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be followers together of me, and mark them which walk so as ye have us for an ensample" (Phil. iii. 17): and as the pious Psalmist, when once he felt the power of grace in tribulation, crying to his heavenly Guardian " Preserve thou my soul: for I am holy" (Ps. lxxxvi. 2). Whereas the same Psalmist also exclaims on another occasion, "There is none that doeth good, no not one," &c. (Ib. xiv. 3) and St. Paul not only quotes this saying of the Psalmist, to shew generally, that there are no examples like that which he proposed, "As it is written, There is none righteous," &c. (Rom. iii. 10), but also applies this very case expressly to himself, concluding, "O wretched man, that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" (Ib. vii. 24), which seems to imply a great contradiction, and yet is easily reconciled by its context in the last cited authority, "For I delight in the law of God after the inward man (Ib. 22). As much as to say, my primitive constitution, my essential constituents are good; and so far might St. Paul stand for an ensample, if we had no other; "but I see another law in my members (an acquired character) warring against the law of my mind," &c. (Ib. 23). Who could ever be an example for others, or even a comfort to himself under such circumstances? "I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord" (Ib. 25). 66 Be ye followers of me, even as I also am of Christ" (Cor. I. xi. 1): "and the life that I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God” (Gal. ii. 20).

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Thus the materials of the Kingdom are naturally good, and so is their original combination: but both are the worse for use, as elsewhere observed, and as the royal preacher also intimates in one saying, especially, “ Lo, this only have I found, that God hath made man upright, but they have sought out many inventions" (Eccles. vii. 29). There may be some difference between a good instrument cracked and one that has never been good: or so Scripture seems to consider the case; still admitting,

that lost goodness can be good for nothing until it be restored to its old essential confederates. No new essential has occurred in the incarnate Kingdom, that we know of, since its creation: the properties that have occurred since are all in their nature fleeting and contingent; they are modes, consequences, characteristics-such things as used to be called Accidents. But all constituents are composed of accidents; and consequently the merest modes in this present state may become essential in another, with another Fiat of the Creator, if not by virtue of the first. For his work is still going on: and his creatures are all going towards their respective destinies; towards good or evil, heaven or hell. "When thou lettest thy breath go forth, they shall be made" (Ps. civ. 30).

With regard to the varieties of characteristics; they may be found by any criterion, and enough of them too for any scientific purpose; as by tests in chemistry to distinguish the different characters in that department; by evidence in law, to ascertain right and equity; by reason and argument in philosophy, to demonstrate what is truth; by judgment and experience in the conduct of life to discover what is prudent; by effect and allotment, to find what is common, as sense; and uncommon, as genius. But what we want to find, ascertain and demonstrate is, the two opposite characters of good and evil, by which the Kingdom of God is distinguished into its two principal spheres or portions of heavenly or heaven, and hellish or hell. Such are the two great divisions of characteristics, which we are now to consider as far as we can, generally in the first place; and afterwards more particularly, with their fruits or consequences. We cannot in the moral department, any more than in the natural, trace every production through every stage from the beginning: we cannot refer every transaction in society to the actual springs or passions by which it is specially combined and produced, as the epic poets of antiquity and some poetical historians of later times have affected to do; but we can

discern in these transactions certain general characters, by which (as in the natural department) we may know sufficiently what class to refer them to, with proper caution. For that we must apply, and some ingenuity likewise, to avoid mistakes in the confines of good and evil; the same being very narrow and as it were, intermingled, however distant their extremes, so that mistakes are easily made in this quarter; and "woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil!" (Isai. v. 20.) We may infer this from some of the undermentioned properties of good and evil; which are worth considering, such as 1, their reciprocity or convertibility, 2, their reality, 3, utility, 4, necessity, 5, merit and guilt. For,

First, Considering the Reciprocity or Convertibility of good and evil-so that by the ordering of Providence nuisances often become benefits; and on the contrary, benefits, nuisances through the mismanagement of those who do not deserve them-may be enough to occasion the misnaming which the prophet denounces as so serious with some who are apt to consider; but that is not the greater part by any means of those who confound the distinction of good and evil; the majority of confounders in any respect being such as are not apt to consider. On farther consideration the former sort may be satisfied with calling evil good, or good evil, when it is made so by conversion; as we call flint, glass, and water, ice, when they are converted into these substances, but in the mean time they had best call them as they are; i. e. evil, Evil; and good, Good: which is too much to expect from the other sort, or from the sceptical tribe either, which denies the second named property of those just alluded to, v. g. the reality of good and evil.

2dly, With those who are not particularly wild, either in their conduct or their opinions, there can be little doubt of the Reality of good, though there may be much of its universality. For if good be universal, people will not always know where to find it: but "there be many that

do say, who will shew us any good?" (Ps. iv. 6.) This property, therefore, generally imputed to good even by those who are yet far to seek for it, in that they never despair of finding the good for which they are yet to seek, needs not to be proved.

One should rather prove, if one might be allowed, to an headstrong votary perchance, that the particular good which he imagines for himself has no foundation either in nature or in equity. For such a conviction might save the man some trouble, and litigation; if it led to no higher consequences but it might be a means of preserving his good humour, and counteracting a very common revolution to which such votaries are liable; when from a fixed persuasion of the reality of good, they come to be more persuaded of the reality of evil.

And even this is a fact too, that many have denied; but at the same time, no one ever seems to have doubted when fairly put to the test. For what do men fear, but what they take to be evil? and where is there a sceptic by profession, who would not be afraid, and fly like his master, Pyrrho, to the nearest tree, if he should happen to meet in a narrow lane, a dog as mad as himself? Never a one of them indeed. Which shews, by the way, what liars these sceptics are: for they will deny any thing as it may suit; and to deny the existence of evil is easy enough in theory, but will they deny it in practice? To do this, the sceptic must make it appear, that "though he walk through the valley of the shadow of death, yet he will fear no evil" (Ps. xxiii. 4). The humble Christian is more likely, perhaps, to exhibit an evidence of this sort, when he comes to be tried. At the same time; as the sceptic may allege, that his weakness or instinct, or whatever he may be pleased to call it, is no sufficient proof of the reality of evil, and this reality is what many would be glad to disprove, if they knew how, the same may deserve some farther consideration, when opportunity offers.

3dly, The Utility of good appears to be more generally admitted than the reality of evil; and a character that no

one can deny to good who believes its existence; since the very idea of good will imply utility, unless it be good for nothing-that is, neither for the present nor yet for the future: which is no sort of good; and consequently, of no use. But real good will be useful, or good in more ways than one: it will be good for enjoyment, and good (or rather better) for an assurance of the divine favour, when such good comes unalloyed with evil; as temporal prosperity, for example, unalloyed with plunder and selfreproach. For "better is a little with righteousness than great revenues without right" (Prov. xvi. 8), or, than "riches kept for the owners thereof to their hurt" (Eccles. v. 13). And according to this rule it is, that we find every sort of temporal prosperity considered in Scripture, and in the Old Testament especially (where the greatest stress is laid on it) v. g. as good, when unalloyed with any particular indesert, to make its goodness questionable. Thus, when victory, conquest and other advantages in war are there referred to, it is not merely for their intrinsic value or importance; but in consideration of the divine favour to which these victories are ascribed. "For they got not the land in possession through their own sword, neither was it their own arm that helped them; but Thy right hand, and Thine arm, and the light of Thy countenance; because Thou hadst a favour unto them" (Ps. xliv. 3). In these and in other respects even temporal prosperity may be useful: so that the general utility of good can hardly be questioned; if that of more serious good may be frustrated by indesert, and the greatest good be made only good for evil, as when the grace of God is received in vain.

But the utility of evil, not being so apparent, may require an example or two by way of illustration: and it is useful indeed many ways by different forms and directions. Evil then is useful in the form of justice and mercy; as a punishment for the wicked, and a correction for the just. It is useful for grace and humility; to put a distinction between the just and the wicked; giving the

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