Europe was to be reorganized; governments representing the wishes of the people were to be established; everywhere public institutions were to be " founded on the sacred rights of humanity," and were to breathe" the same spirit of wisdom and benevolence." Of the operation of such institutions order would be the necessary consequence. Moreover, the parties to the treaty by which the relations of the European states were to be defined were "never to begin a war until after exhausting every means of mediation by a third Power," and were also to adopt a code of international law which, if violated by any of the parties, would "bind the others to turn against the offender and make good the evil he has committed." Alexander even declared it to be desirable to arrive at an arrangement regarding Turkey" in conformity with the good of humanity and the precepts of sound policy "; and believing, as he said, that the peace of Europe could be preserved only "by means of a league, formed under the auspices of Russia and England," Powers which were interested in order and justice and would only by their union be able to maintain it, he even ventured to suggest that, with a view to further the great design, the British Government might "make some change in its maritime code," so as to conciliate the neutral Powers and do away with their distrust of British preponderance at sea.

This suggestion was not warmly received. Indeed, the Russian ambassador in London reported that England, in order to prevent the Mediterranean from becoming, according to the current phrase, a " French lake," felt it indispensable to keep Malta, the retention of which had caused the renewal of the war with France, and considered any alteration of her maritime code to be "equally out of the question." The cherished project, however, was not abandoned by its author. On the contrary, it was later symbolized by the Holy Alliance, which in terms bound the contracting parties to observe in their conduct the precepts of the Christian religion, and was essentially transfused into the Quadruple Alliance between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia, signed November 20, 1815, which, in order to "consolidate the connections which so closely united the four sovereigns for the happiness of the world," bound them (Article VI), "to renew their meetings at fixed periods,' either personally or by their ministers for the purpose of "consulting upon their common interests," and of devising

ineasures which should "be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations, and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe."

Pursuant to this scheme, Alexander on October 18, 1818, presented to his allies at the conference at Aix-la-Chapelle a confidential memorandum, in which he proposed that, while the Quadruple Alliance should be preserved, all the signatories of the Congress of Vienna treaty should make a declaration putting the rights of nations under a guarantee analogous to that which protected individuals. Metternich on behalf of Austria hailed the memorandum with " diplomatic unction "; Prussia, apprehensive as to her new acquisitions on the Rhine, welcomed it. Great Britain opposed it, her spokesman, Lord Castlereagh, declaring that the blessings of perpetual peace would seem too dearly bought at the price of subjugating Europe to an international police, of which the armies of Russia would form the most powerful element, and that "a universal union, committed to common action under circumstances that could not be foreseen," so far from leading to disarmament, would leave the decisive voice to "the master of the biggest battalions." He avowed the belief that, until" a system of administering Europe by a goneral alliance of all its states " could be "reduced to a practical form, all notions of a general and unqualified guarantee must be abandoned." In the end the parties to the Quadruple Alliance signed a protocol, to which France was invited to adhere, by which they declared that the convention of October 9, 1818, regulating the execution of the treaty of peace of November 20, 1815, was regarded as "the accomplishment of the work of peace" and the completion of the political system destined to secure its solidarity "; that their" intimate union," having no other object than the "no maintenance of peace," the "guarantee" of the transactions on which it was founded, and "the strictest observance of the principles of the rights of nations," offered to Europe "the most sacred pledge of its future tranquility "; and that they must constantly labor for "the repose of the world," solemnly acknowledging that their duties to God and their people peremptorily required them to give to the world" an example of justice, of concord, and of moderation."

The union thus described reached its high-water mark at the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, which acted, as Phillips

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remarks, "not only as a European representative body, but as a sort of European supreme court, which heard appeals and received petitions of all kinds from sovereigns and their subjects alike." Great Britain finally broke away when it was proposed to extend the activities of the union to the Western hemisphere, where, as the Russian Government remarked, the revolution in the Spanish colonies fixed the attention of "two worlds" and involved the interests of the "universe" and "the future perhaps of all civilized peoples." The idea of a European league to enforce peace readily expanded in its author's mind into a world association for the same purpose. Castlereagh's successor, George Canning, was even more critical of the whole policy. Canning declared that not only had England's "dignity "been wounded, but that her "material interests" were threatened; that for "Europe" he would desire now and then to read " England"; and later he even congratulated himself that, with France "constitutionally hating England," things were "getting back to a wholesome state again, every nation for itself and God for us all," and instructed the British ambassador at St. Petersburg to bid the Russian Emperor" be quiet," as the "time for Areopagus and the like of that "had" gone by." In America the prevalent attitude toward the suggested interposition of the allied Powers in the contest between Spain and her revolted colonies was unmistakably reflected in President Monroe's famous pronouncement.

I have set forth with some particularity the history of 'Alexander's project of union, not only because it occupies so large a place in the diplomacy of Europe during the first quarter of the last century, but also because it so clearly exemplifies, in its progress and its fate, the possible or probable obstacles with which the attempt to establish such a plan must reckon. The author's evident belief in it was its mainstay, but this naturally ceased to be effective when an ally felt that it no longer needed his support, or might promote its own interests even by antagonizing him. When the situation was thus reversed, the liberties of small states and the cause of peace and humanity were readily found outside the union rather than within it. In other words, the national interest was preferred to the common interest, and the national interest, as has often happened, was in no small part avowedly"material" or commercial.

We have seen that Castlereagh did not relish the prospect of the army of a strong military Power, even when united with the armies of other Powers, marching through the confederation for the purpose of enforcing peace. The Abbé de St. Pierre sought to avoid such an objection by proposing that the armies of great and small Powers should be numerically the same; but, considering the question purely as one of physical resistance or attack, we cannot disregard the latent strength which territory, population and resources themselves may assure. The great importance of this consideration is shown in the wars growing out of the French Revolution and the ensuing Napoleonic Wars. Austria and Prussia, alarmed at the Revolution, began a war against France, but historians are generally agreed that they would have speedily retired from the contest had not Great Britain taken part in it. British statesmen seem to have thought that internal anarchy would compel France to succumb, but the belief in her weakness did not prevent them from forming against her a coalition which, before the end of 1793, embraced all the Christian Powers of Europe, except Sweden, Denmark, Genoa, Venice, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, and Switzerland. Nevertheless, the war lasted, with one brief intermission, for more than twenty years; and when France emerged from it in 1815, she retained with slight exceptions her boundaries of 1790, furnishing to the world an example of the strength of a united people and of the danger of underrating the power and resources of an adversary. The advocates of a "small international police as an effective preventive of armed conflicts may find here material for reflection.

Lastly, it will be observed that Castlereagh objected to anything in the nature of an international administration of Europe. From the point of view of rendering predominant the power and prestige of his own Government, his position was no doubt correct; but he seems also to have admitted that such an administration would be essential to the success of the scheme. It would indeed be important both materially and morally; materially, as a means of fusing the interests of all in a common interest; morally, as a means of creating a common allegiance. It is by the combination of these two measures-the substitution of concert for unlimited competition and the fostering of the sentiment of unity -that the great empires and federations of to-day in effect

operate as peace agencies. This they do within themselves. But, as regards one another, what is their attitude? That of rivals, who may lawfully prosecute their ambitions by all possible means. Internally, the destruction of life and property for gain is forbidden; externally, it may be commanded, and this upon the theory that a number of men can, by associating themselves in a political society, place themselves above any earthly authority.

It is in this attitude of mind, which is exemplified in the recognized law of conquest, that we find the crux of the peace problem. In a letter written in 1893, Alfred Nobel, founder of the Nobel Institute at Christiania, remarked that, if all states would with solidarity agree to turn against the first aggressor, wars would become impossible. So long, however, as states retain their present conception of their duties and functions in their relations one with another, such "solidarity" of action can hardly be relied upon. Nor is the question who was the "first aggressor" so easy of determination that the parties to such an agreement would in the exercise of their independent individual judgments be likely to concur in their conclusions upon it. Ward, in his Law of Nations, narrates the case, in 1292, of two sailors, the one Norman, the other English, who quarreled in the port of Bayonne and began to fight with their fists. The Englishman, who is said to have been the weaker, stabbed the other with his knife; and the local magistrates having failed to take cognizance of the case, the Normans applied to their king, who told them to take their own revenge. They instantly put to sea, and, says Ward," seizing the first English ship they could find, hung up several of the crew, and some dogs at the same time, at the masthead. The English," continues the chronicler," retaliated without applying to their government, and things arose to that height of irregularity, that (with the same indifference on the part of their kings) the one nation made alliance with the Irish and Dutch; the other with the Flemings and Genoese. Two hundred Norman vessels scoured the English seas, and hanged all the seamen they could find. Their enemies in return fitted out a strong fleet, destroyed or took the greater part of the Normans, and giving no quarter, massacred them, to the number of fifteen thousand men. The affair then became too big for private hands, and, the Governments interposing in form, it terminated in that unfortunate war which by the loss of