til by the year 1600 the outlines of large States were clearly defined. In obedience to a powerful force these larger groups solidified and became the great organic States of the modern world. This force is nationality. Briefly, but with satisfying development of the essential thoughts, the author traces the rise of national feeling and of the national idea-not as yet clearly conceived: he points out the part played by wars against a common foe in strengthening the sentiment of unity, and shows how nationality found expression in certain personalities, through literature or otherwise, as in Dante, in Chaucer and Wycliffe, in Jeanne d'Arc. In France the later development of nationality, as Professor Rose makes plain, was prepared for by the achievement of union under absolute monarchy. Then came the struggle for liberty and with it the sense of nationality. Not only the new conception of liberty but the new idea of the nation, the author instructively points out, is to be found in Rousseau. Nationality conferred new energy upon France; but the Revolutionary impulse erred by excess and paved the way for Bonapartism. In Germany, curiously enough, we find in the pre-national period a development of international or cosmpolitan ideals, as illustrated in the thought of Kant. But these ideals were connected with a condition of political weakness and inefficiency. It was only under the influence of political forces making for union, of new philosophical and literary teachings, such as are found in the writings of Schiller and in the later doctrines of Fichte, of the national education that was carried on in the new universities, that the energy of the German people was really released.

Up to this point, nationality is seen to be in no small degree an affair of thought-an education of the national consciousness. This, however, is not always nor necessarily true. In contrast with the cases of Germany and of France, is set that of Spain-a very different phenomenon. The Spanish national rising of 1808 was, indeed, a genuine expression of nationality; it led the more phlegmatic peoples of the North into the crusade that finally overthrew the might of Napoleon. But it was an expression of nationality in a relatively crude form. The impulse that led to national resistance was simply that of outraged pride and dignity, unconnected with the deeper convictions of the mind. "An explosion of terrific force took place, but thereafter everything tended to settle down in nearly the same condition as before."

Plainly, intellectual leadership is necessary for the healthful development of nationality. In Italy such leadership was found. It is in the words of Mazzini that we find the most explicit and acceptable declaration of the creed of nationality: "The map of Europe will be remade. The countries of the peoples will arise, defined by the voice of the free, upon the ruins of the countries of kings and privileged castes. Between these countries there will be harmony and brotherhood. . Then each of you may hope by your per

sonal efforts to benefit the whole of Humanity." In this utterance of Mazzini's the force of nationalism seems to blend with the ideal of internationalism. This utterance, indeed, may be regarded as the high water mark of the enlightened spirit of nationality.

By comparison, the modern German form of nationalism seems crude and depraved, while the Slavs have not yet reached a degree of national development capable of carrying the ideal still further or of applying it more effectively. The study of Slavic efforts, indeed, adds nothing to our conception of nationality except that these struggles, in their very incompleteness and their comparative failure, confirm those conclusions which are reached by examining the history of other peoples.

What, then, is nationality? The author has indicated his leading conception by a quotation from Renan which he has prefixed to his volume: "Avoir fait de grandes choses ensemble, vouloir en faire encore, viola la condition essentielle pour être un peuple." Nationality, it would seem is an affair of the will. Decidedly it is not primarily a matter of race or of language or of geography: still less is it due to periodic visitings of the world spirit-the fatal doctrine of Hegel. Abstract definitions can hardly prove fruitful, but certain practical conclusions at which the author arrives are in a high degree productive of enlightenment. Obviously, nationality is a mighty power, by no means to be ignored, nor to be deprecated in the interests of a lifeless cosmopolitanism. It has "endowed the European peoples with a vitality and force which resembles, say, the incoming of steam power into industry." In its highest form it is "a spiritual conception, inconquerable, indestructible." The instinct of nationality, to be sure, is capable of abuse, and the present European war is in a sense its reductio ad absurdum. Yet this instinct is amenable to guidance, and when properly guided may be a force for good of incalculable potency. Between nationalism and internationalism there is no necessary conflict; the former may support and blend with the latter." After the attainment of civic freedom and national solidarity, the national instinct, which strengthens with opposition and weakens after due satisfaction, ought to merge in the wider and nobler sentiment of human brotherhood, in the attainment of which it is only a preparatory phase." There is hope, then, of a definite improvement in man's estate after the close of the present war, if only in the final settlement nationality is recognized as the unexhausted and truly evolutionary force that it really is.

THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR. By Charles Seymour, Ph.D. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1916.

The increasing number of books about the war makes careful selection among them a necessary measure of self-protection for the reader. In particular has the writing of discussions about the diplo

matic antecedents of the conflict been overdone. Out of many articles and treatises on the subject has come much information, indeed, but little real enlightenment. The fact is that the time for writing more or less superficial or opinioned accounts of national policies and characteristics, more or less impassioned denunciations of national characters and traits, more or less journalistic traceries of diplomatic intrigues or estimates of public men, has pretty well passed. There is good hope that the second crop of war books may prove far better than the first. It is surprising, however, that at the present stage of events a book so sound and historically so mature as Professor Seymour's The Diplomatic Background of the War, could be produced. The reader who has learned to shrink at the sight of the word "diplomacy "upon a title page may be reassured with respect to this volume. What Professor Seymour has written is not a history of recent diplomacy-from which conclusions of value might or might not be deducible-but an account of diplomacy in modern history.

The European War was preceded by a diplomatic struggle scarcely less bitter than the war itself. Back of this conflict lies a formative period in which the main interests the real and not the imaginary interests-of the Powers, are gradually defined, and the influences that have divided Europe into two hostile groups of nations may be seen interacting. To obtain a clear view in outline of the whole period from 1870 to 1914, is to gain an insight that would be sought in vain through a more partial study, however thorough. This clear general view, supplemented by adequate details, Professor Seymour most acceptably supplies. As treated by him the story of European international relations during the last forty-five years proves to be unexpectedly coherent, relatively simple. The main features stand out plainly. Bismarck's foreign poliey and the formation of the Triple Alliance, with, eventually, the Dual Alliance between France and Russia as a weak offset; the leading motives of German and English foreign policy; the "diplomatic revolution" which led to the formation of the Triple Entente and to the conflict of alliances; the developments of the Near Eastern Question, which resulted in the Balkan wars and ultimately precipitated the crisisin dealing with all these topics, Professor Seymour makes essential truths appear, and he manages with uncommon success to avoid the fault of amplifying either too much or too little.

Manifestly a historic study that is essentially so clear and so well proportioned as this of Professor Seymour's should lead the reader into cool and sane ways of thinking. Such is the case. The account of international struggles which is given in this book "holds together" so well, is so intelligible and so reasonable, that it seems to exclude prejudice or bitter feeling. And there is also in the author's remarks a quality of tolerance and good sense that deserves to be especially noticed.

THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY. By G. Lowes Dickinson. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916.

After nearly two years of painfully confused thought in regard to the causes of the war and of bitter controversy about the motives of the nations engaged in it, the idea that is beginning to be uppermost in the minds of many thoughtful persons is simply this: that not the insatiable greed nor the hypocritical selfishness of any one nation is responsible for the disaster, but the whole European system-the medieval conception of international relations which still prevails. We are still living, if not in the dark ages, in the age of Machiavelli-an age dominated by belief in necessary state selfishness and characterized by a self-perpetuating mutual suspicion between the nations of Europe. This idea is beginning to detach itself from the partial notions that have formed, so to speak, its matrixfrom Utopian schemes of universal peace, from denials of the principle of nationality, from denunciations of secret diplomacy, from demonstrations of the economic interdependence of all nations.

The old order needs changing; for under it even the best and most chivalrous of nations can be but a knight-errant in a world of violence. It cannot, indeed, change all at once. But one may rationally hope that the conclusion of the present war may bring its passing appreciably nearer. According to what seems the soundest view, the first step would be the formation of a league of nations for the enforcement of international law and order, with a reservation of force for the coercion of the law-breakers. "Let the lawbreaker be defined," writes Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson in his recently published book, The European Anarchy, "as the one who appeals to force instead of appealing to law and right by machinery duly provided for that purpose, and the aggressor is immediately under the ban of the civilized world, and met by an overwhelming force to coerce him into order." And, indeed, would Germany have entered upon the present world-conflict, for the beginning of which so many hold her responsible, if she had had any solid ground for faith in international justice, or even if she had known in advance the tremendous power that would be brought against her?

In order to effect the desired change, not merely new machinery is needed but a new point of view, a reform in the general way of thinking about international questions. When a patriotic Englishman can write with the moderation, and also with the freedom from visionary idealism, which is manifested in this book of Mr. Dickinson's, it seems that the change is nearer the possibility of realization than might be supposed. "I do not palliate the responsibility of Germany for the outbreak of the war," declares the author, "but that responsibility is imbedded in and conditioned by a responsibility deeper and more general-the responsibility of all the Powers alike for the European anarchy." The same spirit

of fairness is expressed in what Mr. Dickinson writes of the Kaiser: "According to Baron Beyens, on hearing the news of the murder of the Archduke the Kaiser changed color, and exclaimed: All the effort of my life for twenty-five years must be begun over again!' A tragic cry which indicates what I personally believe to be the case, that it has been the constant effort of the Kaiser to keep the peace in Europe, and that he foresaw now that he would no longer be able to resist war. 99

That view of European affairs which seems destined to prevail when passions have subsided and truth separates itself from doctrine, is expressed by Mr. Dickinson with a philosophic clearness, an intensity, and a restraint that should make his book a real force.

PRESENT-DAY CHINA. By Gardner L. Harding. New York: The Century Company, 1916.

Mr. Harding's little book stands quite apart from much that has been written about China in that it is neither a conventional study of events nor merely a series of more or less vivid impressions of Chinese life and character. In order to understand the awakened China of today, it is necessary first to know something of the people-not in generalities, but in specific human terms-and then to understand what the spirit of nationality is, and what its power may be not merely among the inhabitants of America and Europe but among the remoter dwellers in Asia. Mr. Harding possesses both kinds of comprehension. As one who has lived long in China and who has studied to attain a genuine understanding of the Chinese people, he has gathered plenty of significant observations. Through his grasp of the Chinese situation as a whole-and more particularly through his sympathetic understanding of the national spirit-he is able to interpret his observations convincingly.

The reader of Mr. Harding's book will be likely to revise the view, if he has entertained it, that the Chinese are foredoomed to vegetate for an indefinite period under an absolute and unprogressive monarchy." The Chinese worship of monarchical institutions, for all the centuries, . . . is largely an illusion for foreign consumption. The Chinese have not even had a nobility, and their local government, which has been until recently the only government the people have felt, has been essentially democratic, even communistic in character." The awakening of the people, though slow and partial, has been real. Then, too, there have been concrete signs of national progress. The peril of bankruptcy, for example, has passed, and the game of paying off old debts with new loans is almost over." The reader cannot but respond to the author's well-supported and not too sanguine conviction that the potentiality of China as a nation is imThe significance of this hopeful view is seen when it is

mense.