, of which they do not even venture to deny the justice, is not perhaps in strict conformity with the line of conduct which should naturally be adopted towards a useful political ally. The same causes, however, which establish a friendly relation between us and France, also create one of a similar kind with Russia, which may, in like manner be traced, through the whole course of our history from the period of the Armed Neutrality up to the present day. The importance of this relation is constantly increasing with the progressive increase of Russia in power and influence; and as this increase also modifies considerably the international relations of the great powers of the west of Europe, and renders France and England allies instead of rivals, it naturally affects at the same time the general character of our foreign policy, and will, ultimately, lead us to look to Russia instead of France as our principal political ally. The difference between the forms of government of the two powers is of no importance in this respect, because, having no point of contact, they cannot possibly be dangerous to each other. We consider it as a strong proof of the ability with which the statesmen of Russia have managed the affairs intrusted to them, that they have distinctly perceived the true character of their relations with us, and have acted throughout in conformity with it, although some mistakes would perhaps have been excusable in regard to a country forming so completely, as we do, the antipodes of theirs, both in geography and politics. They have certainly displayed, in this branch of their foreign relations, far more sagacity than the French, who have hitherto claimed the

superiority over all other nations in diplomatic skill. The extravagant pretensions, blundering incapacity, and wanton violence of the successive rulers of France during the last forty years, have at times completely vitiated, and throughout rendered doubtful, the nature of our position in regard to that power. Even now, as we have already remarked, she denies us what she has herself admitted to be strict justice. From Russia, on the other hand, we have received a series of good offices, uninterrupted by any act or demonstration of an opposite character, and crowned within the last few months by the spontaneous and disinterested gift of a ticket of admission to the Black Sea. It is not in the nature of men or nations to be insensible to such a course of proceeding. It has been and will doubtless continue to be reciprocated by the government of the United States on every proper occasion, and will completely establish the friendly relation which is naturally created by the respective positions of the two powers in regard to Great Britain. It may be proper to add, for the satisfaction of those persons who are sure to misunderstand whenever there is a possibility of misconstruction, that when we speak of Great Britain as a political rival or enemy, we do not mean that it is for our interest to be on bad terms with her. By a political rival or enemy is meant a power with which we are, from the force of circumstances, in greater danger of coming into collision than with any other. Such a power is of course precisely the one with which it is for that very reason most important for us to be on good terms, and which we ought to use every effort and make every reasonable sacrifice to conciliate. Such has in general been, and we trust always will be, however at times imperfectly reciprocated, the character of our proceedings towards the British government.

Such, however, being the general outline of our foreign policy, and in particular of our relations with Russia and Great Britain, it follows of course that every augmentation of the influence of the former power may be regarded by us, looking at the subject merely under a political point of view, as a favorable occurrence. As friends of the cause of freedom and civilization, we may regret that a purely military and despotic government should be gradually gaining on the constitutional monarchies of the west of Europe. But we have, after all, not much faith in the value or permanence of these mixed modes, which seem to be, as they have been in fact described by

one.

some of the most distinguished European writers as a sort of mongrel system, growing up naturally in the course of the transition from one simple form to another, but not containing in themselves any principle of vitality or permanent existence. It would perhaps be as well for the western nations of Europe to be under the influence of a stable and well-administered simple monarchy, as to be disturbed by the perpetual and organized war of parties, that belongs to the essence of a compound At all events, since Europe, according to Bonaparte, must be either Republican or Russian, and since there is, from present appearances, no great probability that the former part of the alternative will be realized, we must make the best of the latter. If we regret on the one hand that a nation, whose political forms and constitution differ so much from our own, is rapidly increasing in influence, we may console ourselves on the other with the reflection that her power, however great it may become, is not attended with danger to this country, and can only affect us, if at all, in a favorable way.

We shall perhaps be charged on this occasion as we have been on some preceding ones of a similar kind, with exaggerating the greatness of Russia, and with entertaining 'nervous terrors' of her future progress. What is meant by 'nervous terrors' of the progress of a power which we have uniformly looked upon and represented as our principal political ally, we must leave it for those to explain who make the charge. We should as soon have expected to be accused of entertaining individually nervous terrors' that one of our best friends would marry an accomplished and beautiful wife with a large fortune, or draw the highest prize in the lottery. As respects the imputation of exaggerating the greatness of Russia, and its probable increase, we cannot but remark that our critics, instead of vaguely denying the correctness of our representations, would perhaps better subserve the cause of truth by indicating with precision the errors contained in them. Enjoying some advantages for a comprehensive view of the political field, we have habitually published our impressions with perfect sincerity, and, as far as we are conscious of our motives, without 'fear, affection, or hope of reward.' They have been for the most part merely statements of fact, which may be easily verified by references to the map or the statistical table. We have occasionally, though somewhat sparingly, hazarded opinions and conjectures as to the present and future political situation of the VOL. XXX.-No. 67.

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world. In their general scope, the sentiments we have expressed coincide with those of the most enlightened politicians and statesmen of Europe for fifty years past, as is proved by the extracts given in the present article from Ségur, De Pradt, and Favier, which might be multiplied, if necessary, to any extent. In our speculations on this subject, we have little or no credit to claim on the score of originality, nor have we ever presented them as anything different from what we deem them, that is, probable speculations and not certainties. The vague charge of exaggeration can of course only be repelled by an equally vague contradiction. If any real errors can be pointed out in our statements or reasonings, we shall be ever happy to acknowledge and correct them. It is easy to see the interested motives, which may lead a certain class of politicians to represent our views as tinctured with extravagance; but we submit it to their consideration, and that of the public, whether existing facts are altered by pretending to doubt their reality, or dangers averted by denying their existence. In this, as in most other cases, it would in our opinion be a safer course for the interested parties to look the danger full in the face, ascertain its precise character, and act accordingly. The disastrous consequences of pursuing a different policy may already be seen, if we are not mistaken, in the actual situation of some of the great powers of Europe.

A. & C.

・Sharks.

ART. VIII.-Life of Arthur Lee, with his Political and Literary Correspondence, and his Papers on Diplomatic and Political Subjects. By RICHARD HENRY LEE. Boston. Wells & Lilly. 1829. 2 vols. 8vo.

LITTLE has yet been published, which illustrates the early diplomatic history of the United States. The subject of foreign alliances engaged the attention of the Old Congress almost at the outset of its deliberations, and agents were secretly and openly sent abroad for the purpose of obtaining intelligence, in regard to the views of people and governments in Europe, some months before the declaration of independence. These were followed by Commissioners to treat with France, and by