 To have the sense of virtue is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction.  Mind - Sayfa 421892Tam görünüm - Bu kitap hakkında
 | Christina Petsoulas - 2001 - 220 sayfa
...constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations.... | |
 | Gilles Deleuze - 1991 - 188 sayfa
...analogically the form of the exposition of transcendence.61 There is no inference to be drawn in this case. "We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous."62 Ethics admits the idea as a factor only of the relevant circumstances and accepts the... | |
 | Austin Sarat - 2009 - 179 sayfa
...this symmetry gives rise confirms its moral correctness. In A Treatise on Human Nature, Hume argues, We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds... | |
 | Lene Østermark-Johansen - 2003 - 182 sayfa
...from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. [...] We do not infer a character to be virtuous because...particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes and sensations.... | |
 | Alexander Broadie - 2003 - 386 sayfa
...the accusation that he is a hedonist. Perhaps the best interpretation is given by Hume when he says: 'We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that is virtuous.'16 It is the particular character of the moral pleasure that makes us approve of benevolence,... | |
 | David Hume - 2003 - 484 sayfa
...constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that 'tis virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes,... | |
 | Jerrold Levinson - 2005 - 844 sayfa
...virtuous or vicious; why? because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind . . . We do not infer a character to be virtuous because it pleases: ... in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous.... | |
 | Kathy McReynolds - 2004 - 106 sayfa
...discovered by the special feeling of moral approval which is directed upon them. Hume states further that "we do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous.42 According to Hume. then, both moral distinctions and personal merit fall wholly within... | |
 | Brian G. Henning - 2005 - 276 sayfa
...constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations. 14... | |
 | 陳榮華、傅佩榮、關永中、楊金穆, 蔡信安、林照田、林火旺、楊植勝 - 2006 - 352 sayfa
...constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because...particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous." (Treatise, 3.1.2.3: 303) Treatise, 3.1.27: 302. WffS?Kl&&& ' 0M^ <t&^> f^H^ 距太大， 如何轉移呢?... | |
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