statute to the contrary notwithstanding, although the orders were made by magistrates of a city or town, not a county of itself (l).

Appeals against Orders of Removal made by Borough Magistrates.] -The act 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76, provides (s. 105) for holding courts of separate quarter sessions in certain boroughs, having councils under that act (s. 103), by recorders, being barristers of not less than five years' standing, and sitting as sole judges to the exclusion of the borough justices. Borough quarter sessions thus constituted are courts of record, and have cognizance of all crimes, offences, and matters whatsoever cognizable by any court of quarter sessions for counties in England; and such a recorder has "power to do all things necessary for exercising such jurisdiction, notwithstanding his being sole judge, as fully as any such last-mentioned court" (m).

It is now settled, that where a separate court of quarter sessions has been granted to a borough, under 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76, the recorder has, in such court, under sect. 105, exclusive jurisdiction over appeals against orders of removal made by the borough justices (n). It was argued, that the court of quarter sessions of the county had at least concurrent jurisdiction; but the court held, that the words of that section, though affirmative only (o), repealed the negative words of 8 & 9 W. III. c. 30, s. 6, above stated (p.)

per Patteson, J., S. C.; and 59 G. III. c. 95, R. v. Gordon, 1 B. & Ald. 524.

(1) See R. v. Wendover, Salk. 490; R. v. Malden, 2 Bott, 959, n. By 8 & 9 W. III. c. 30, s. 8, the justices of the peace within the liberty of St. Albans were permitted to hear and determine appeals for the settlement of the poor in their quarter sessions, as they might have done before the making that act. 9 Geo. I. c. 7, s. 7, enables justices within the liberty of the borough of St. Peter and hundred of Nassaborough, in Northamptonshire, to hear similar ap peals in their quarter sessions, as they might have done before 8 & 9 W. III. c. 30. This appeal is given to quarter sessions as distinct from general sessions, Reg. v. Middlesex, (Js.) 4 Q. B. R. 807.

(m) Sect. 105. See s. 91, 103.

(n) Reg. v. Shropshire (Justices), 2 Q. B. R. 85, 95. See Reg. v. St. Edmund's, Salisbury, id. 72.

(0) See Brown v. Macmillan, 7 M. & W. 196.

That affirmative words in a later act

do not necessarily repeal a former act which is unconnected with it, unless there is something so wholly inconsistent in the provisions of the two that they cannot stand together, see per Abbott, C. J., 2 B. & Cr. 323; 7 B. & Cr. 12; 4 East, 142; 1 B. & Ald. 637; 1 Atk. 675; Com. Dig. tit. Parliament R. 9 & 25, tit. Dismes (M. 13), Plowden, 112; Langham v. Baker, Hardres, 116;. Paget v. Foley, 2 Bing. N. C. 689; R. v. Berridge, 3 P. Wms. 461.

(p) Statutes 17 G. II. c. 38, s. 5, and 1 G. IV. c. 36, seem similarly repealed. As to negative words in a statute making it imperative and not directory only, see 2 Stra. 1123; 4 M. & Sel. 509, 510, [collecting several cases]; also, 7 B. & Cr. 12; 2 Inst. 448; Dyer. 135; 1 Hale, P. C. 705; 3 Inst. 87; 11 Rep. 68, b.: and see argument in 10 Ad. & E. 711, 715; 2 P. & D. 589: as to the exclusive wording of the appeal clause, see 17 G. II. c. 38, s. 4, 5. That general words do not revoke or alter any particular act where such words

An appeal was lodged against an order made by two justices of Ludlow, under 9 Geo. IV. c. 40, s. 38, for removing a pauper lunatic to a lunatic asylum. The appeal was given by s. 46 to the quarter sessions for the "county." The court held, that reading the word "county" as including " town corporate" (under s. 61), the appeal since the passing of 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76, was properly brought to the borough quarter sessions, impersonated by a recorder, under s. 106 of the latter act (2).

The express terms of 8 & 9 W. III. c. 30, show that appeals against orders of removal to the sessions of cities or towns being counties of themselves, could always be heard at the quarter sessions for such cities, &c.; (r) a jurisdiction which, since 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76, is in such counties of cities vested in the recorder.

Appeals against Poor's Rates, and Rates in nature of County Rates in Boroughs.]-Appeals against poor rates made within a borough of a city or town corporate, not being a county of itself, seem to stand on a different footing; for in corporations or franchises, not having six justices of peace, nor having jurisdiction over two or more whole parishes or wards contained in such corporation, &c. any person might appeal, in a case mentioned or referred to by 43 Eliz. c. 2, or 17 G. II. c. 38, to the next general or quarter sessions of the peace for the county, riding or division wherein such corporation or franchise is situate (s). The enactments on this subject were intended to secure a hearing of the merits by justices not concerned in making the rate; and though the justices of a borough have no longer any judicial power at courts of gaol delivery, general or quarter sessions, and the recorder is the sole judge, yet as the liberty to appeal to the sessions of the county is not taken away by express words, it appears to remain in these cases, concurrently with the authority of the recorder (t).

Rates, in nature of county rates, cannot be made or levied within boroughs by the recorder or any other justice of the borough; and by 6 & 7 W. IV. c. 105, s. 8, "no recorder, by virtue of his office, shall have power to allow, apportion, make, or levy, or do any act whatsoever, with relation to the allowance, apportionment, making, or levying of any rate whatsoever." These words might seem sufficiently exten

may operate properly without such revocation or alteration, see Lyn v. Wyn, Sir O. Bridg. 327; see Jenkins's Centuries, 212, pl. 49; 19 Viner, 340.

(g) Reg. v. St. Lawrence, Ludlow, 11 Ad. & E. 170.

(r) And see R. v. Carmarthen, 4 B.

& Ald. 281, cited 4 Ad. & Ell. 322.

(s) See 17 Geo. II. c. 38, s. 5; 1 Geo. IV. c. 36.

(1) See per Abbott, J., R. v. Lancashire (Justices), 1 B. & Ald. 637; and Reg. v. Somersetshire (Justices), 10 Ad. & E. 711. Ante, p. 3, note.

sive to prevent a recorder from sitting as judge in appeals against any rates imposed within the borough; but are more probably intended to apply merely to the inchoate steps of making and levying them. It is held, that the Queen's Bench has no jurisdiction over the decisions of the quarter sessions of a borough, on an appeal against a borough rate, in the nature of a county rate assessed by the town council; for by 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76. s. 123, the certiorari was taken away as to convictions, orders, warrants, or other matters made by virtue of the act (u). But in order to give all persons interested in a borough fund a more direct and easy remedy for its misapplication, any order of the council of a borough for payment of any sum out of the borough fund, may now be removed into the Queen's Bench by certiorari (x).

In the Bath case an individual appealed to the quarter sessions of that borough and city, against a borough rate made after the six months allowed by 7 W. IV. and 1 Vic. c. 81, s. 2, for making retrospective borough rates. The rate appealed against was shown by affidavit to have been made to pay, as well debts due before 17th July, 1837, when 7 W. IV. and 1 Vic. c. 81, passed (y) for providing funds to pay that class of liabilities, as other debts accruing since that date. The rate, however, was good on the face of it; and the court held, that the borough sessions had no power to entertain the appeal on any ground of personal grievance of the party, or of the retrospective nature of the rate; those not being matters for which s. 92 of the municipal corporation act, 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76, had provided such a remedy, under its terms of reference to the county rate appeal act, 55 G. III. c. 51, s. 14 (z).

Appeals against the allowance or disallowance of overseers' accounts by justices, seem abolished in districts where an auditor may be appointed under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101 (a).

(u) Reg. v. Rippon (Justices), 7 Ad. & E. 417; 2 N. & P. 411, S. C.; and see R. v. Surrey (Justices), 2 T. R. 504; also post, Chap. IX. s. 2.

(x) 7 W. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 78, s. 44, passed 17th July, 1837. But this section gives no remedy in the case of a borough rate; see per Patteson, J., R. ▼. Bath (Recorder), 9 Ad. & E. 817. However it has retrospective effect over orders dated before its passing, and a town council may apply for a certiorari to remove such an order of a previous town council, Reg. v. Bridgewater

(Mayor, &c.) 10 Ad. and E. 281.

(y) Sect. 2, passed in consequence of Woods v. Reed, 2 M. & W. 777.

(z) Reg. v. Bath (Recorder), 1 P. & D. 622; 9 Ad. & E. 817. The rule is thoroughly established that no appeal lies from the act of magistrates to quarter sessions, unless expressly given. Reg. v. Ipswich (Recorder), 8 D. P. C. 103, on authority of R. v. Surrey (Justices), 2 T.R. 504. See also post, Chap. IX. s. 2.

(a) Id. s. 37, see post.

Jurisdiction of County Justices in Boroughs.]—This subject is ruled by 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76, s. 111, and 7 W. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 78. s. 50, post, Chap. III. Such jurisdiction can only exist in boroughs to which no separate court of quarter sessions is granted, or where quarter sessions have since the first-mentioned act ceased to be holden.

Within ten days after the grant of a separate court of quarter sessions of the peace to any borough, the council thereof shall send a copy of such grant, sealed with the seal of the borough, to the clerk of the peace of the county in which such borough or any part thereof is situated. See, as to quarter sessions in boroughs, post.

Sessions of the peace are of four descriptions :-Petit (or as they are usually called, petty), Special, General, and General Quarter (or quarterly) sessions.

SECTION II.

OF PETTY SESSIONS.

Petty Sessions, what.]-As every meeting of two or more justices in the same place, for the execution of some power vested in them by law, whether had on their own mere motion, or on the requisition of any party entitled to require their attendance in discharge of some duty, is itself a petty (or petit) session; they need not be averred to be "acting in petty session;" (b) nor as it seems need the information, if of misdemeanor only, be reduced to writing, though it must be given on oath, in the presence of the justices, in order to ground a warrant (c). On many occasions in which a single magistrate may lawfully proceed, it is better and usual to obtain the attendance of two or more justices, and see p. 11.

The occasions for holding petty sessions are now become so numerous, in consequence of the summary powers which have been of late years so frequently confided to two magistrates by statute, that any complete enumeration would fruitlessly occupy too large a space, and if incomplete would mislead. One of the most important acts of petty session, is the bailing parties accused of felony, which may now be done after a full hearing of evidence on both sides, where the presumption of

(b) Reg. v. Rawlins, 8 C. & P. 339; 2 Greaves's Russell, 663.

(c) Caudle v. Seymour, 1 Q. B. R. 889, see post, tit. CONVICTIONS.

guilt shall either be weak in itself, or weakened by the proofs adduced on behalf of the prisoner.

Power of two or more Justices to bail in Felony (d).]—By 7 Geo. c. 64, s. 1, "Where any person shall be taken on a charge of felony, or suspicion of felony, before one or more justice or justices of the peace, and the charge shall be supported by positive and credible evidence of the fact, or by such evidence as, if not explained or contradicted, shall, in the opinion of the justice or justices, raise a strong presumption of the guilt of the party charged, such person shall be committed to prison by such justice or justices in the manner hereinafter mentioned; but if there shall be only one justice present, and the whole evidence given before him shall be such as neither to raise a strong presumption of guilt, nor to warrant the dismissal of the charge, such justice shall order the person charged to be detained in custody until he shall be taken before two justices at the least; and where any person so taken, or any person in the first instance taken before two justices of the peace, shall be charged with felony, or on suspicion of felony, and the evidence given in support of the charge shall, in their opinion, not be such as to raise a strong presumption of the guilt of the party charged, and to require his committal; or such evidence shall be adduced on behalf of the person charged as shall, in their opinion, weaken the presumption of his guilt; but there shall notwithstanding appear to them, in either of such cases, to be sufficient ground for judicial inquiry into his guilt, the person charged shall be admitted to bail by such two justices in manner hereinafter mentioned: provided always, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to require any such justice or justices to hear evidence on behalf of any person so charged as aforesaid, unless it shall appear to him or them to be meet and conducive to the ends of justice to hear the same" (e).

The form of the recognizance taken from the accused, and his sure

(d) By 3 Ed. I. c. 15 (now repealed, quoad hoc, by 7 Geo. IV. c. 64), persons indicted of larceny, by inquests before sheriffs or bailiffs, or of light suspicion, or for petty larceny under 12d., (if not guilty of larceny aforetime), or guilty of receipt of felons, or of commandment, or force, or of aid in felony done, or guilty of any other trespass, for which one ought not to lose life or member, were bailable by sufficient surety, whereof the sheriff was answerable. See also 23 H. VI., c. 9.

(e) Duty of justices as to persons charged with felony.]-By 7 Geo. IV. c. 64, sec. 2 (amending and extending the previous enactments of 1 & 2 Ph. & M. c. 13, and 2 & 3 Ph. & M. c. 10, repealed by sec. 32), the two justices, before they shall admit to bail, and the justice or justices before he or they shall commit to prison any person arrested for felony, or on suspicion of felony, shall take the examination of such person, and the information upon oath of those who shall know the facts and circumstances of the case,