be reckoned from the time of the order, or from that of the actual stoppage in consequence of it; and the court held the former. Lawrence, J., said, that on the construction of the act as to the time of appealing, he saw no other line to go by, as otherwise it would be difficult to say to what period an appeal might be deferred (x); a principle adhered to, and illustrated by Lord Ellenborough in a subsequent case on the same act (y). And it is immaterial that the appellant has had no notice of the order, &c. in time to enable him to appeal in proper time, or in fact did not know it (z), for if the right of appeal were to depend on such personal notice of the order, the time for appealing would be indefinitely deferred, contrary to the intention of the legislature (a).

Two justices in a special session, on the 20th of June, made an order for a public footway to be diverted and turned. On the 4th of July following, they made another order for the old footway to be stopped

up

under the act then enabling them to do so. Appeal at the next Michaelmas quarter session, the Midsummer quarter session having been holden on the 11th of July. The justices dismissed the appeal, conceiving that the time within which it was to be made was to be reckoned from the date of the first order, which was for diverting the way. But the court held that the grievance commenced only from the time of the order for stopping up the old footway, not from that of the order for making a new one; and issued a mandamus to hear the appeal (b).

An act for the inclosure of certain lands in Middlesex, contained a clause giving an appeal" within six months from the time when the cause of complaint shall have arisen" (c). The commissioner, at a meeting under the act, on 18th June, 1818, showed the map to the appellant, with the allotment marked out upon it, which he, the commissioner, had assigned to him, the appellant. The latter raised some objections to it, and desired the commissioner to reconsider it. He did so, but made no alteration, and having received no further application, on 28th August following, sent a formal notice to the appellant that the land remained allotted to him according to the map exhibited to him on 18th June previous, and on the same day the said allotment was accordingly staked out by command of the said commissioner.

According to the local act, as well as the general inclosure act, no allotment ought to be made, till the roads have been set out; and the roads in this case could not be staked out till the end of July, because the crops were on the ground. The appeal was lodged on 9th January, and respited till the 29th April, when it was opposed on the ground of not having been lodged in time, i. e. within six months from the cause of complaint arising; and the justices dismissed the appeal on this ground; but the court granted a mandamus to them to hear the appeal, being of opinion that there was no actual setting out of the allotment according to the true construction of the act, till something founded on the plan was actually done (d).

An inclosure act gave to the party aggrieved a right of appeal for any thing done in pursuance of that act, or of the (recited) general inclosure act, on giving to the commissioner, and to the parties concerned, ten days' notice in writing. Notice of appeal against an order ascertaining the boundaries between two townships, was served on the commissioner, but not on the lady of the manor, who was interested in the question, on account of an alleged error in ascertaining the boundaries of the parish to be inclosed. The appeal was to the quarter sessions, on the ground that the commissioner had included within his boundary a considerable part of an adjoining manor belonging to S. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that the sessions had no jurisdiction, no notice having been given to the lady of the manor; and the court held that the justices had acted right, for the notice of appeal was insufficient. By the general act, the party who appeals is bound to give eight days' notice to the commissioner, by the local act ten days' notice to the commissioner, and also to the parties concerned. The latter, therefore, so far supersedes the provisions of the former; and it would be a great hardship if the parties concerned were bound by a notice to the commissioner alone. "Party concerned" includes parties directly interested in the soil; which in this case the lady of the manor was, and therefore entitled to notice, which she had not received (e).

It seems to follow from Farrar v. Billing (ƒ), that, at least in cases where the provisions of a local inclosure act conform to, and do not contradict or supersede, those of the general inclosure act, the grievance or foundation of appeal arises at that point of time when the allottee has notice of the portion allotted for him on the map by the

(d) R. v. Middlesex (Justices), (MSS. Dickenson), & 1 Chit. R. 367. See R. v. Nockolds, 1 Ad. & E. 245; and post, Chap. XV. sect. 6.

(e) R. v. Lancashire (Justices), 1 B. & Ald. 630.

(f) Farrar v. Billing, 2 B. & Ald. 171.

commissioners, whether he obtains that knowledge from a map, or by staking out, or in any other manner. A local inclosure act gave an appeal to parties grieved by any thing done in pursuance of the act, to "any general quarter sessions holden for the county, within four calendar months next after the cause of complaint shall have arisen." An allotment was made and staked out by the commissioners in March, and the appellant cropped it. It was held, that though the mere staking out the ground might not be a grievance, as it might be done without notice to the party, yet his cropping it showed him too late in lodging his appeal at the October session (g).

In a private inclosure act, power was given to the commissioners to set out land in a certain proportion in lieu of tithes to the vicar, with the following clause of appeal ;-"And if any persons shall think themselves aggrieved by any thing done in pursuance of this act, they may appeal to any general quarter session of the peace for the county, &c. within six calendar months after such cause of complaint shall have arisen." The commissioners made an allotment upon the map, which the vicar inspected in November, 1812, and appointed an agent who attended a subsequent meeting, when an alteration was made which such agent approved, and it was understood at the meeting where such agent so concurred, that all objections were reconciled, and the allotments definitely settled. In November, 1813, the commissioners gave notice that all tithes were to cease from the 29th of September last preceding. The vicar entered an appeal against the allotment at the Epiphany sessions, 1814, being within six calendar months from the date of the notice of the commissioners above mentioned; which appeal was dismissed as being out of time, the question being from what period the "grievance commenced." But the court held that the notice of the commissioners of the time from which the tithes were to cease, was the commencement of the vicar's grievance, and therefore that the appeal was in time (h).

An act gave, in the first place, a complaint to special sessions, and afterwards an appeal to quarter sessions to any person aggrieved by any act done under the act. A party grieved applied to special sessions, who after hearing the case and evidence, dismissed the complaint on a supposed want of power to

(g) R. v. Wilts (Justices), 13 East, 353. See R. v. Cumberland (Justices), 1 B. & Cr. 64. The other point held in R. v. Wilts (Justices), was, that as it was too late to lodge it at the October sessions, they could not adjourn it.

grant relief. The quarter sessions

(h) R. v. Gloucestershire (Justices), 3 M. & S. 127; and see R. v. Nockolds, 1 Ad. & E. 245; Smith v. Shaw, 10 B. & Cr. 277. See as to inclosures in general, 6 & 7 W. IV. c. 115; 3 & 4 Vict. c. 31.

dismissed the appeal on the ground of want of jurisdiction to hear it. But the court granted a mandamus, holding the dismissal by the petty sessions to be an act done against which an appeal would lie (i).

A local act vested the management of the parish poor in the churchwardens and others, and gave an appeal to them by any person thinking himself aggrieved by any thing to be done by virtue of the act, and if he should not be satisfied with their determination, then gave an appeal to the quarter sessions. A parishioner applied for relief against a poor-rate to the churchwardens, &c. who, at a meeting, resolved to take no further notice of his application; the court held, that as the churchwardens, &c. had not come to any determination on the subject matter of the complaint, the remedy was by mandamus to them to hear the appeal; and an appeal to the sessions was held mistaken (k). By a local act, certain guardians, &c. of the poor were incorporated and ordered to hold courts at which rate-payers might object to their proceedings; and if the matter could not be then settled, it was to be adjourned to the next court, to be then "finally heard and determined. By another clause, any person aggrieved by any thing done in pursuance of the act, and for which no further mode of relief was already appointed,' might appeal to the quarter sessions to be holden within four calendar months next after the cause of complaint should have arisen." The directors ordered certain payments to be made for sums due on annuities and interest on loans previously granted and incurred. A rate-payer appealed within four months after the date of their order. Held that the borrowing the money and granting the annuities were not the "cause of complaint," but the being burdened in respect of the payments by the making the order; and the sessions were ordered to hear the appeal (1). The court also held that the act did not confine the party to the remedy before the directors.

Where a local act gave an appeal against a rate, first to a borough sessions, and then against their order to the county sessions, the appellant was confined to the original grounds of appeal urged at the borough sessions, though he might bring forward-additional evidence (m).

(i) R. v. Tucker, 3 B. & C. 544. See also Blakemore v. Glamorgan Canal Company, 3 Y. & J. 60.

(k) R. v. Kent (Justices), 9 B. & C. 283. See Reg. v. Haines, argued Q. B. Trin. 1845.

(1) R. v. Salop (Justices), 2 B. & Adol.

145.

(m) R. v. Suffolk (Justices), 1 B. & Ald. 640; and see R. v. Tucker, in last page, and post.

SECTION III.

OF THE STEPS PRELIMINARY TO THE ENTERING AN APPEAL FOR HEARING; AND HEREIN OF NOTICES OF APPEAL GENERally.

When Convicting Justices must inform the Party of his Right to Appeal, and when not.]-Some statutes make it a part of a magistrate's duty to acquaint the party whom he convicts of his right of appealing, and also to inform him of the necessary steps to be taken. In convicting on such statutes, if the justice neglect to perform the whole of this duty,-viz. if on a statute requiring both the entering into a recognizance to appear at the next sessions and prosecute his appeal, and also notice in writing of appeal, he informs the party convicted of his right to appeal and receives his recognizance, but is silent as to the notice, the appellant is discharged from the obligation of giving the notice in writing, and the session is bound to receive his appeal (n). The necessity for informing the party that he must give notice of appeal may be waived: as, where a party was informed of his right of appeal, and replied, he thought he had better pay the penalty, but notwithstanding afterwards appealed (o).

Time of Entering into Recognizance in order to Appeal.]—A statute required that recognizances should be entered into "forthwith" after giving notice of appeal. That means not "immediately" after the act of giving the notice of appeal, but without unreasonable delay; and a nine days' interval, without cause assigned for the delay, was held to take away the right to appeal (p). If a recognizance is made necessary, it may be verbally acknowledged before a justice within the time fixed, and perfected afterwards (q). It is doubted whether a corporation can enter into a recognizance; so that any clause requiring it will beinapplicable as to them, unless expressly named (r); but they may appoint an attorney, or procure sureties to enter into it (s).

(n) R. v. Leeds (Justices), 4 T. R. 583. Note, there had been a notice of appealing, though not in writing; and the convicting magistrates had expressed their satisfaction with it, see 2 B. & Ald. 695.

(0) R. v. York (West Riding, Justices), 3 M. & S. 493, per Cur. "All the statute positively requires is, that the justices shall make known to the person convicted his right of appeal; they do so; and if he had thereupon signified his intention to appeal, non liquet that they would not have also proceeded

to inform him of the further steps to be taken by him. But why should they do so nugatory an act as to inform him what he must do to appeal and enforce his right, when he had declined to appeal altogether, and had waived his right? See also 7 & 8 G. IV. c. 29, s. 72; id. c. 30, s. 38.

(p) Reg. v. Worcestershire (Justices), 7 D. P. C. 789, Coleridge, J.

(9) See ante, p. 50.

(r) Cortis v. Kent Waterworks Company, 7 B. & Cr. 331.

(s) Id. 331, 332, 337.