The hospital is supported by government, and by 6d, a month out of every seaman's wages. No seaman on board his Majesty's ships can be arrested for any debt, unless the same be sworn to amount to at least twenty pounds, though a soldier may be arrested for a debt which extends to half the sum.

Select Books on Navigation and Naval Tactics.

Robertson's Navigation improved by Wales, 2 vols. 8vo. used in the Mathematical School at Christ's Hospital. Nicholson's svo. The Practical Navigator, 8vo. Moore's 8vo. Mackay's Treatise on the Longitude, 2 vols. 8vo. and his Navigation, svo. The article Navigation in the Pantologia, is very able, and is written by an excellent mariner and mathematician, Mr. Glendinning, of Yarmouth. Witchell's Tables to the Nautical Almanac. Clerk's Naval Tactics, 410. Hamsted's Tactics, 4to.

Select Books on Mathematics.

Hutton's Mathematics, 3 vols. 8vo. Simpson's Fluxions, 8vo. Maclaurin's, 2 vols. 8vo. Donne's Trigonometry, 8vo. Dealtry's Fluxions, 8vo. Bridge's Algebra, 8vo. Bonnycastle's Trigonometry, 8vo. West's Mathematics 8vo. Gregory's Mechanics, 8vo. Hutton's Tracts, Mathematical and Philosophical, 8vo. and his Mathematical Dictionary, in 2 vols. 4to. Hutton's Mensuration, 8vo. Cote's Land Surveying, 12mo. Hammond's Surveying, 8vo. Davis', 8vo. Croker's, 8vo. Stephenson's, svo. Symonds' Gauging, 12mo. Leadbeter's Dialling, 8vo. Martin's Logarithms, 8vo. and Hutton's Tables, roya! gvo.

1.

ETHICS

CHAP. V.- ETHICS.

enjoins the exercise of right reason in all our affairs and actions; its object is to render man good and happy. Hence ethics may be defined, a right manner of thinking, in order to obtain human felicity; or a science by which man is directed to conduct his will and his actions, so as to live well and happily. The principal, or rather the only topics are happiness and manners: whence arise two parts, or branches of ethics: the first on moral happiness, considered as the end; and the second on moral virtues, or good manners, as the means of attaining such happiness.

2. It has not been unusual, of late, for persons to object to the science of ethics, or morality, as an abstruse and

useless speculation, a mere amusement of the mind, presenting us only with ingenious hypotheses, and specious conjectures, more calculated to lead a man to endless doubts and perplexities, than to settle him in a state of solid and lasting satisfaction. On the contrary, however, we hesitate not to assert that it is of the utmost importance to mankind, that it lies level to the apprehensions of the weakest minds, provided they are sincere and well-disposed, and that it is attended with all the certainty that any impartial and considerate person can desire.

3. An adinirable writer (Cumberland, De Leg. N. C. 4.) forms an ingenious comparison between algebra and morality, as to the method of finding out truth, and teaching it when found he judiciously observes, that in external operations, where the question is often perplexed by the multiplicity of circumstances, our not being able always to arrive at precise determinations, no more affects the certainty of morality, than it does the truth and usefulness of the principles of geometry about the measuring of lines, surfaces, and solids, that neither by the senses nor the help of instruments is it possible to effect a line perfectly straight, or a surface perfectly plane or spherical, or a body perfectly regular. It is enough that we approach so near to the utmost exactness, that nothing of any moment to human practice is wanting. And so much may be attained by the principles of moral doctrine. The method, the rules of operations, and the way of deducing one thing from another, are the same (in morality as in mathematics), neither do the uses of life require a complete accuracy any more than the same is necessary in measuring planes and solids.

4. The celebrated Puffendorf has also remarked, that moral qualities, as they are not capable of being adjusted in their mutual proportions with so much exactness as physical quantities are, so they do not need such a precision, but allow of a latitude. Thus in estimating the merit of persons, the value of things and actions, the proportion of the punishment to the crime, and in the exercise of the greater part of the virtues, except justice, as liberality, gratitude, equity, charity, &c. there is a certain latitude or extent. It cannot be denied that the nature of the subject matter is different in moral and mathematical sciences; and

according to this difference in the subject, there is a like difference in the kind of evidence: but from this it will by no means follow, that because the evidence to be expected in morality is not the same as that of the mathematics, that, therefore, it is not satisfactory.

5. Ethics give satisfaction, where it is most of all desirable, in the enquiry after happiness. It has been already observed, that one great end of ethics is happiness; and will any one say that happiness is an impossible attainment? A most wise and good God hath made ample provision for other creatures, that they might reach the ends to which they incline, and for which by their several natures he hath fitted them; and it is hard to conceive that man only should be under a necessity of falling short of the happiness of which he is capable. It is possible for God to make man happy; the thing does not imply a contradiction; nor is there any insurmountable incapacity in the subject to oppose it; for, being furnished both with understanding and will, man wants not the principles of fruition. And who can doubt but that infinite power can supply objects of enjoyment adequate to the faculty? Certain it is then that God can make man happy; and because he is infinitely good, we are justified in inferring that he will do it, with this only condition, that man be not wanting to himself.

We shall conclude this chapter with some observations on happiness, which are well worthy the attention of the young reader.

1. Happiness differs from pleasure by its duration. A single pleasure, or even several pleasures, may be scattered. over the whole dark picture of life, as rare luminous points, and yet the whole life, or the person to whose share these pleasures fall, cannot be called happy. Hence, it is justly asserted, that the man who spends his life in sensual pleasures is not to be reckoned happy. Sensual pleasures, if we addict ourselves to them alone, are attended with disagreeable and painful consequences; and should they even not be immediately followed by such disagreeable and painful circumstances, he who hunts after sensual pleasures only, is, however, debarred from the enjoyment of more refined and nobler pleasures. Happiness is the uninterrupted enjoyment of the best pleasures. The rude joy of

the savage gives him, at times, the sensation of pleasure; but he is not happier than the member of a civilized community. The constant alternative of intemperance and want frequently disturbs his pleasure, and his rudeness deprives him of the more refined pleasures enjoyed by man in a state of civilization.

2. If happiness be superior to pleasure in duration, it is superior to contentment in intensity. All men may be equally content, either because ignorance precludes them from wishing for more than they possess, or because they know how to limit their wishes. But all men are not equally happy. They cannot all possess an equal share of good things; and if they did, they are not equally capable of enjoying them. Hume's assertion, that all who are equally content,-the little girl in her new gown, the commander at the head of a victorious army, the orator after having delivered a brilliant speech in a large assembly, are equally happy, must be pronounced erroneous. Happiness consists, farther, in the variety of the agreeable sensations of which we are conscious. A peasant has not the capacity of enjoying equal happiness with a philosopher. A large glass and a small one may both be filled to the brim, yet the larger one holds more liquor than the small one.

3. Were the savage even content in his situation, it would still be wrong to infer from thence, with Rousseau, that he ought to be left in that situation. Man's vocation is happiness. So true it is that the most splendid paradoxes are frequently built upon undefined ideas; and that, in the investigation of philosophical subjects, the accurate discrimination of the terms employed is of the highest importance.

4. The result of Dr. Paley's inquiry into the nature of happiness, in bis Moral and Political Philosophy, is comprised in the following propositions.

I. Happiness does not consist in
i. Pleasures of sense,

Because they are of short duration at the time;
Because they cloy by repetition;

Because eagerness for intense delights takes away
relish for others.

These objections are valid, independently of loss of health, &c.

ii. In exemption from evils which are without, as labour, &c.

Because the mind must be employed.

Hence pain is sometimes a relief to the uneasiness of vacuity.

iii. In greatness, or elevated station.

Because the highest in rank are not happiest, and so in proportion.

Because superiority, where there is no competition, is seldom contemplated.

II. Happiness is to be judged of by the apparent happiness of mankind, which consists in

i. The exercise of the social affections.

ii. The exercise of the faculties of body or mind for an engaging end,

Because there is no happiness without something to hope for.

Those pleasures which are most valuable are most productive of engagement in the pursuit.

Therefore endeavours after happiness, in a future state, produce greater happiness in this world.

iii. In a prudent constitution of habits.

Habits of themselves are much the same, because what is habitual becomes nearly indifferent;

Therefore those habits are best which allow of indulgence in the deviation from them.

Hence that should not be chosen as a habit, which ought to be a refreshment.

Hence by a perpetual change the stock of happiness is soon exhausted.

iv. In health of body and good spirits.

Because necessary for the full enjoyment of every pleasure.

Because itself is a pleasure, perhaps the sole happiness of some animals.