| Manuel García Pazos - 1999 - 268 sayfa
...Wünschenswerte, weil es allein gewünscht wird, denn die utilitaristische Ethik beruht wesentlich darauf, „ that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends" .537 Dagegen scheint jedoch die Tatsache zu sprechen, daß die Menschen noch nach etwas anderem als... | |
| Bina Gupta - 2002 - 294 sayfa
...and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory...promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling... | |
| Various - 2002 - 596 sayfa
...and pleasure, and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory...utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.... | |
| Mark Timmons - 2002 - 318 sayfa
...standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said. . . . But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory...from pain, are the only things desirable as ends. (Mill [1863] 1979, 7) However, Mill's version of hedonism makes an important departure from the version... | |
| Marcus George Singer - 2002 - 362 sayfa
...not it is true, as Mill claims in that same rich paragraph, that 'these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory...freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends' This is part of what I attempt here. I believe that Mill was right to distinguish different qualities... | |
| Slavko Splichal - 2002 - 254 sayfa
...central to utility as a moral standard, he immediately emphasized that "these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory...from pain, are the only things desirable as ends" (Mill 1863, 10). Mill criticized Bentham's abstract utilitarianism striving, as it did, for an increase... | |
| Mark Timmons - 2002 - 308 sayfa
...standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said. . . . But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory...namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the oiJy thmgs desirable as ends. (Mill [1S63| 1979,7) However, Mill's version of hedonism makes an important... | |
| Linda C. Raeder - 2002 - 418 sayfa
..."privation of pleasure." The philosophical basis or ground of the doctrine is the "theory of life" that "pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only...things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things . . . are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of... | |
| G. W. Smith - 2002 - 322 sayfa
...utility principle, according to Gray, is an axiological principle defining the end of human conduct, namely 'that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends', not a moral axiom that we maximize happiness.29 The individuality of self-development, which Mill praises... | |
| Otfried Höffe - 2002 - 348 sayfa
...happiness can be calculated. now at the value-theoretical presupposition of such a calculation. the idea that "pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends" (Mill t979 [t86t]. chap. 2).1 Not least. utilitarianism has been accused of not providing a satisfactory... | |
| |