ties, is in all points precisely the same with that of every individual act or accident of which it is composed.

Of the parts or kinds of judgment the most remarkable are those formed by two distinct objects, v. g., ourselves and others; by which our judgment is distinguished into two sorts, foreign and domestic-that regarding other men and theirs; this ourselves and ours. For however unbecoming such a distinction may seem in theory, in practice it is real enough, and no distinction more common. And farther than this we shall hardly find among the different kinds of judgment, though sufficiently numerous, a distinction that is not more characteristic than several kinds of its correlatives that might be mentioned. Therefore, as the characteristic class of constituents is reserved for future consideration, it does not seem necessary to insist any more here on the essential property of judg

ment.

4, The Will is another intellectual property, and a correlative of the last mentioned: but its being also most important in the characteristic type makes it subject to the last observation; and the most that needs to be said of it now, is a word in apology for the station it here occupies among intellectual constituents; as the property may appear at first sight more spiritual, and more allied to appetite. But a little consideration will shew, that the property of willing is not placed by this arrangement at all above its rank in the heavenly corps, and that it is most nearly allied to the two between which a station has been assigned it, namely to judgment on the one hand and to imagination on the other. It would be beside the purpose to enter here into a formal demonstration of this fact; and only a little reflection may also make it apparent to every one how the judgment, the will and the imaginations of the heart are nearly identified as one in most of us; especially when the characteristic types of the will, as good-will, free-will, &c., are compared with the essential. For of these, that is of essential types, there are also instances though rare; as, 1, a divided will, which we call Hesitation; 2, a decided

will, which we call Resolution; and, 3, one still more decided perhaps, which we call Determination, with perhaps some others, which it does not seem necessary to look after, as these may serve for a sample. No more does it seem necessary to look after many particulars of the forthcoming and only remaining essential property of the intellectual kind to be now considered: which is,

5, The property of Imagination: the same being indeed a theme at once so slender and so slippery that one should hardly know how to take hold, or how to say much of it, if one was so disposed: and the spiritual historian might be glad, that he is not obliged to dwell on such airy portraiture in the way of his undertaking; the most that can be expected on this behalf, consisting in the enumeration of a few principal features in the proper objects of his attention, and the main of which it will be soon enough to produce at the same time with their objects.

Therefore, although the imagination rank as high as the top of the very topmost class of essential properties, being that by which a human intellect communicates immediately with the divine, the known with the unknown, the intrinsic with the extrinsic, the spotted and mixed with the immaculate and unalloyed-as appears in its characteristic type; yet it will not be proper to insist now even on this last property any farther than just to indicate an essential distinction of the same. This distinction.will comprehend two principal differences or conditions of the imagination, which we find between sleeping and waking; and which simply considered have neither of them any moral character or perfection, as in simply being awake there is neither good nor evil, nor yet in being asleep. And, yet considered in another view, from these two principal varieties of the highest intellectual constituent may be deduced some very decided characteristics; as sweet sleep on this, vigilance, alertness, &c., on that: although with regard to these varieties, and also with regard to other properties similarly founded on the imagination, as discovery and invention, skill and ingenuity, and faculties likewise of the

same foundation, as lying, fiction, &c., with one exception there is nothing to be said.

The instance excepted is that of the two first mentioned properties, discovery and invention; which differ from each other by a single shade only; one being more spiritual, as it implies outward motion; the other more intellectual, as it implies only the motion of the mind: while either of them shall be equally considered, as a faculty built on the imagination. And it may be useful to notice this particular, if only for the sake of shewing by an example how faculties are constructed: which is, by adding the property of volition to another property, as in this case to the imagination. For we may understand two sorts of imagination, voluntary and involuntary in this respect; the first mentioned sort being what is commonly understood as the faculty of imagination or invention. A very uncertain faculty however, if it be one, at the best! We find performance indeed quite another thing in every pure operation of the understanding from what it is in any in which the members of the body or its organs either are engaged but most particularly in the invention of subjects that have no ostensible train or climax by which they may be apprehended, any more than the wind, which a man might as soon gather in his fists (Prov. xxx. 4). And the most a man can do towards such an apprehension is, simply, to bend his sails, and put the helm of his understanding on the course he means to steer when the breeze or tide of inspiration shall serve. A man cannot do

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better in that case than as the Psalmist advises, "stand in awe, and sin not: commune with your own heart, and in your chamber, and be still" (Ps. iv. 4). For the exercise of the mind alone may be sufficient in a trying case, without any sort of bodily motion, to say nothing of fatigue; and of what use is it? Much time may be spent in looking for the wind, much weariness felt in waiting, much trouble in keeping a man's versatile imagination to the point; but without feeling the wind, which he cannot

without laying himself out for it, and patiently waiting for and ardently expecting it, he can never advance towards his object. Therefore, "Though it tarry, wait for it" (Hab. ii. 3), may be a good rule on this head; and the Psalmist's a good example; as he says, "I waited patiently for the Lord and he inclined to me, and heard my calling” (Ps. xl. 1). But such a dependence as this, howmay be, will abate very much of the consequence of our faculties; and may make them appear to be less substantial in their existence, perhaps, than the world generally supposes*.

ever agreeable it

To remove any objection which may arise on the view that is here taken of the subject of FACULTIES, a farther definition of the same may be convenient and especially, to distinguish these from constituent properties, whether essential or characteristic. For which purpose it should be observed, 1, that faculties are understood, in relation to the human species at least, as plain acquirements; which shews, that they cannot be essential: 2, that as the good or evil of faculties must depend on their application, they cannot be characteristic either: and 3, that however intimately faculties may be received and assimilated, there can be no more reason for regarding them as constituents, than for so regarding that which is received outwardly. For being taken into, or endowed upon the imagination or any other central property cannot make a foreign matter to become a part or constituent of the subject, any more than its being taken into his body or circumference; an error in the judgment any more than a thorn in the flesh, it is to be hoped. The constituents of human intellect are a part of its creation, the faculties depending thereon a part of its education: the difference of the two articles seems obvious enough. Yet it may not be amiss to illustrate the same by an example.

And as these two particulars, v. g. properties and faculties, seem to refer to a double creation, the said example would not be unaptly taken from the operation of the divine Word, which is a prime agent in both, and the miracles of our Lord Christ, which were generally performed on constituents, rarely, if ever on faculties. This may be thought some evidence of the reality and supremacy of those miracles: and at any rate is a circumstance that may enable us with due attention to discriminate between these nearly related subjects. Thus, in operating on the deaf and dumb person, as we read, it does not appear that our Lord did either restore or communicate the faculty of speech, but the property of sound or utterance, which is an essential constituent of every created being, though not voluntary and spontaneous as in man, and in most other animals. For it is evident from the two different accounts of the affliction thus removed, one ascribing it to an evil possession (Mat. ix. 32-Luke xi. 14), and another to some unfor

It is not here meant to be asserted, that the five radical or essential properties above mentioned are all the essential sorts of an intellectual cast or quality: for there may be others of which we have no conception; and we know there are other faculties which have not been mentioned, because, however important they may be in themselves, they are not so in reference to the objects of this discussion; as the properties of learning and experience, and also the remarkable faculty of ABSTRACTION or condensation, being one by which many apprehensions, recollections, conclusions, determinations, imaginations are blended and form one image; making, as it may be said,

tunate impediment (Mark vii. 32.), that such affliction was not natural, but adventitious, and subsequent to the knowledge and enjoyment of speech.

The part required, therefore, was more than to have such knowledge communicated, it was to have a constituent restored, or the use of a constituent restored, which had been bound for some time by Satan, according to the more spiritual account, or obstructed by some defect of the organs, according to the more material: and this part the divine Operator performed solely by the Word, his Principle; the person so healed, owing to man secondarily as its medium the blessed faculty of speech, to God immediately, the creation and restoration of the power or essential property.

So in the gift of healing others, which our Saviour imparted to his first apostles (Mat. x. 8 &c.), there was no art, or skilful process like that which we justly esteem in physicians included, but a spiritual property-opposite in its character, but in other respects similar to that by which hereditary and infectious diseases are communicated. So, likewise, in the gift of eloquence, which is an improvement on the faculty of speech, as great almost as that faculty on the natural constituent of spontaneous sound or utterance, no act nor even cogitation was included, whenever the Saviour bestowed it on his apostles and faithful professors after he left them corporeally; as he often did according to his promise. "And when they bring you into the synagogues, and unto magistrates and powers, (said he,) take ye no thought how, or what thing ye shall answer, or what ye shall say. For the Holy Ghost shall teach you in the same hour what ye ought to say" (Luke xii. 11, 12). To have given the art either of healing, or of eloquence would have been as easy for the divine Bestower as to give the property or performance which appears from the gift of languages or tongues to his disciples by the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost: but what he gave being freest from suspicion was most convincing, and therefore best suited to the purpose for which it was given.

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