ferred him to the state prison of Fenestrelles in Savoy. There he was kept a close prisoner until the beginning of 1813, when the unparalleled disasters of the Moscow campaign drove Buonaparte upon the forlorn hope of conciliating the pontiff, and his illustrious friend Pacca was allowed to join him at Fontainbleau, with a view to forward the imperial designs. To that place Pius himself had been recently removed, and he was detained there until Napoleon's overthrow in 1814. He had previously spent three years at Savona, whither he was transferred from Grenoble, and the cause of his removal from that place was intelligence that an English frigate was cruising in the Gulph of Lyons, with a view to his escape. At Savona he was not actually in prison, but always under strict observation. To the seizure of his person, Buonaparte protested at St. Helena that he was not privy; and such, probably, is the literal truth. But his whole subsequent conduct proves incontrovertibly that he approved of the act after it was committed, and hence, there can be no doubt, that it was in strict conformity with his own instructions, although his agents might have been intentionally allowed considerable discretion in the execution of them. The captivity of Pius required, in fact, no slight caution, and hence it was obviously convenient to shift the responsibility of it, as much as possible. In spite of the scoffing spirit upon all serious subjects fatally prevalent, even in France, a pope who was a prisoner strongly moved popular pity and veneration. When Pius first was taken to Grenoble, the French people crowded around him with the warmest demonstrations of respectful affection. On the Italian side of the Alps, he was more than once under the necessity of exerting his personal influence to prevent attempts at a rescue'. § 6. The earliest measure of much general importance, which followed the return of Pius to Rome, was the revival of the Jesuits, or more properly, their re-organization as a religious order, capable of indefinite extension. As masses of individuals, more or less connected together, they had never been extinct, and in two recent instances, they had already been formed into national communities. The emperor Paul 7 Alison, vii. 615. obtained papal authority for their revival in Russia, in 1801, and in 1804 they were revived in Sicily, at the suit of king Ferdinand; a patronage but moderately flattering in either case. These concessions the pope, by a bull issued in August, 1814, extended to his own states, and to all others. He authorized, accordingly, Thaddeus Borrozowski, general of the order, to re-unite its members into one community, for the purpose of employing themselves in education, and in clerical duties. The publication of this bull was followed by an act, ordaining the restitution of the funds which formed a patrimony for the Jesuits, and compensation for such of their property as had been confiscated'. The reasons assigned for a measure so decisive as the restoration of an order which had been generally obnoxious, in Romish countries even, but a few years before, were solicitations from persons of every class', and the obvious duty of employing a body so "vigorous and experienced to row the bark of St. Peter, tossed by continual storms "." This metaphorical language has been interpreted as meant for protestantism; which unquestionably was the original mark that Jesuits aimed at. The papal party, however, interprets it as meant for infidelity. Nor is this view unreasonable. England, a protestant state, had been mainly instrumental in the pope's restoration, and of dangers from her creed he had long possessed very little leisure to think. But he had seen a great deal of the dangers caused by infidelity. He therefore naturally thought most of the evils from that quarter, and reasoned that they were more likely to be diminished by the combined efforts of a combination admirably organized and skilfully directed, like the Jesuitic order, than by the desultory move 8 Hist. of the Jesuits, i. 10. 9 Butler's Hist. Mem. iv. 355. "The order of the Jesuits," says Villers, "the most important of all the orders, was placed in opposition to the Reformation, and it acquired a preponderance proportioned to the enormous mass which it was intended to counterbalance. It is with reference to the same great object of opposing the Reformation, that the present pope” (1816) "has declared that he should deem himself guilty of a great crime towards God, if, amidst the dangers of the christian republic, in other words, of the cause of popery, he should neglect to employ the aids which the special Proridence of God had put in his power." Ibid. ii. 396. 5"It is in vain that the advocates of his holiness will contend that he desired the aid of the Jesuits against infidelity; for where is the danger to be apprehended from infidelity now?" Ibid. ments of individuals led by their own impulses to come forward, and commonly possessing neither the discretion nor the ability to come forward effectively. But it is plain that Jesuitism, made once more thoroughly effective, will ever seek its principal objects of attack among adherents of a scriptural faith. Such religionists are likely to take a full share in the warfare against infidelity; but their influence, and even their existence, always menace with absolute extinction such articles of faith as have no surer warrant than tradition, and such religious usages as are palpably akin to downright heathenism. The inherent rottenness of the system that labours under these objections, appears from few things more clearly than from an instinctive clinging to organized combinations during many ages, and as society advanced, from its urgent need of a combination so versatile and so perfectly organized as that of the Jesuits. In this proteiform body, individuals are merged in the whole. Their personal sense of moral responsibility even is liable to be seriously impaired by the share of it seemingly thrown upon a superior; and the superior himself is exposed to a similar evil from confidential communications with select counsellors, and from his dependence upon the recorded principles of his order. In the end, undoubtedly, such a society can hardly fail of injuring the cause that it may temporarily serve. When success has aroused a grasping ambition in itself, and a jealous hostility in others, all its proceedings are likely to be regarded with a suspicion greater even than the necessity requires, and the exertions of individual members are very liable to be undervalued. The men are known to be tools artfully used by others, and the purposes to which they are applied may be thought such as the parties themselves, if honestly under their own guidance, would not have more than half approved". § 7. Among the results of the restoration of papal authority, was a settlement of ecclesiastical arrangements in France. Pius had been allowed little more power in that country, under "His holiness, since the publication of this bull for the restoration of the society, has twice formally signified, that it was not his intention that it should have the effect of restoring it to any state which should not recall it, or express a wish for its return." (Butler's Hist. Mem. iv. 350.) How, then, come fraternities of Jesuits into Britain and Ireland? Surely the state has not "recalled the order, or expressed any wish for its return." one. the imperial government, than the privilege of granting institution to prelates nominated by Napoleon. This sanction, however, he was found in many cases unwilling to give. In 1811 no fewer than twenty-seven bishops were ineffectual suitors for it. Indignant at such a disregard of his choice, Buonaparte declared the Concordat at an end, and called a council of French and Italian prelates to Paris, to provide a remedy for existing evils'. But they came to no determination, during their first session in June. At a second, in the following August, they determined, that unless the pope should institute within six months of the imperial nomination, that power should devolve upon the metropolitan. After many conferences, the pope confirmed this decree, but, for some unknown reason, the emperor would not receive it. In 1813 Pius was again plied with negotiations for a new Concordat, and Napoleon actually signed certain articles as the basis of The pope, however, though a prisoner at Fontainbleau, annulled this plan, and declined all farther intercourse with the imperial court, until he should be restored to liberty. Buonaparte's other affairs now became so urgent, that he had no leisure to think much of the church, and accordingly, Lewis XVIII., on his restoration, found ecclesiastical questions in a very unsatisfactory state. It was not until after various negotiations, protracted into 1817, that they were placed upon a permanent footing. It was then agreed that the Concordat of 1801 should wholly cease, and that the religious concerns of France should stand hereafter upon the basis that had been settled between Leo X. and Francis I. At the same time were founded seven new archbishoprics, and twenty-five bishoprics, to be endowed, as before, with stipends out of the public revenue; a wretched substitute for the ease and independence which France, in earlier times, had conferred upon her clergy'. § 8. When the nineteenth century opened, the Romanists of Britain and Ireland entertained sanguine expectations, from former concessions, the progress of liberality, and rumours of the minister's favourable intentions, of a complete release from 7 Coote, 320. $ Collins, 223. their civil disabilities. It was even believed that Mr. Pitt had given positive encouragement to such anticipations, when intent upon the legislative union of the two islands. The real encouragement, however, given by him amounted to no more. than an observation in the speech by which he brought the articles of union before the House of Commons, that, until that measure should be carried, "full concessions could not be made to the Romanists, without endangering the state, and shaking the constitution to the centre"." This language, which is at farthest ambiguous, and might be little else than a rhetorical amplification, was naturally taken by the parties anxious for relief as an explicit declaration in their favour. They talked, accordingly, of a promise made, but Mr. Fox candidly expressed a belief, in 1805, that such was not the fact'; and in 1810, Robert Stewart, viscount Castlereagh, (afterwards marquess of Londonderry,) negatived in the House of Commons current reports of a pledge given, in the fullest and most unequivocal manner. That able statesman was the principal conductor of the union in Ireland, and during the two years that it was in agitation, he carefully abstained from compromising Mr. Pitt in any manner, as to the Romish question; a silence which near observers interested in its concession interpreted unfavourably, and, in consequence, much of their influence was exerted to preserve the Irish legislature. Leading Romanists, accordingly, were surprised to see Mr. Pitt and his friends assigning the impossibility of obtaining royal consent to the removal of Romish disabilities, as a reason for breaking up the ministry, in 1801'. It is, indeed, probable that this was not the true reason; that rather lying in the difficulties of making peace, experienced by a cabinet which had long bound up its interests with war. Had the assigned cause been the real one, Mr. Pitt could hardly have abstained from advocating the question, when unfettered by office. He did, however, so abstain, and when again in office, that abstinence continued; probably from respect for George the Third's conscientious scruples. But Romish disabilities could not be connected, however inaccurately, with the retirement of a cabi 9 Bp. Phillpotts's Letter on the Coronation Oath. Lond. 1828. p. 136. |