logy. But while intent solely on accommodating and applying the principles of human covenants to divine subjects, he incautiously fell into some opinions which it is not easy to approve. For instance, he asserted that the covenant, which God made with the Hebrew nation, through the medium of Moses, did not differ in its nature from the new covenant procured by Jesus Christ. He supposed, that God caused the ten commandments to be promulged by Moses, not as a law which was to be obeyed, but as one form of the covenant of grace. But, when the Hebrews had offended him, by various sins, and especially by the worship of the golden calf, God being moved with just indignation, superadded to that moral law the yoke of the ceremonial law, to serve as a punishment. This yoke was in itself very burdensome, but it became much more painful in consequence of its import. For it continually admonished the Hebrews of their very imperfect, dubious, and anxious state, and was a kind of perpetual memento, that they merited the wrath of God, and that they could not anticipate a full expiation and remission of their sins, till the Messiah should come. Holy men, indeed, under the Old Testament, enjoyed eternal salvation after death; but while they lived, they were far from having that assurance of salvation, which is so comforting to us under the New Testament. For no sins were then actually forgiven, but only suffered to remain unpunished; because Christ had not yet offered up himself as a sacrifice to God, and therefore could not be regarded, before the divine tribunal, as one who has actually assumed our debt, but only as our surety. I omit other opinions of Cocceius. Those who assailed the Cartesian doctrines, attacked also these opinions, in a fierce war, which was kept up for many years, with various success. The issue was the same, as in the Cartesian contest. No device, and no force, could prevent the disciples of Cocceius from occupying many professorial chairs, and from propagating the opinions of their master, both orally and in writing, with wonderful celerity, even among the Germans and the Swiss'.

9 The same writers may be consulted here, as were referred to before; for the Cartesian and Coc

ceian controversies were united in one. To these may be added, Val. Alberti, Aλovν кάжTа, Cartesianis

§ 33. Nearly all the other controversies, which disquieted the Dutch churches in this century, arose from an excessive attachment to the Cartesian philosophy as connected with theology. This will appear from those commotions, greater than all others, produced by Roel and Becker. Certain Cartesian divines, at the head of whom was Herman Alexander Roel, a theologian of Franeker, a man of singular acuteness and perspicuity, were supposed, in the year 1686, to attribute too much to reason, in theology. Nearly the whole controversy was embraced in these two questions: I. Whether the divine origin and authority of the sacred books, can be demonstrated by reason alone; or whether the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit is necessary, in order to a firm belief on this subject? II. Whether the Holy Scriptures propose any thing to be believed by us, which is contrary to correct and sound reason? The first was affirmed and the second denied, not only by the above-named Roel, but also by John van der Wayen, Gisbert Wessel, Duker, Ruard ab Andala, and others: the contrary was maintained by Ulrich Huber, a jurist of great reputation, Gerhard de Vries, and others'. A great part of Belgium being now in a flame, the states of Friesland prudently interposed, and enjoined silence and peace on both the contending parties. Those who shall accurately investigate this cause, will, I think, perceive that a great part of it was a strife about words, and that the remainder of it might have been easily settled, if it had been stripped of its ambiguities.

§ 34. A little after this controversy had been hushed in a measure, this same Roel, in the year 1689, fell under no slight suspicion, that he was plotting against sound theology, in consequence of some other singular opinions of his. He was viewed with suspicion, not only by his colleagues, and particularly by Campeius Vitringa, but also by very many of the Dutch divines. For he denied that the scriptural representations of the generation of the Son of God, are to be under

mus et Cocceianismus, descripti et refutati. Leips. 1678. 4to.

1 John le Clerc, Biblioth. Universelle et Histor. tom. vi. p. 368.

2 Concerning this extraordinary man, see the Bibliotheca Bremensis

Theologico-Philol. tom. ii. pt. vi. p. 707. Caspar Burmann's Trajectum Eruditum, p. 306, &c. [Unpartheyische Kirchenhistorie, Jena, 1735. 4to. vol. ii. p. 620, &c. Tr.]

stood as denoting any natural generation; and maintained that the death of holy men, and the evils they suffer in this life, equally with the calamities and death of the wicked, are the penal effects of the first sin; and he advanced some things respecting the divine decrees, original sin, the divine influence in regard to the sinful acts of men, the satisfaction made by Christ, and other subjects, which, either in reality, or at least in form and phraseology, differed much from the received opinions. The magistrates of Friesland published decrees, which prevented these disputes from spreading in that province but the rest of the Dutch, and especially those of the province of Holland, could not be restrained from condemning Roel and his disciples, both privately, and in their public conventions, as corruptors of divine truth. Nor did this resentment die with the excellent man who was the object of it; but

3 These errors may be best learned from a paper of the Faculty of Theology at Leyden, in which they confirm the sentence pronounced on them by the Dutch synods, entitled, Judicium Ecclesiasticum, quo opiniones quadam Cl. H. A. Roëlli Synodice damnatæ sunt, laudatum a Professoribus Theologiæ in Academia Lugduno-Batara; Leyden, 1713. 4to. 20 sheets. [Roel maintained, that the title Son of God referred only to the human nature of Christ, and to the supernatural formation or conception of it, as also to his mediatorial office; and consequently, that it afforded no proof of his divinity. Yet in his later writings, he admitted, that Christ was also called the Son of God, on account of his eternal generation by the Father; yet without excluding the before-mentioned ground. In order to prove that the death of believers is a punishment, he maintained, that in justification, only some of the punishments of sin are remitted, and that the complete removal of them does not take place, till after the resurrection. Schl.]

[It must not be inferred, from this statement of Dr. Mosheim, that professor Roel was excommunicated, deprived of his office, or even declared a heretic. Some of his opinions were condemned; but not the man. After serving as a chaplain to several noble

men, he was made professor, first of philosophy, and then of theology, at Franeker in Friesland, in the year 1686. In the year 1704, he was removed to the professorship of theology at Utrecht; where he died in office, A. D. 1718, aged 65. The states of Friesland enjoined upon him, in 1691, not to teach or preach his peculiarities of sentiment; they also enjoined upon his opposers, to keep silence on the same subjects. Both obeyed: so that in Friesland there was no more contention. But in the other Dutch provinces, no such order was taken by the government: and therefore, several synods, finding Roel's opinions to exist and to spread, passed orders of condemnation upon them; and decreed, that candidates should be required to renounce them, in order to their receiving license. He was undoubtedly a great man. Hence Mosheim calls him "vir eximius." He was also, in the main, sound in the faith. Yet on some points, he carried his speculations farther than the spirit of the times would permit. But, like a good man, when he found his speculations to produce alarm and commotion, at the bidding of the magistrates, he forebore to urge them, and expended his efforts on subjects less offensive. Tr.]

even to our times, the Roëlians, though they most solemnly protest their innocence, are thought by many to be infected with concealed heresies.

§ 35. Balthazar Becker, a minister of the Gospel at Amsterdam, from the Cartesian definition of a spirit, the truth of which he held to be unquestionable, took occasion to deny absolutely, all that the Scriptures teach us respecting the works, snares, and power of the prince of darkness and his satellites, and also all the vulgar reports respecting ghosts, spectres, and witchcraft. There is extant a prolix and copious work of his, entitled, The World Bewitched, first published in 1691; in which he perverts and explains away, with no little ingenuity, but with no less audacity, whatever the sacred volume relates, of persons possessed by evil spirits, and of the power of demons; and maintains, that the miserable being, whom the sacred writers call Satan and the Devil, together with his ministers, lies bound with everlasting chains in hell; so that he cannot thence go forth, to terrify mortals, and to plot against the righteous. Des Cartes placed the essence of spirit in thinking: but none of those acts, which are ascribed to evil spirits, can be effected by mere thought. Therefore, lest the reputation of Des Cartes should be impaired, the narrations and decisions of the divine books must be accommodated to his opinion. This error not only disquieted all the United Provinces, but likewise induced not a few Lutheran

5 ["Our historian relates here, somewhat obscurely, the reasoning which Becker founded upon the Cartesian definition of mind or spirit. The tenor and amount of his argument is as follows: The essence of mind is thought, and the essence of matter is extension.-Now since there is no sort of conformity or connexion between a thought and extension, mind cannot act upon matter unless these two substances be united, as soul and body are in man therefore no separate spirits either good or evil, can act upon mankind. Such acting is miraculous, and miracles can be performed by God alone. It follows of consequence, that the Scripture accounts of the actions and operations of good and evil spirits must be understood in an allegorical

sense.'-This is Becker's argument; and it does, in truth, little honour to his acuteness and sagacity. By proving too much, it proves nothing at all; for if the want of a connexion or conformity between thought and extension renders mind incapable of acting upon matter, it is hard to see how their union should remove this incapacity, since the want of conformity and connexion remains notwithstanding this union. Besides, according to this reasoning, the Supreme Being cannot act upon material beings. In vain does Becker maintain the affirmative, by having recourse to a miracle, for this would imply, that the whole course of nature was a series of miracles, that is to say, that there are no miracles at all." Mac.]

divines to gird on their armour. Its author, although confuted by vast numbers, and deprived of his ministerial office,