Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and DemocracyCambridge University Press, 1 Ara 2005 - 267 sayfa Corruption is a threat to democracy and economic development in many societies. It arises in the ways people pursue, use and exchange wealth and power, and in the strength or weakness of the state, political and social institutions that sustain and restrain those processes. Differences in these factors, Michael Johnston argues, give rise to four major syndromes of corruption: Influence Markets, Elite Cartels, Oligarchs and Clans, and Official Moguls. In this 2005 book, Johnston uses statistical measures to identify societies in each group, and case studies to show that the expected syndromes do arise. Countries studied include the United States, Japan and Germany (Influence Markets); Italy, Korea and Botswana (Elite Cartels); Russia, the Philippines and Mexico (Oligarchs and Clans); and China, Kenya, and Indonesia (Offical Moguls). A concluding chapter explores reform, emphasising the ways familiar measures should be applied - or withheld, lest they do harm - with an emphasis upon the value of 'deep democratisation'. |
İçindekiler
Wealth power and corruption | 1 |
power consensus and policy | 16 |
Participation institutions and syndromes of corruption | 36 |
influence for rent decisions for sale | 60 |
how to buy friends and govern people | 89 |
we are family and youre not | 120 |
reach out and squeeze someone | 155 |
From analysis to reform | 186 |
Countries in each cluster and distances from statistical | 221 |
228 | |
257 | |
Diğer baskılar - Tümünü görüntüle
Sık kullanılan terimler ve kelime öbekleri
abuses affluent market democracies agendas anti-corruption Botswana bribery bribes bureaucratic campaigns chaebols chapter China citizens civil society cluster contrasts contributions corrupt deals Corruption Perceptions Index corruption syndromes countries credibility democratic dominated economic liberalization effective elections electoral Elite Cartel corruption enforcement Environmental Sustainability Index factions favors Federal Election Commission figures funds groups growth Human Rights Watch impunity incumbents indicators Indonesia Influence Market interests involved Italy Japan Johnston Kenya Korea leaders legitimate less levels major Marcos Mexico million money politics networks Official Moguls Oligarch and Clan opportunities organized crime participation and institutions parties percent Philippines political and economic political competition Political Corruption politicians Porta President presidential processes property rights reform regime Rose-Ackerman Russia scandals scores significant social strong Suharto sustained syndromes of corruption tangentopoli thru tion Transparency International violence weak institutions wealth and power
Popüler pasajlar
Sayfa 234 - Are Corruption and Taxation Really Harmful to Growth? Firm-Level Evidence," Policy Research Working Paper 2485, Washington, DC: World Bank.
Sayfa xii - Sciences, and a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow, at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey; for that opportunity and their support I gratefully acknowledge the Institute and NEH.