volution of causes and effects from God downwards, by which things and events, positis omnibus ponendis, are necessarily produced, according to the plan which infinite wisdom designed from the beginning. God, the first cause, hath given being and activity to an immense number of secondary subaltern causes; which are so inseparably linked and interwoven with their respective effects (a connexion truly admirable, and not to be comprehended by man in his present state,) that those things which do in reality come to pass necessarily, and by inevitable destiny seem, to the superficial observer, to come to pass in the common course of nature, or by virtue of human reasoning and freedom. This is that inscrutable method of divine wisdom, "A. qua" (says St. Austin) "est omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo, mensura, numerus, pondus; a qua sunt semina formarum, formæ seminum, motus seminum atque formarum."

Necessity is the consequence of fate. So Trismegistus ! Παντα δε γιάνεται φυσει και ειμαρμένη, και εκ επιτοπο ερημου προνοίας. προνοια δε εσι, αυτοτελης. Δοσο τα επερανία Θεό. δυο δε τ878 αυτοφυεις δυνάμεις, ανασκη nas poguern. i. e. "All things are brought about και ειμορμένη. by nature and by fate: neither is any place void of providence. Now providence is the self-perfect reason of the super-celestial God; from which reason of his issue two native powers, necessity and fate." Thus, in the judgment of the wiserHeathens, effects were to be traced up to their producing causes; those producing causes were to be farther traced up to the still higher causes, by which they were produced; and those higher causes, to God, the cause of them. Persons, things, circumstances, events, and consequences, are the effects of necessity: Necessity is the laughter of fate: Fate is the offspring of God's.

infinite wisdom and sovereign will. Thus, all things are ultimately resolved into their great primary cause; by whom the chain was originally let down from heaven, and on whom every link depends.

It must be owned, that all the fatalists of antiquity, (particularly among the Stoics) did not constantly express themselves with due precision. A Christian, who is savingly taught by the word and Spirit of God, must be pained and disgusted, not to say, shocked, when he reads such an assertion as Την πεπρωμενην μοιραν αδυοαλον εςι αποφυσειν και Θιῳ. God himself cannot possibly avoid his destiny, (Herodot. 1.) or that of the poet Philemon :

Δόλοι βασιλεων εισιν, οι βασιλείς Θεων,
Ο Θεός αναγκης.

Common men are servants to kings; kings are servants to the gods; and God is a servant to necessity. So Seneca: "Eadem necessitas & Deos alligat; irrevocabilis Divina pariter atque humana cursus vehit. Ille ipse, omnium conditor ac rector, scripsit quidem fata, sed saquitur. Semper paret: Semel jussit." The self-same necessity binds the gods themselves. All things, divine as well as human, are carried forward by one identical and overpowering rapidity. The supreme Author and Governor of the universe hath indeed written and ordained the fates; but having once ordained them, he ever after obeys. them. He commanded them at first, for once; but his conformity to them is perpetual. This is, without doubt, very irreverently, and very incautiously expressed.-Whence it has been common with many Christian writers to tax the Stoics with setting up a first cause superior to God himself, and on which he is dependent.

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But, I apprehend, these philosophers meant in reality no such thing. All they designed to inculcate was, That the will of God and his decrees are unchangeable: that there can be no alteration in the divine intention; no new act arise in his mind: no reversion of his eternal plan; all being founded in adorable sovereignty; ordered by infallible wisdom; ratified by omnipotence; and cemented with immutability. Thus Lucan : Finxis in æternum causas; qua cuncta coercet, Se quoque lege tenens.

And this, not through any imbecility in God, or as if he was subject to fate, of which (on the contrary) himself was the ordainer; but because it is his pleasure to abide by his own decree. For, as Seneca observes, "Imminutio majestatis sit, and confessio erroris, mutanda fecissa: Necesse est et eadem placere, cui nisi optima placere non possunt:" "It would detract from the greatness of God, and look as if he acknowledged himself liable to mistakes, was he to make changeable decrees: his pleasure must necessarily be always the same; seeing that only which is best, can at any time, please an all-perfect being, a good man (adds this philosopher) is under a kind of pleasing necessity to do good; and, if he did not do it, he could not be a good man."

"Magnum hoc argumentum est firmæ voluntatis, ne mutare quidem posse :" "It is a striking proof of a magnanimous will, to be absolutely incapable of changing." And such is the will of God, it never fluctuates nor varies. But, on the other hand, was he susceptible of change, could he through the intervention of any inferior cause, or by some untoward combination of external circumstances, be induced to recede from his purpose, and alter his plan, it would be a most incontestable mark of weakness and de

pendence the force of which argument made Seneca, though a heathen, cry out "Non externa Deos cogunt; sed sua illis in legem æterna voluntas est ;" "Outward things cannot compel the Gods; but their own eternal will is a law to themselves." It may be objected, that this seems to infer, as if the Deity was still under some kind of restraint: By no means. Let Seneca obviate this cavil, as he effectually does in these admirable words: "Nec Deus ab hoc minus liber aut potens est; Ipse enim est necessitas sua:" God is not hereby, either less free, or less powerful; for he himself is his own necessity."

On the whole, it is evident that when the Stoics speak, even in the strongest terms, of the obligation of fate on God himself, they may and ought to be understood in a sense worthy of the adorable uncreated Majesty. In thus interpreting the doctrine of fate, as taught by the genuine philosophers of the Portico, I have the great St. Austin on my side; who, after canvassing, and justly rejecting the bastard, or astrological fate; thus goes on: "At qui omnium connectionem seriemque causarum, qua fit omne quod fit, fati, nomine appellant; non multum cum eis, de verbi controversia, certandum atque laborandam est: quandoquidem ipsum causarum ordinem, and quandam connectionem, summi Dei tribuunt voluntati:" i. e. "But for those philosophers, [meaning the Stoics] who, by the word fate, mean that regular chain and series of causes, to which all things that come to pass owe their immediate existence: we will not earnestly contend with these persons about a mere term, and we the rather acquiesce in their manner of expression, because they carefully ascribe this

fixed succession of things, and this mutual concatenation of causes and effects, to the will of the supreme God." Austin adds many observations of the same import; and proves from Seneca himself, as rigid a Stoic as any, that this was the doctrine, and the meaning of his philosophic brethren.