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cruiser, destroyer and submarine types were not accomplished, and the 5-5-3 ratio does not apply to these types of ships. However, the main object, which was to effect a reduction in the capital ship tonnage and to establish ratios commensurate with national naval interests, has been accomplished. Likewise the second object, the establishment of aircraft carrier tonnage, ships inferior only in size to the capital ship, was also accomplished on a 5-5-3 basis and in a ratio commensurate with the capital ship tonnage.

The abolishment of competitive building in capital ships and aircraft carriers and the establishment of a naval holiday for ten years, during which period no capital ship tonnage may be laid down, have in themselves accomplished the major purposes of the Naval Limitation Treaty, for these ships, taking three or four years to complete, are the best measures of a nation's floating naval strength.

Under the terms of the treaty the United States, of its capital ships intended to be scrapped under the original proposal, may complete two. The completion of these two ships is essential to bring our Navy to the ratios fixed. Likewise two battle cruisers may be converted to aircraft carriers, and this is important to round out our fleet to its proper proportions so that the essential tasks of training, without which no Navy can be called fit or efficient, may be undertaken. The United States is also permitted to carry to completion the ten scout cruisers now on the ways and building and this should be done, as we are in this type of ship quite behind the actual navy of Great Britain and also behind the proposed navy of Japan.

We are also permitted to complete the submarines now under construction which are of an improved type, capable of performing their tasks with the fleet in a manner which previously has not been possible. These submarines are on the average over 90 per cent on their way towards completion. They serve to replace many of the older craft which age has made obsolete.

In addition to these combatant craft, the United States is permitted to build such small craft, such as gunboats and river police boats, as may be necessary to protect the interests and lives of our nationals abroad.

Article XIX of the Naval Treaty puts a stop, within certain defined limits, to further expansion and fortification of naval bases in the Pacific. The principal point to be noted is, that the establishment of the status quo in fortifications and naval bases is an attempt to maintain the spirit of good understanding arrived at through an amicable settlement of the Far Eastern problems, and through the elimination of competitive building and of any aggressive tendencies which might be attributed to us by other Powers. The outlying fortified points of both Japan and the United States have been rendered offensively harmless. The right further to fortify is no longer possible, nor in the future may the great fleets of the United States seek the shelter of fortified harbors within the Philippines, assured that they are so impregnable that they will remain safe havens of refuge and of supply when our fleet, bent on other missions, is absent from their protection. For the defenses of these advanced positions we must rely now upon the spirit of good understanding entered into through the offices of this Conference. Japan has done the same with her outlying positions. The active defense of our Philippine possessions, if such ever becomes a necessity, must now rest entirely upon the back of our floating naval establishment, geographically placed many thousands of miles away.

The Far Eastern agreements arrived at have a very distinct relation to the Naval Limitation Treaty. Any further reduction of our Navy below that of the standard set, by whatever means it may be accomplished, would be in effect to stultify the purposes which the Conference strove to achieve.. Important as is the Naval Limitation Treaty in removing friction, yet if it is to live as a vital and not as a spent effort, it must rest on the foundation of the Four Power Treaty. The severing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the new relationships established have made limitation of naval armament possible. The Four Power Treaty might stand alone; but the spirit, motives and results of the Naval Treaty could not carry on in the coming years of the future without the support of the Four Power Treaty. As the Naval Treaty is the material, so the Four Power Treaty is the moral 1They will be effective just in proportion as our naval force, augmented by the recent good understandings reached, is effective.

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backbone of the agreements which have been reached by the Conference.2

Without going into too great detail, it is sufficient to say that Great Britain under the terms of the treaty may build two 35,000ton capital ships. When completed, these ships will be the last word in modern naval architecture. She may also lay down two aircraft carriers of 33,000 tons each to match the two which we are permitted to convert from two of our battle cruisers. Other than this, Great Britain has for the present no extensive naval building programme, nor is any necessary, at this moment, to preserve equality in strength with the United States. In light cruisers, flotilla leaders and in modern cruisers generally, Great Britain ranks ahead of the United States, and it may be a long time before we are in a position of equality with Great Britain in cruiser types.

Japan has no capital ships to complete to give her the tonnage allotted, but she has the right to convert two of the ships, which otherwise would be scrapped, into aircraft carriers of 33,000 tons each. In addition to these two ships, Japan has a contemplated programme of light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, which is quite extensive.

France and Italy have no great programmes in capital ships, but it is their avowed purpose to bring their navies up to date by replacing, under the terms of the treaty, the older capital ships as soon as may be practicable. Each has also submarine, destroyer, and light cruiser programmes sufficient to care for their national needs.

These facts, while not indicating any aggressive tendencies on the part of the nations involved, denote a desire to make efficient those navies which are apportioned to them under the agreements entered into in the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments.

Naval policy is the system of principles and the general terms of their application governing the development, organization, maintenance, and operation of the Navy. It is based on, and is

2 International law is the sea law which in war governs the relationships between different sea Powers. It is difficult to make, either by treaty or by imposing the wishes of one nation upon another. It comes into being through universal assent, extending over long years of tradition and sea practice. The Submarine Treaty has a direct bearing on Naval Policy. The more nearly this treaty accords with the rules of existing international law, the more probable it is that in a future war its articles will be generally subscribed to.

designed to support, national policies. It comprehends the questions of numbers, size, type and distribution of vessels and stations, the character and number of personnel, and the character of peace and war operations. It follows the flag the world over. To meet the situation as it to-day exists, a comprehensive naval policy should divide itself under four main heads, namely:

Education. By this is meant not only that essential education which must be carried on at all times within the Service, but instruction outside of the Service proper to enable the public to know the relation of its naval forces to the maritime and international interests of the country and the purposes for and the way in which a naval force should be organized and operated.

Intercourse with Foreign Powers. One of the great results of this Conference has been to inaugurate a better understanding between the parties to the Conference. It is imperative that the good understanding now inaugurated should be perpetuated. It is important that this understanding be extended to those nations which have not participated in the Conference.

Training. Training is the performance of those duties essential to keep a naval force thoroughly indoctrinated and efficient in the operations it might be called upon to perform, both in peace and war. Training makes the boy who passes through the school of the Navy a self-disciplined, efficient man.

Maintenance. The maintenance of the material and personnel factors of a naval organization should be kept in such efficient condition that they readily can be used in case of national need.

The training of the fleet to perform those duties which it might be called upon to undertake in war and must undertake in peace, is the purpose on which the organization of the fleet must be based. In general it may be said that the fleet is organized to perform the four following tasks:

Scouting. To obtain and transmit the information necessary to the efficient conduct of the strategic and tactical features of a campaign.

Attack. The actual operations through which a certain definite objective is obtained.

Control. The retention and administration of objective points which have been won by the attacking force.

Supply. All those other auxiliary activities which enter into and form so large a part of any campaign.

With the fleet thus organized so that training and maintenance become the essential features of internal naval policy, it is practicable to utilize the fleet for the other two purposes indicated, namely, education and intercourse with foreign Powers. Thus, by organizing the naval establishment so that its internal policies are sound, we are able to utilize it for any other purpose which, in time of peace, the country may deem to be necessary.

The organization of the shore and base establishments is in itself a gigantic task. To summarize briefly, it may be said that the purpose and aim of every shore and base establishment must be to make more efficient the fleet which it serves. Without home bases the fleet cannot be repaired, docked, or supplied, and those craft, which during peace must of necessity be laid up, have no place in which to be berthed. The advanced base is to the overseas fleet what the home base is to the fleet operating on its home coasts.

While the active fleet must be dependent upon the shore and base facilities for repair, supply, docking, and a certain amount of maintenance, and can in no wise be thoroughly efficient unless the shore establishments are properly located in a geographical sense and efficiently operated and administered, yet the fleet itself has tasks to perform in order to render it capable of carrying out the nation's policies. It must train to shoot and steam economically, and must consequently engage in those operations without which our naval organization afloat would be only a collection of independent units acting indiscriminately without efficient coordination under responsible leaders.

It is not possible to carry on efficient training unless an adequate number of the various component units be gathered together and work side by side as team mates. Under the proposed Treaty there are left to the United States eighteen battleships, or six divisions of three ships each, which must constantly manoeuver and work together in order to form the nucleus of an efficient fighting force.

While the battleships form the main body and the heart of the fighting force, the cruisers, destroyers, submarines, mine forces,

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