detached part belongs], did, &c. &c." After the usual conclusion, it may be advisable to add as follows: "And the jurors aforesaid, on their oath aforesaid, do further present that the said C. D., afterwards, to wit, on the date of the warrant of commitment,] at the parish aforesaid, in the county of A. aforesaid, having been charged with the above-mentioned felony [or misdemeanour, as the case may be], before one J. P., Esq., one of her majesty's justices of the peace acting in and for the county of B., was then and there committed by the said J. P. upon the said charge to the custody of the gaoler of — gaol [or house of correction] at in the said last-mentioned county of B., [the county where trial is to be had,] there to be and remain till discharged by due course of law" (c). We have seen that it is in general advisable to lay every material fact to have taken place at some specific parish or place from which, before 6 G. IV. c. 50, s. 13, a jury might have come (d), and which is laid to be situate within the county or borough, &c. stated in the margin; and this is essential to the validity of the indictment where local description is of the essence of the offence, as in cases of nuisance to highways, keeping disorderly houses, arson, burglary, housebreaking, stealing in the dwelling-house (e), being armed at night in a close for the purpose of killing The (c) Reg. v. Loader, before Rolfe, B., at Dorsetshire spring assizes, 1840. Simple larceny, committed in a parish of Somersetshire entirely detached from it, and surrounded by Dorsetshire. Prisoner was committed by a Dorsetshire magistrate to the gaol of that county. indictment laid the offence to have been committed in the parish in Somersetshire, stating it to be surrounded in the whole by Dorsetshire, but did not state that the prisoner was in Dorsetshire, or committed by a justice acting for Dorsetshire. Fitzherbert, for prisoner, objected, 1st, that this should have appeared on the face of the indictment; and 2ndly, that if it had been so stated, the grand jury of Dorsetshire could not find the bill, the words of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 82, s. 1, being only that offenders in detached parts of counties may be "committed for trial, tried, convicted and sentenced," &c. as if the detached part were part of the county for which such committing justice acts. He urged that these words do not give any power to indict, or to a grand jury to inquire of an indictment. As instances of enactments in pari materiâ, he cited 7 G. IV. c. 64, s. 12, and 4 & 5 W. IV. c. 36, s. 2. Rolfe, B., overruled the objection, saying, that it would strike the act out of the statute book, but quære. N.B. a writ of error would have been useless, as the sentence was a month's imprisonment. (d) E. g. a town, a ward, or hundred, a parish, a hamlet, a borough, a manor, a castle, a forest, or other known place, 3 Hawk. c. 23, s. 92. Though it was formerly held that " Guildhall, in the city of London," is not sufficient venue for London, which, in respect of its size, required a parish or ward to be stated, (R.v. Harris, 2 Leach, 800; Mackalley's case, 9 Rep. 66, b.) the reasoning in the text seems to apply, since 6 G. IV. c. 50, s. 20, directed juries to be returned from the body of a county, and not from any hundred or hundreds, or particular venue within it. And Patteson, J., has held that even burglary is sufficiently laid as committed at a place named, e. g. "at Norton juxta Kempsey in the county aforesaid," without laying it to be a parish or vill, Reg. v. Brookes, 1 Car. & Mar. 544. (e) It is enough to lay a house to be in parish of B., though it is divided for game, forcible entry, &c. (f). But though it remains usual to lay a parish, hamlet, town, or other place within the county from which a jury might come (g), still, since the jury act, 6 G. IV. c. 50, s. 20, it seems sufficient to lay in the body only the county laid in the margin, or the city, borough, or other part of that county to which the jurisdiction of the court is limited, except in offences of a local description, depending on the situation of a road, a dwelling-house, a close, &c. as in the instances just given (h). In other offences it will be sufficient to show them to have in fact occurred at any place within the same jurisdiction, though other than that laid; the original reason for this particularity having long since ceased to operate. It was formerly considered desirable that the jury who should try the offence should come from the visne or neighbourhood of the place where it was committed, in order that they might be familiar with the parties and the circumstances; whereas in modern times not only is the venire awarded from the body of the county (i), but it is usual cautiously to abstain from swearing jurors who happen to come from the neighbourhood of the transaction, lest they should bring local prejudices to the trial of the issue, and decide from other sources than the evidence given on oath. On an indictment for highway robbery, the prisoner's counsel objected that the prosecutor had not proved the offence to have taken place in the parish laid; viz. St. Thomas, Pensford, but had shown the parish to be Pensford; however, Littledale, J., declared that a great majority of the judges held that it was not necessary to prove affirmatively for the prosecution that such a parish as that laid in the indictment exists, and expressed doubts how they should hold, even if proved negatively for the prisoner, that there was no such parish (k). It has been since held, on a case reserved, that where an offence not requiring a local description, is described as having been committed in a parish which does not exist, the defect can only be made the subject of a plea in ecclesiastical purposes intothree districts, each called a parish, Reg. v. Howell, 9 C. & P. 437, Littledale, J. \f) R. v. Roberts, Shower 389; R. v. Ridley, R. & Ry. C. C. 515; 1 Burr. 333; R.v. Napper, 1 Mood. C. C.44; R. v. Bullock, Carr. C. L. 282; R. v. Corry, 5 East, 376; 1 Hawk. c. 10, s. 5. In Reg. v. St. John, 9 C. & P. 40, indictment charged burglary in a house stated to be at "the parish of Woolwich." The correct name of the parish was stated to be "St. Mary's, Woolwich." Indictment held good, the parish being shown to be known as laid, having been so described in the statute 4 & 5 W. IV. c. 36, s. 2. (g) And see per Littledale, J., in R. v. Connop and others, 4 Ad. & El. 943. (h) See 8th ed. Archbold's Crim. Pl. & Ev. 37, Goldsmith's case, 3 Camp. 78. In R. v. Perkins, 4 C. & P. 363, is a contrary dictum by Gaselee, J., now overruled. (i) See note in last page. (k) R. v. Dowling and another, Ry. & M. N. P. C. 433. abatement (1). So much of 9 H. V. st. 1, c. 1, as avoided an indictment, if laid in a non-existing place, is repealed (m). Indictment for setting fire to an out-house and stack of beaus, "situate in the parish of Normanton on the Wold," in the county of Nottingham. It appeared that there was no such parish in Notts, but that there were two parishes in it called "Normanton on Sour," and "Normanton on Trent." A conviction took place and was upheld, as the offence had nothing of locality in it, and the fact that there was no such place in the county as that laid, was only matter for plea in abatement (n). Formerly, an insufficient venue or repugnancy as to place was bad in arrest of judgment; but the defect is now certainly cured by verdict (o). Offence in a Parish situate in one or more Counties, or in detached part of a County.]-Where a parish is situate in more than one county, it is proper to allege the offence to have been committed “in that part of the parish of A. which lies in the county of B. ;" but "in the parish of A., in the county of B.," is sufficient (p), except in cases requiring local description, as housebreaking (q). By 7 & 8 Vict. c. 62, s. 4, no judicial proceeding is invalidated by reason of any error in stating the name of the county to which a detached portion [attached to another county by s. 1], originally belonged, instead of the county to which it will belong under sect. 1; or the converse. Repeating Time and Place to every Material Fact.]—Time and place should be repeated to every material fact, but the words "then and there" referring to the last antecedent, will sufficiently express both. Where the circumstances stated in indictments for misdemeanours are merely continuous, as in assaults with aggravation, one mention of time and place as applicable to all circumstances will suffice; but this is otherwise in felonies where distinct and independent circumstances are necessary to the charge (r). Where the time and place are immaterial, they may be introduced by the words to wit-though (1) R. v. Woodward, 1 Mood. C. C. 323; R. v. Bullock, id. 324. See 3 Camp. 77. (m) 7 G. IV. c. 64, s. 32. (n) R. v. Woodward, 1 Mood. C. C. 323; Archb. Crim. Pl. & Ev. 8th ed. 311. (0) 7 G. IV. c. 64, s. 20, ante. (p) R. v. Perkins, 4 C. & P. 363. (9) Per Patteson, J., Reg. v. Brookes, 1 Car. & Mar. 543. However it would then be sufficient to convict on for the larceny, S. C. (r) 2 Hale, 178; R. v. Cotton, Cr. El. 738. without a scilicet in such case, a variance would not prejudice; and as in cases where they are of the essence of the charge, a scilicet will not aid a variance in proof (s), it is rarely if ever useful. 5. The Description of the Party against whose Person or Property the Offence was committed.] The indictment must be so certain as to the party against whom the offence was committed, as to enable the prisoner to know and understand who that party is, and what charge he is called on to answer (t). In general, the christian and surname when known should be set forth, followed by the style and title, if a peer or peeress (u); but except where the dignity is a necessary part of the description, no addition is requisite, as the statute of additions applies to defendants only (x). An Irish peer cannot prosecute by his title of dignity, but should be described by his proper name, with addition of degree and title, as James Hamilton, Esq., Earl of Clanbrassil, in that part of the united kingdom called Ireland (y). And if a party is so described that he cannot be mistaken, the description will suffice; and therefore an indictment for an assault on "John, parish priest of D.," was held sufficiently certain (z); an indictment for larceny, laying the goods stolen as the property of Victory Baroness Turkheim, by which style the prosecutrix was known, was held good, though her real name was Selina Victoire (a). The mis-spelling of a surname, when its usual pronunciation is satisfied by the manner in which it is written in the record, as "Whyneard," for "Winyard," is sufficient (b); but a mere statement of the christian name, without further description, will not suffice (c). Where the name and addition of the injured party cannot be ascertained, as where a body of a murdered person is found who cannot be identified, or goods are found on a highwayman, &c., the indictment may allege the party to be "to the jurors unknown” (d). Where a party is as usually known by one name as another, he may (8) Bushy v. Watson, Bla. Rep. 1052. (f) 2 Curw. Hawk. 319. (a) Stealing goods of "Geo. Talbot Rice Lord Dynevor," good; R. v. Pitts, 8 C. & P. 771, per Erskine, J., after consulting the judges. Entering ground of "Right Hon. William Fitzhardinge Lord Segrave," good, 8 C. & P. 772. "Baron" is more correct. In Willion v. Berkley, Plowden's R. 223, one defend. ant is called Henry Berkley, Knight, Lord Berkley. (x) 2 Hale, 182. As to stating dignities of parties prosecuted, see ante, p. 203. (y) R. v. Graham, 2 Leach, 549. An (a) R. v. Sulls, 2 Leach, 861. (d) 2 Hale, 181. See 2 B. & Ald. 580. To support the description of "unknown" there must be evidence shewing be described by either, and by the name which he has assumed, even though shown not to be his right name (e). If a false description be added to the name, as if a female feloniously married by a man whose wife is still alive, be described a "widow," when she is shown to be a single woman, the error will be fatal, though no description of her was requisite (f). Where the party injured has a mother or father of the same name, it is better to style the prosecutor the "younger," as it may be presumed that the parent is the party meant; for George Johnson means G. J. the elder, unless the contrary is expressed (g). But this was held immaterial where it sufficiently proved who Elizabeth Edwards, the party described assaulted, was, viz., the daughter of that the name could not reasonably have been supposed to be known to the grand jury, Reg. v. Stroud, 1 C. & Kir. 187. "Unknown was held sufficient where there was evidence that the party injured, a bastard child who died at twelve days old unbaptized, had been called by its mother Mary-Ann, R. v. Smith, 1 Mood. C. C. 402; S. C. 6 C. & P. 151. A bastard which had never acquired a name is sufficiently identified by shewing the name of its parent thus—“ A certain illegitimate male child then lately born of the body of A. B. (the mother). Reg. v. Mary & Jane Hogg, 2 M. & Rob. 380. See Reg. v. Hicks, 2 id. 302, where an indictment for child-murder was held bad for not stating the name of the child or accounting for its omission. A bastard must not be described by his mother's name till he has acquired it by reputation, R. v. Clark, R. & Ry. 358; Wakefield v. Mackay, 1 Phill. R. 133, contra. A bastard child, six weeks old, who was baptized on a Sunday, and down to the following Tuesday had been called by its name of baptism and mother's surname, was held by Erskine, J., to be properly described by both those names in an indictment for its murder, Reg. v. Evans, 8 C. & P. 765; but where a bastard was baptized "Eliza," without mentioning any surname at the ceremony, and was afterwards, at three weeks old, suffocated by the prisoner, an indictment, styling it "Eliza Waters," that being the mother's surname, was held bad by all the judges, as the deceased had not acquired the name of Waters by reputation, R. v. Ellen Waters, 1 Mood. Cr. C. 457. (N.B. No baptismal register or copy of it was produced at either trial. Semb. "Eliza" would have sufficed. See Reg. v. Stroud, C. & Kir. 187, and cases collected, Williams v. Bryant, 5 M. & Wel. 447.) In the previous case of R. v. Frances Clark, Ry. & Ry. 358. an indictment stated the murder of "George Lakeman Clark, a base-born "infant male child, aged three weeks,'' by the prisoner, its mother. The child had been christened George Lakeman, being the names of its reputed father, and was called so, and not by any other name known to the witnesses. Its mother called it so. There was no evidence that it had been called by or obtained its mother's name of Clark. The court held him improperly laid Clark, and as nothing but the name identified him in it, the conviction was held bad. See also R. v. Sheen, 2 C. & P. 634. However in Reg. v. Biss, 8 C. & P. 773, an indictment against a married woman for murder of a legitimate child, which stated "that she, in and upon a certain infant male child, of tender years, to wit, of the age of six weeks, and not baptized, feloniously and wilfully, &c. did make an assault, &c." was held insufficient by all the judges, as it neither stated the child's name, nor that it was "to the jurors unknown." Semble, it would have sufficed to state him as a certain male child, &c. of tender age, that is to say, about the age of six weeks, and not baptized, born of the body of E. B." See 2 C. & P. 635, n. 66 See also R. v. Sheen, 2 C. & P. 634. (f) R. v. Deeley, 1 Mood. C. C. R. |