It may turn out a safe criterion, by which to judge whether the court above will or will not interfere with those decisions of a quarter sessions which hinge on its own rules, to consider, whether the point be one of pure practice for the regulation of its own proceedings, and as such, necessarily within its own discretion to adjudicate on, or one which also involves a legal question, and of which accordingly, though the magistrates are judges, they are not sole judges; e. g. the common question, What is that" reasonable" notice of appeal which gives a quarter sessions jurisdiction to hear it (n)? In R. v. The Justices of Wilts (0), the court interposed to prevent what appeared to them an unjust result of a novel practice at the sessions. Where an appeal was formally entered at a sessions, as an appeal by an individual named, against the accounts of the "churchwardens and overseers" of a parish, and the appellant served a notice of it directed to the overseers only, it was held that as the churchwardens had not, in fact, received or disbursed any parish money, or kept any account, it was evident to one looking at the subject-matter of the appeal, that it was substantially against the accounts of the overseers, to whom notice had been given, and the sessions were ordered to hear the appeal (p). Costs of Appeals "heard and determined" at Quarter Sessions.]— The power to give costs is not incident to the authority of the sessions, nor does it exist at common law: and therefore they never can be given, unless by the words of the particular act under which the justices are acting at the time. Whenever the sessions grant costs, they form part of the judgment of the court, and the amount must be ascertained by and in the order itself to be made before the sessions end (q); for they have no power to grant costs generally, like the courts at Westminster, to be afterwards taxed by the proper officer; though they may direct the clerk of the peace to ascertain and report to them during the same (n) Suggested by the observations of Mr. Baron Parke, then a member of the court of king's bench, on R. v. Wilts (Justices), 10 East, 404, made by him in R. v. Lancashire (Justices), 7 B. & Cr. 691; R. v. Yorkshire (Justices, W. R.), 5 B. & Adol. 671, 672. The case of R. v. Surrey (Justices), as reported in 1 D. & R. 162, has some expressions of Lord Tenterden contrary to this, which, however, do not occur in the report in 5 B. & Ald. 539. In another case also (R. v. Monmouthshire (Justices), 3 D. P. C. 311), Patteson, J., said of R. v. Wilts (Justices), 10 East, 404, that the judges thought many of its note. (p) R. v. Norfolk (Justices), 2 B. & Adol. 944. (q) James Parke, J., sitting alone in ex parte Holloway, 1 D. P. C. 26, relied on in Reg. v. Long; and Sellwood v. Mount, ante. session, the items of expenditure which may form the grounds of their decision; but they must themselves, while the sessions continue, determine the sum to be paid, for they cannot delegate their authority (r). Such order, when made, cannot be enforced by attachment; but the party who disobeys it after it has been personally served on him, will be liable to indictment for the misdemeanour, and punished for his contempt by imprisonment and fine. By the practice at many sessions, forty shillings costs is allowed to the party succeeding on an appeal, in which costs may be given. Sometimes, when notice of appeal is given and not countermanded, the practice is to refuse the appellant leave to enter and respite his appeal, unless he agrees to pay the costs of the day (s). In the case of an appeal against a poor's rate, unless the appeal is entered, the sessions cannot order the appellant to pay the costs which his notice may have occasioned to the respondents in preparing to resist the appeal; for it is not "heard and determined" (t): but if it was entered and respited, and opposition to it is afterwards abandoned by the respondents, so that the rate was quashed without more, and the appeal allowed, it was held to have been "heard and determined" so as to enable the sessions to give the appellant the costs incurred down to the time of abandonment (u); and the like, if, after the appeal was entered and respited, a notice of appeal given for the second sessions was countermanded, and the appellant did not appear then to support his appeal (x). Record of Appeal having been heard.]—In order to prove the hearing of an appeal, the record should be produced regularly made up on parchment (y). This, however, appears not absolutely necessary if the paper sessions book, made up by the clerk of the peace, is produced (z). (r) S. C. but see one case, semb. contra, ante. () R. v. Monmouthshire (Justices), 1 B. & Adol. 895. See Porter v. Cooper, 2 C. M. & R. 232; 4 Tyr. R. 456; King v. Taylor, 2 C. M. & R. 235; 5 Tyr. 804. (t) R. v. Essex (Justices), 8 T. R. 583, on 17 G. II. c. 38, s. 4. Appellant countermanded his notice of appeal the day before the sessions. (u) See R. v. Cawston, 4 D. & R. 445. See 2 Adol. & E. 374. (x) Ex parte Holloway, 1 D. P. C. 26, ante, p. 658, note (g). (y) R. v. Ward, and other cases, ante, p. 520; also as to the requisites of such record, 2 Nolan, 564. (z) R. v. Yeoveley (Inh.) 8 Ad. & E. 806, ante. CHAPTER X. OF APPEALS AGAINST POOR-RATES; THE APPOINTMENT OF OVERSEERS; AND OVERSEERS' ACCOUNTS. SECTIONS. I. II. III. Of the Right of Appeal against Poor-Rates, and to what Sessions, p. 660. 1. Of the Persons by whom the Rate is to be Made, p. 668. 2. Of the Purposes for which the Rate may be made and its Proceeds applied, p. 669. 3. Of the Subjects in respect of which the Assessment may be made; and herein of the Parties liable to be Assessed in respect of Occupation, &c. and the Principle and Proportion of Assessment, p. 671. 4. Of the Manner in which Poor's Rates must be made, allowed, and published, p. 691. IV. Of the Trial of Appeals against Poor's Rates, and the Judgment of the V.-Of Appeals against the Appointment of Overseers, p. 699. SECTION I. OF THE RIGHT OF APPEAL AGAINST POOR-RATES. How Originates.]—The right of appealing against rates for relief of the poor was given originally by 43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 6, which enables any persons "who shall find themselves grieved with any cess or tax, or other act done by the churchwardens and other persons, or by the justices allowing the rate," to appeal generally to the general quarter sessions, who were to make such order thereon as by them should be thought convenient; the same to conclude and bind all parties. This provision being thought to confine the remedy to persons complaining of pecuniary grievance, stat. 17 G. II. c. 38, s. 4, gives the right of appeal to any person who “shall find himself aggrieved by any rate or assessment made for the relief of the poor; or shall have any material objection to any person or persons being put on or left out of such rate or assessment; or to the sum charged on any person or persons therein; or shall have any material objection to such account (i. e. the overseers' account) as aforesaid, or any part thereof; or shall find himself aggrieved by any neglect, act, or thing done or omitted by the churchwardens and overseers of the poor, or by any of his majesty's justices of the peace." The safest remedy against an improper rating is by appeal; for, if the objections rest on the uncertainty of the specification of property in the rate (a), or on any other ground short of absolute want of jurisdiction by the justices (e. g. the nullity of the rate as regards the party assessed, where he has no visible, real, or personal property, so that he is not rateable at all-or its not having been duly published, &c.), an appeal is the only remedy (b). A rate cannot be abandoned by overseers after its allowance by the justices and publication in the church, and the only mode of getting rid of it as an existing rate, if at least the assessments have been collected and the appeal entered, is by quashing it at the sessions on appeal (c). But overseers may abandon the defence of a rate by not contesting an appeal at sessions, and consenting to a motion to quash it (d). To what Session in respect of Place and Time.]-The appeal is given to the general quarter (e) session of the peace for the particular (a) Cortis v. Kent Waterworks Company, 7 B. & C. 314, 333, 334; Hutchins v. Chambers, 1 Burr. 580. (b) See Marshall v. Pitman, 9 Bing. 595, Hil. 1833, collecting the cases from Milward v. Caffin, 2 Bla. R. 1330. See also the note to 5 Ad. & El. 8, and Sibbald v. Roderick, 11 Ad. & E. 38, as distinguished in 11 M. & W. 503. Trespass, (Cro. Car. 394, cases collected 6 New C. 373; see also 11 Ad. & E. 993); replevin, and case for excessive levy, are the other remedies; see 9 Bing. 595; 1 Ad. & E. 264; 11 M. & W. 149, 158, 503. As to remedies by appeal under local acts, see R. v. Kent (Justices), 9 B. & C. 283; R. v. Tucker, 3 B. & Cr. 544; R. v. St. James, Westminster, 1 Ad. & E. 241; 4 Nev. & Man. 499; R. v. Suffolk (Justices), 1 B. & Ald. 640. As to the Sudbury act, R. v. Norwich (Justices), 3 D. & R. 42. (c) Thus where a sessions refused to hear an appeal against a rate, because the respondents had previously given notice of abandoning it, a mandamus issued to compel the hearing, R. v. Cambridge (Justices), 2 Ad. & E. 370; but the court would not give, against the parish officers, costs of application for a mandamus, and of that writ under ] W. IV. c. 21, s. 6. The same law applies to a borough rate in nature of a county rate. See post, Ch. XIV. (d) Reg. v. Fouch and another, 2 Q. B. 309. (e) Though 17 G. II. c. 38, s. 4, expressly gives the appeal to the "next general OR quarter sessions, it appears from other parts of that act, aswell as from other acts in pari materia, that those terms are used synonymously. Thus, though in London and Middlesex there are four general as well as four quarter sessions, still every quarter session being a general session, the appeal against a rate must in those counties be to the next quarter jurisdiction in which the parish lies, whether county, riding, or other division. If it be situate in the borough of a corporate city or town, having a grant of a court of separate quarter sessions under the late municipal corporations act (f), the appeal must be to that court. But in franchises or corporate towns where no such separate court exists, and having less than six corporate justices, it seems that this appeal may still be to the sessions of the county, riding, or division (g). Nothing in the parochial assessment act (6 & 7 W. IV. c. 96), for enabling justices to hold four special sessions in the year to hear appeals against rates of parishes within their division, deprives a person of a right to appeal to quarter sessions against any rate; and no order of such a special session is of any force pending any appeal touching the same matter to the court of general or quarter sessions of the peace having jurisdiction to try such appeal, or in opposition to the order of any such court upon such an appeal (h). The appeal must be lodged at the next practicable quarter sessions after publication of the rate (i); for it is by the assessment that the party is "aggrieved," and against that he appeals (j); but an appeal before such allowance is premature (k). By "practicable," is meant the next session for which the appellant is in time to give an effectual notice of appeal after publication of the rate (). If, from a refusal of a copy of the rate, or its late publication, only one day intervenes between its publication and the next immediate quarter session, the appellant is not bound even to lodge his appeal there (m). It may be lodged at an adjourned general quarter session, if the practice admits of so doing (n); but the appellant is not bound so to enter it (o). Yet, sessions, R. v. London (Justices), 15 East, 631. This is otherwise in cases of an appeal against orders of removal when the appeal is only given to quarter sessions, Reg. v. Middlesex (Justices), 4 Q. B. 807. (f) See R. v. St. Mary, Taunton, 1 Bott, 274, 282; 2 Nolan, 491; and R. v. Cambridge (Justices), 2 Ad. & E. 370; S. C. 4 N. & M. 238. (Both are cases before 5 & 6 W. IV.) (g) See 17 G. II. c. 38, s. 55; 1 G. IV. c. 36. See R. v. Essex (Justices), 5 M. & S. 513. However, in 43 El. c. 2, s. 8, are negative words excluding any but borough justices from entering or meddling in towns, places corporate, and cities (semble, out of sessions). (h) 6 & 7 W. IV. c. 96, s. 7, ante. (i) 17 G. II. c. 38, s. 4; R. v. Sussex (Justices), 15 East, 206, R. v. Hendon, ante; and see R. v. London (Justices), 15 East, 632; ante, note (e). The regularity of the publication in church, or the reverse, will not be inquired into in the queen's bench on a case reserved at the sessions, if it was not intended to be referred, R. v. Aire and Calder Navigation, 2 T. R. 660. As to publication, see post. (j) R. v. Micklefield, Cald. 507; 1 Bott, 204, 279, note; 43 El. c. 2, is repealed, quoad hoc, by 17 G. II. c. 38, s. 4; R. v. Worcestershire (Justices), 5 M. & S. 457; R. v. Coode, Cald. 464; 1 Bott. 276. (k) R. v. Atkins, 4 T. R. 12. (m) R. v. Sussex (Justices), 15 East, S. 479. |