Sayfadaki görseller
PDF
ePub

Seventh Dialogue.-Locke's Theory of Abstraction.

113

term 'man' is not the mark to suggest a particular individual, as Peter and Paul, but is the proper sign of the abstract idea of man, the verbal token of that which is the mental image of each and all men. And hence, since words are only signs of ideas, since ideas must always underlie them, it follows that any general term, which does not convey to the mind an abstract idea of something, is idealess, and therefore nonsensical.

With these arguments, which we believe can all be derived from Locke, Alciphron makes short work of Christianity. Take, he observes, the term 'grace. It is a general term; it does not stand for any particular thing or individual object. It follows, therefore, that it must betoken some abstract idea, either of a quality common to objects, or of a class of objects capable of real being, or at least of something appertaining to many individuals, which can be drawn off, and formed into an abstract idea. But it is impossible to frame any such mental figure or idea, and, therefore, the term is idealess, and consequently absurd. In reply, Euphranor asks him to frame an abstract idea of the term 'force,' which signifies a quality common to many objects, which abstract idea, according to the hypothesis, is to be severed from all particular objects, and to suggest a distinct mental image. Alciphron finds this impossible; and is then requested to frame an abstract idea of triangle,' which shall not give the image of any particular triangle, but shall represent to the mind the entire class of three angled figures. Being here equally at fault-as, indeed, his master was before him-he is driven to admit that his demonstration is ' vain wisdom all and false philosophy,' that abstract ideas, as mental phenomena, cut off from all objects, are non-existent, or at least cannot be framed by Alciphron's process, and that, inasmuch as general terms are elements of language, which may either not convey ideas at all, but may be used to communicate emotions and feelings, or which, when taken in sentences, may convey notions or ideas quite distinct from any ideas that, taken apart, may underlie each term, they do not necessarily suggest to the mind any distinct image in each term set alone. How true this is of general terms will be evident to any one who takes up a sentence containing them. Thus in the text, man 'shall not live by bread, but by every word which cometh from 'the mouth of God,' it is evident that this conveys to the mind a notion of a law for man, but does not suggest to it any separate ideas of word or man.' And hence the doctrine, that every general term in language must, when used, suggest an abstract idea, is altogether futile; and so Alciphron's philosophy falls to the ground. We may here incidentally observe, that because in this and other places Berkeley assails Locke's theory of abstrac

NO. LI.

[ocr errors]

I

[ocr errors]

tion, and denies that abstract ideas can be formed by a kind of prescinding from particulars, it does not follow that he is a mere nominalist. On the contrary, he expressly admits that words are not the only cause of our forming general ideas; that general ideas, representing the conformity between individuals of the same sort, do exist, though not elaborated by abstraction; and, therefore, we apprehend he is to be classed as a conceptualist.

But further, Euphranor asks, Are not religious doctrines matters of faith? And does faith presuppose an intellectual perception of the ideas contained in the terms of each proposition we are called on to believe? If we believe that God is a Spirit,' do we 'wiredraw ideas' of 'God' and 'Spirit'? On the contrary, is not faith an assent to a proposition, or series of propositions, more or less determined by our moral faculties? Try religion and scepticism by the same test, with regard to this particular. Do not sceptics require faith in the proposition 'that fate rules the world? And yet does every one who believes in this adjust distinct ideas of fate and world'? It must be admitted this is not the case; and yet faith in the dogma may and does exist; for it is not a perception of the ideas of its terms, but a moral as well as an intellectual assent to any doctrine that really obtains for it extensive credit.

Alciphron now,

'Quite at a loss, for all his darts were spent,

takes refuge in fatalism. We quote the pith of Berkeley's refutation, as it is remarkably terse and lucid, and applies to this doctrine its only satisfactory solution, its utter negation in practice, that is, its confutation by man himself in all his dealings:

'Alciph. But still the question recurs, whether man be free?

'Euphr. To determine this question, ought we not first to determine what is meant by the word free?

'Alciph. We ought.

'Euphr. In my opinion, a man is said to be free, so far forth as he may do what he will. Is this so, or is it not?

[ocr errors]

Alciph. It seems so.

Euphr. Man, therefore, acting according to his will, may be accounted free.

'Alciph. This I admit to be true in the vulgar sense, but a philosopher goes higher, and inquires whether man be free to will.

[ocr errors]

Euphr. That is whether he can will, as he wills. I know not how philosophical it may be to ask the question, but it seems very unintelligible. The notions of guilt and merit, justice and reward, are, in the minds of men, antecedent to all metaphysical disquisitions; and

His Political Works.-The Querist.

115

according to these received natural notions it is not doubted that man is accountable, that he acts and is self-determined.'

Alciphron, having now made all his objections, collapses into universal scepticism. Tavтa úπoλntic is his arcanum, which perhaps some persons would not wish to have translated into 'everything is subjective.' The dialogue closes with some admirable remarks to which we can only refer. The following is quite in Butler's spirit: Whether the principles of Christians or infidels are truest 'may be made a question, but which are safest there can be none. Certainly if you doubt of all opinions, you must doubt of your 'own; and then, for aught you know, the Christian may be true. 'The more doubt, the more room for faith, a sceptic of all men 'having the least right to demand evidence. But, whatever uncertainty there may be about other points, thus much is 'certain either there is, or is not a God: there is, or is not a 'Revelation: man either is, or is not an agent: the soul is, or is 'not, immortal. If the negatives are not sure, the affirmatives are possible. If the negatives are improbable, the affirmatives ' are probable. In proportion as any of your ingenious men finds 'himself unable to prove any one of these negatives he hath 'grounds to suppose he is mistaken.' The practical conclusion of course is, that, even on the sceptic's own principles, where there is room for doubt, that faith should be adopted which is most for man's welfare. The point is thus put in the Analogy: 'number'less instances might be mentioned respecting the common pur'suits of life where a man would be thought distracted, and that ' in a literal sense, who would not act, and with great application 'too, not only upon an even chance, but even upon much less' of the credibility of that which had determined his conduct.

The principal political work of Berkeley is the Querist, a series of problems, suggested by the condition of Ireland in the author's time. It well illustrates the truth of an observation in it 'that 'an early habit of reflection, though obtained by speculative 'sciences, may have its use in practical affairs.' In our judgment the Querist is the clearest exponent of the social state of Ireland in the middle of the last century, and contains the wisest appreciation of its distempers, and their remedies, that can be met with. It is almost free from the tone of sectarianism, and prejudice of caste, which characterises the works of every Anglo-Irish Protestant of this period; it is distinguished from all contemporaneous writings in its liberality to the Irish Roman Catholic nation, and in its identifying the welfare of Ireland with that of all classes in it; and if it wants boldness in its details of abuses and plans for improvement, this must be attributed to the sensitive modesty of Berkeley's disposition. It shows also an insight into

the leading truths of political economy, which is surprising in the case of one who preceded Adam Smith by a full generation. When it was written, Ireland was probably the worst governed and most miserable dependency of the crown. The penal laws were doing their work in deepening and making impassable the lines of demarcation between the dominant and the subject races in that country, in checking the free transfer of landed property, banishing from it industry and capital, and embittering the relations between the owners and occupiers of the soil. The restrictions too upon commercial and manufacturing enterprise in Ireland were checking severely the natural growth of its opulence. Already the results were becoming apparent. Already, in an embarrassed and domineering proprietary; in middleman tenures chaining the soil in feudal fetters; in a degraded peasantry eking out life in the potato; in undeveloped industrial resources; in class hatreds and sectarian animosities, were to be traced the symptoms of that social disorganization, of which the historian. of the last ten years will write the catastrophe, and, let us hope, the epitaph. Berkeley's thoughts on the subject may be classed under three heads-1. Political; 2. Economical; and 3. National. One extract, which is all for which we can afford space, relates to our author's economic views.

'Whether the four elements, and man's labour therein, be not the true source of wealth?

'Whether money is to be considered as having an intrinsic value, or as being a commodity, or standard, or measure, or a pledge, as is variously suggested by writers? And whether the true idea of money, as such, be not altogether that of a ticket or counter ?

'Whether a fertile land, and the industry of its inhabitants, would not prove inexhaustible funds of real wealth, be the counters for vending thereof what you will, paper, gold, or silver?

'Whether even gold and silver, if they should lessen the industry of its inhabitants, would not be ruinous to a country? And whether Spain be not an instance of this ?.

'Whether the real foundations of wealth be not laid in the numbers, the frugality, and the industry of the people? And whether all attempts to enrich a nation by other means, as raising the coin, stockjobbing, and the like acts, are not vain?

Whether it be not agreed, that paper hath in many respects the advantage over coin, as being of more dispatch in payments, more easily transferred, preserved, and recovered when lost ?

'Whether the credit of the public funds be not a mine of gold to England? And whether any step that should lessen this credit, ought not to be dreaded?

Whether money lying dead in the bank of Amsterdam would not be as useless as in the mine?

Contrast between his Method and that of Butler. 117

'Whether it would not be folly to think that inward commerce cannot enrich a state, because it doth not increase its quantity of gold and silver? And whether it is possible a country should not thrive, while wants are supplied, and business goes on?

Whether the general rule of determining commerce by its balance, doth not, like other general rules, admit of exceptions ?

'Whether it would not be a monstrous folly to import nothing but gold and silver, supposing we might do it, from every foreign port to which we trade? And yet whether some men may not think this foolish circumstance a very happy one?

'Whether he must not be a wrongheaded patriot, or politician, whose ultimate view was drawing money into a country, and keeping it there ?

Whether it would not be a silly project in any nation, to hope to grow rich by prohibiting the exportation of gold and silver?

'Whether keeping cash at home, or sending it abroad, just as it must seem to promote industry, be not the real interest of every nation ?'

Some of the observations in this treatise, when viewed in the light of existing knowledge, and from our present standing point of experience, may appear commonplace. But we venture to think that it is far beyond the reach of any contemporaneous writer on the social science. Its thorough appreciation of the true sources of wealth, of the fallacies of the old mercantile theory of economics, and of the necessity of just government for the Irish nation, are, in our judgment, not to be found so clearly developed by any other thinker before Adam Smith. It is curious how little comparative popularity the Querist enjoyed, when contrasted with the coarse and able, but grossly ignorant Drapier's Letters. But time has separated the chaff from the wheat. It may also be observed that Chesterfield was an admirer of Berkeley's work; and Chesterfield was the first viceroy of Ireland, from 1688 to 1745, who advocated an enlightened and just policy towards that country.

Looking at Berkeley, generally, we do not rank him in the first-class of metaphysical thinkers. His is rather the credit of carrying out the theory of subjective idealism to its logical consequences, regardless of any difficulties involved in the process. We have already given our reasons for rejecting the entire theory as fallacious, and as based upon an hypothesis that is utterly untrue. Nor can it be doubted that Berkeley's philosophy, like every other system that rests upon the old sophistical tenet that every man is the measure of all things,' leads directly to scepticism. But as a metaphysical writer his merits are of the highest order. So perfect and delightful a style, logical in all its deductions, copious and clear in all its illustrations, has rarely adorned

« ÖncekiDevam »