 To have the sense of virtue is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction.  Mind - Sayfa 421892Tam görünüm - Bu kitap hakkında
 | Don Garrett Associate Professor of Philosophy University of Utah - 1996 - 289 sayfa
...from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. . .. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. (THN 471) In Treatise III.iii.l ("Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices"), however, and again... | |
 | Andrews Reath - 1997 - 438 sayfa
...mechanism, producing feelings that are then projected onto the people we are judging. To quote Hume, "We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous" (Treatise, III, i, 2, 471). However, natural sentiments are not, on Hume's view, straightforwardly... | |
 | Dacia Maraini - 2000 - 268 sayfa
...constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgements concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations.... | |
 | Nicholas Rescher - 1998 - 228 sayfa
...constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no further; nor do we inquire into the cause of the satisfaction. WE DO NOT INFER a character to be virtuous BECAUSE...particular manner we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations.... | |
 | David J. Peterson - 1999 - 214 sayfa
...constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no further, nor do we inquire into the cause of the satisfaction, we do not infer a character to be virtuous because...that it pleases after such a particular manner we in effect/ee/ it is virtuous. The case is the same in our judgements concerning all kinds of beauty, tastes... | |
 | William Joseph FitzPatrick - 2000 - 410 sayfa
...to twentieth century emotivism. For example, "morality.... is more properly felt than judged of, and "we do not infer a character to be virtuous because...particular manner we in effect feel that it is virtuous" (Treatise, III. 1. II); or again: "language must. ...invent a peculiar set of terms in order to express... | |
 | John Rawls, Barbara Herman - 2000 - 408 sayfa
...judged. Several points support this second view. It is suggested at one place when Hume says (T:471): "We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous." If we take the "feel that" here as expressing a judgment, we have a projectivist interpretation of... | |
 | Donald Davidson - 2001 - 360 sayfa
...contemplation of a character', he also held that The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration . . . We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgements concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations.... | |
 | Frederick Ferre - 2001 - 388 sayfa
...constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations... | |
 | Bo Mou - 2001 - 404 sayfa
...constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no further; nor do we inquire into the cause of the satisfaction. WE DO NOT INFER a character to be virtuous BECAUSE...particular manner we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations.... | |
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